Essays on intervention, speculation and sentiment in the foreign exchange market by Mao, Xuxin
Glasgow Theses Service 
http://theses.gla.ac.uk/ 
theses@gla.ac.uk 
 
 
 
 
Mao, Xuxin (2015) Essays on intervention, speculation and sentiment in 
the foreign exchange market. PhD thesis. 
 
 
http://theses.gla.ac.uk/6674/ 
 
 
Copyright and moral rights for this thesis are retained by the author 
 
A copy can be downloaded for personal non-commercial research or 
study, without prior permission or charge 
 
This thesis cannot be reproduced or quoted extensively from without first 
obtaining permission in writing from the Author 
 
The content must not be changed in any way or sold commercially in any 
format or medium without the formal permission of the Author 
 
When referring to this work, full bibliographic details including the 
author, title, awarding institution and date of the thesis must be given. 
 
  
 
 
 
Essays on Intervention, Speculation and 
Sentiment in the Foreign Exchange Market 
 
 
 
Xuxin Mao 
 
 
 
 
Submitted in fulfillment of the requirements for the Degree of 
Doctor of Philosophy 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Department of Economics 
Adam Smith Business School 
University of Glasgow 
2015 
 
Abstract
The purpose of this thesis is to analyse the interaction of currency inter-
vention, speculation and sentiment, and their inuence on the exchange rate
dynamics across the developed and developing countries.
This thesis tackles the three factors attributable to the unsolved issues in
the eld, i.e., the lack of proper data set or proxies, theoretical foundation,
and structural models. After reviewing the related literature, microstructure
frameworks are built with theoretical set-ups, e.g., the international parities,
the forward rate bias and central bank credibility. Then the transmission
channels of currency interventions, the reaction functions of central banks,
and the impacts of the speculators activity and psychology are examined
with cointegrated VAR methodology. In doing so, this thesis o¤ers thorough
structural and identied analyses of the developed and developing country
currencies in a joint theoretical framework.
Therefore, this thesis lls some methodological, theoretical and empiri-
cal gaps in the eld of international nance. Furthermore, it provides not
only suggestions for future empirical and theoretical research but also policy
implications for central banks across developed and developing countries.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
Abstract
This chapter describes some fundamental aspects of the research on currency intervention,
speculation and sentiment in the foreign exchange market, and provides an overview of the
background, structure and ndings of the main chapters.
1.1 Assessment of Unresolved Issues
After decades of economic research on exchange rates, it is still not easy
to explain the mechanism of the exchange rate dynamics, with gaps in the
eld. Monetary authorities across developed and developing countries still
need to understand the interactions between the exchange rate dynamics,
market conditions and investorspositions, and through which channel their
intervention policies can have impact. Investors, especially speculators, are
adjusting their currency portfolio allocation according to the exchange rate
movements and currency interventions. This thesis analyses currency inter-
vention, speculation and sentiment to shed some light on the exchange rate
dynamics.
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1.1.1 Assessment of Issues related to Currency Intervention
Central banks began to conduct currency interventions even before the es-
tablishment of the classical gold standard era (Bordo et al., 2007). However,
despite decades of practices and economic research, there is hardly any con-
sensus on the e¤ectiveness of currency interventions, with many questions
related to currency intervention yet to be answered.
Vitale (2007) attributes the puzzling phenomena to several issues. Firstly,
the adequate o¢ cial intervention data is still sparse. Secondly, most analyses
lack a theoretical foundation of the market microstructure to explain the in-
teractions of currency interventions, currency values and market conditions.
Thirdly, most studies on currency intervention are based on non-structural
models which can not avoid simultaneity and identication problems. There
have been few studies with identied models to analyse the e¤ects of inter-
ventions on the exchange rate dynamics.
With a clear theoretical foundation and market microstructure, this thesis
adopts identied and structural models to analyse currency intervention. We
use only o¢ cial intervention data from central banks, instead of data from
balance sheets or news reports, which denes clear scales and directions of
currency intervention. However, this means there are limited choices when
it comes to analysing the e¤ects of currency intervention and the reaction
function of central banks. Hence this thesis focuses Japan and Mexico, the
few countries with long and persistent interventions.
This thesis rst adopts a Uncovered Interest Parity and Purchasing Power
Parity framework proposed by Juselius and MacDonald (2004), to test the
e¤ectiveness of the Japanese currency interventions through the portfolio bal-
ance and signalling channels. Then it builds a market microstructure model
to analyse the exchange rate dynamics through the coordination channel, and
uses the stylised facts of the forward rate bias to further test the e¤ective-
ness of the signalling channel. The results on the currency interventions and
12
exchange rate dynamics provide clear theoretical underpinnings for future
studies.
In the spirit of early identied and structural studies, e.g., Kim (2003),
Kearns and Rigobon (2005), this thesis uses cointegrated VAR models to sys-
tematically analyse the exchange rate dynamics, currency intervention and
market conditions. Through the identied and structural approach, this the-
sis tests and formulates potential long-term relations with respect to the ef-
fectiveness of the transmission channels and the factors that inuence central
banksreactions. Finally, the short- and long-run e¤ects of currency inter-
vention and market conditions on the exchange rate dynamics are examined.
1.1.2 Assessment on Issues related to Speculation and Sentiment
To further tackle the questions related to currency intervention raised by
Vitale (2007), this thesis considers the activities and psychology of other
market participants, especially the speculators. Some studies on currency
intervention have noted the interactions between intervention, speculation
and sentiment in the foreign exchange market. For example, Neuman (1984)
suggests that the aim of currency intervention is to reduce the incentive for
speculators. Ito (2005) also documents that currency speculators and central
banks are at odds with each other in terms of the direction of exchange
rate movements. While Dooley and Shafer (1983) and Le Baron (1999) nd
that currency speculators benet from the market ine¢ ciency created by
the interventions, Ito (2002) demonstrates that central banks also generate
revenues through their intervention operations.
However, largely due to the data availability problem, the research on
speculation and sentiment in the foreign exchange market is still sparse. If
transaction data can not be accessed, proxies for speculation have to be con-
sidered. Furthermore, indices are needed to reect the expectations of spec-
ulators on the currency market conditions. To measure currency speculation
and sentiment, this thesis proposes to use data from the Commitment of
13
Traders reports.
Although some researchers, e.g., Corrado et al. (2007), start using models
motivated by recent developments in behavioural nance, most studies on
currency intervention, speculation and sentiment still lack a solid theoretical
foundation. With research progresses related to nancial market microstruc-
tures, it is possible to construct microstructure models for the coordination
channel. Based on theoretical settings of the forward rate bias and central
bank credibility, this thesis also tests the e¤ectiveness of the signalling chan-
nel.
Furthermore, there is no research employing structural relations of cur-
rency intervention, speculation and sentiment in identied models. It is im-
portant to tackle the simultaneity issue on currency intervention and iden-
tify the impact of speculation and sentiment under di¤erent market condi-
tions. By constructing a structural and identied model this thesis provides
a promising way to tackle the simultaneity problem. It also o¤ers a new
approach to formulate an identied model for currency intervention and the
transactions and psychology of currency speculators.
1.2 Overview of Main Chapters
This section o¤ers an overview of the main chapters of this thesis, covering
chapters on literature review, theoretical and empirical analyses of currency
intervention, speculation and sentiment.
1.2.1 Brief Overview of Chapter 2
Chapter 2 presents a review of related literature on currency intervention,
speculation and sentiment, and illustrates the relations between the existing
literature and the studies in the following chapters.
Currency intervention is a common occurrence in the foreign exchange
market and becomes a prolic research topic in international nance. How-
14
ever, there are still many limitations in the current studies. Using non-
structural models, traditional research on currency intervention focuses on
developed country currencies and two transmission channels, i.e., the portfolio
balance and signalling channels. There are few studies on currency interven-
tion in developing and emerging countries because of the limited availability
of the o¢ cial intervention data.
Besides covering papers that adopt traditional time series and event study
methods, this chapter reviews recent papers using identied methodology to
systematically analyse the exchange rate dynamics with currency intervention
and fundamental macroeconomic variables. Meanwhile, this chapter presents
a detailed review on three transmission channels, including the coordination
channel which incorporates market microstructure measuring interactions be-
tween central banks and currency speculators.
Although the activities and emotion of speculators can not be ignored
when it comes to analysing the exchange rate dynamics, the related research
has been limited by the data availability problem. Suitable indices for specu-
lation and sentiment in nancial markets are documented for empirical stud-
ies.
The chapter begins with a historical review of currency intervention across
developed and developing countries. It then reviews the studies on the
transmission channels of currency intervention, i.e., the portfolio balance,
signalling and coordination channels. Some important theoretical set-ups
and empirical ndings related to the main channels are presented and com-
pared. This chapter also presents four groups of estimation methods for
analysing currency intervention, i.e., low-frequency time series, event study,
high-frequency time series, and identied models. The sections on specula-
tion and sentiment describes the interactions of currency intervention and
speculation, and various sentiment measures in the foreign exchange mar-
ket. In the end, this chapter describes the connections between the present
literature and the main chapters of this thesis.
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1.2.2 Brief Overview of Chapter 3
Chapter 3 analyses the e¤ects of intervention, speculation and sentiment on
the JPY/USD rate between April 1991 and August 2008. During the period,
there were 318 days of solo interventions initiated by the Japanese monetary
authorities, and 22 days of coordinated interventions conducted by Japan
and the USA.
In Japan, the Ministry of Finance makes decisions on currency interven-
tion, and the Japans central bank, the Bank of Japan, implements interven-
tions. While in the USA, the Treasury decides whether to step in the foreign
exchange market, and, together with the Federal Reserve Bank of New York,
imposes interventions.
Although numerous studies have addressed the e¤ects of currency interven-
tion on the JPY/USD rate, few are based on a solid theoretical framework.
To remedy the problem, this chapter tests the portfolio balance e¤ects of
currency intervention in the context of the international parity framework
proposed by Juselius and MacDonald (2004). While the e¤ects of currency
intervention are dependent on the market conditions, especially the activities
and psychology of speculators, there have been few studies on the interactions
of currency intervention, speculation and sentiment. This chapter addresses
currency speculation with a COT sentiment index and test its e¤ects together
with currency intervention.
This chapter starts with a review of related literature on the portfolio
balance and coordination channels, and currency speculation and sentiment.
Then it presents a theoretical framework of international parity conditions for
testing the portfolio balance channel, and o¤ers a microstructure framework
for testing the coordination channel with consideration of currency specula-
tion and sentiment. After an illustration of related data and international
parity conditions, the chapter shows the testing criteria for the transmission
channels. Accordingly, it tests the long-run parity conditions to see whether
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the requirement for the e¤ectiveness of the portfolio balance channel is ful-
lled. With variables related to the currency intervention, speculation and
sentiment, the e¤ectiveness of the portfolio balance and coordination channels
are examined.
This chapter generates some important results. While the U.S. currency
interventions were not e¤ective, the rejection of nonstationarity of the UIP
condition provided prerequisite for the e¤ectiveness of the Japanese currency
interventions through the portfolio balance channel. Indeed, the Japanese
interventions had both short- and long-term e¤ects on the exchange rate
through the portfolio balance channel. Furthermore, they were e¤ective
through the coordination channel.
The results provide suggestions for studies on the intervention, speculation
and sentiment related to the JPY/USD rate. The Japanese interventions can
be analysed in several regimes classied by intervention patterns. Further-
more, the e¤ectiveness of the signalling channel should be analysed, and more
factors, e.g., the forward rate bias, exchange rate volatility, could be consid-
ered to provide more explanatory powers of the dynamics of the JPY/USD
rate.
1.2.3 Brief Overview of Chapter 4
This chapter o¤ers a follow-up of the study on the Japanese currency inter-
vention, speculation and sentiment in Chapter 3. It examines three separate
intervention regimes between 1991 and 2004 in an innovative microstructure
framework.
The o¢ cial intervention data is available from 1991, and there have been
only three o¢ cial interventions since 2004 (Bordo et al., 2012). The rst
regime, from 1st April 1991 to 20th June 1995, was characterized by small-
scale but frequent interventions (Ito, 2005). The second regime, between
21st June 1995 and 14th January 2003, featured very large-scale but infre-
quent interventions initiated by Eisuke Sakakibara and Haruhiko Kuroda
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(Ito and Yabu, 2007). The third regime between 15th January 2003 and
16th March 2004 was labeled as the "Great Intervention" (Taylor, 2006), and
characterised by large-scale and highly frequent interventions implemented
by Zenbee Mizoguchi.
The main aim of this chapter is to jointly test on the coordination and sig-
nalling channels in an identied and structural framework. Firstly, it provides
background information on the intervention regimes, and new theoretical
frameworks to analyse the interactions of currency intervention, speculation
and sentiment. Then it tests the e¤ectiveness of the signalling channel by
examining the forward rate bias and central bank credibility. Meanwhile, the
tests on the coordination channel are based on a new microstructure model
which considers the interactions between central banks and currency specu-
lators. All the main empirical tests use the cointegrated VAR methodology,
and the empirical results are summarised and compared for future research
and policy implications.
There are several important ndings based on the analysis of this chapter.
Firstly, the shocks to the bond yield di¤erential were the driving force of
the dynamics of the JYP/USD rate, and had strong long-run impact on
speculation and sentiment. Secondly, with respect to the reaction function
of the central bank, the interventions happened in clusters, and were the
reactions to the sharp JPY appreciation. Between 2003 and 2004, the central
bank also reacted to the large speculation position and high sentiment on
Yens appreciation. Thirdly, the signalling channel was e¤ective when the
interventions were frequent. Fourthly, the speculation and sentiment showed
strong e¤ects on the changes in the exchange rate, and the coordination
channel worked when the changes in exchange rate volatility were slow.
1.2.4 Brief Overview of Chapter 5
Using similar frameworks to those formed in Chapter 4 on the JPY/USD
rate, Chapter 5 provides a unique examination on the Mexican currency in-
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terventions between 1998 and 2009, and compares exchange rate dynamic
mechanisms across developed and developing countries. Together with the
research in previous chapters, this chapter o¤ers suggestions for related em-
pirical and theoretical research and potential policy implications for central
banks.
Contrary to the reduction of the currency interventions in advanced economies,
interventions in developing countries are frequent and sometimes in very large
amounts (Guimaraes and Karacadag, 2006). However, there have been few
studies on currency intervention in developing countries, partially due to the
lack of publicly available time series data (Menkho¤, 2013).
As an exception, the Mexican central bank has published its o¢ cial in-
tervention data since the Peso oated in December 1994. The Mexican in-
terventions can also be classied into three regimes. The rst period, from
October 1997 to June 2001, featured small and infrequent interventions. In
the second regime from May 2003 to mid September 2008, the interventions
were small but frequent, and the exchange rate volatility was relativity low.
The third regime covered September 2008 to December 2009, a period where
the exchange rate volatility was very high. The interventions were large and
frequent, but their volume was decreasing with the improving economic con-
ditions.
As a corollary to the frameworks created in Chapter 4, Chapter 5 analyses
the e¤ects of Mexican currency intervention, speculation and sentiment using
the same methodology, and produces some similar ndings. While the sig-
nalling channel was e¤ective when the Mexican interventions were frequent,
the coordination channel was e¤ective when there was no sharp change in the
exchange rate volatility, and the small and infrequent currency interventions
did not work through either channel.
However, the di¤erence across developed and developing countries are
hardly unnoticeable. While the Japanese monetary authorities mainly re-
acted to the sharp appreciation in YEN, their Mexican counterparts focused
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the high speculation and sentiment on Pesos appreciation and the increasing
exchange rate volatility. While the bond yield di¤erential drove the dynamics
of the JPY/USD rate, currency speculation and sentiment played a similar
role in changing the MXN/USD rate.
1.3 Summary
There have been many unanswered questions related to currency intervention,
speculation and sentiment during the post Bretton Woods period. The lack
of three factors, i.e., proper data set or proxies, theoretical foundations, and
structural models, are the main obstacles of the empirical studies in the eld.
This thesis tackles these issues, and reveals the powers of the identied
cointegrated VAR modeling technique and microstructure framework to ex-
plain the exchange rate dynamics across developed and developing countries.
By examining the transmission channels of currency intervention and the in-
teractions between central banks and speculators, this thesis o¤ers a new way
to analyse intervention, speculation and sentiment in the foreign exchange
market.
The study provides not only potential directions for related empirical and
theoretical research, but also policy implications for central banks across
developed and developing countries.
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Chapter 2
Literature Review on Currency
Intervention, Speculation and
Sentiment
Abstract
Most studies on currency intervention focus on two transmission channels, i.e., portfolio
balance and signalling channels. They normally use non-structural models to analyse the
dynamics of developed country currencies. This chapter reviews the related research and
recent developments in the area of currency intervention, speculation and sentiment. The
recent advances include studies using identied methodology to systematically analyse the
e¤ects of interventions with fundamental variables. They also include studies on the coordi-
nation channel and market microstructure, which treat intervention as order ow of a central
bank. Given that the order ow data is not always available, di¤erent sentiment indices are
examined as potential proxies for currency speculation and sentiment. This chapter ends
with suggestions for future research directions.
2.1 Introduction
Currency intervention has a long history and is still an important research
topic in international nance. Using non-structural methods, numerous pa-
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pers have analysed the e¤ectiveness of traditional transmission channels, i.e.,
portfolio balance and signalling channels, for currency interventions in de-
veloped countries. Recently, identied models have been introduced to sys-
tematically analyse the e¤ects of interventions with fundamental variables
and a new transmission channel, the coordination channel, has emerged from
market microstructure studies. While Order ows of speculators and central
banks are needed, there is often a data availability problem. Therefore, dif-
ferent sentiment indices in the nancial markets are reviewed and proxies for
speculation in the foreign exchange market are proposed.
This chapter begins with a brief historical review of currency intervention
across developed and developing countries. After reviewing the studies on
the main transmission channels, i.e., portfolio balance, signalling, and coor-
dination channels, it examines four groups of estimation methodology, i.e.,
low-frequency time series, even study, high-frequency time series, and identi-
ed models. The chapter ends with summarization of literature review and
suggestions for future research.
2.2 Currency Intervention
2.2.1 Brief Historical Review of Currency Intervention
Currency intervention is dened as the purchases and sales of foreign curren-
cies by the monetary authorities in order to inuence the exchange rate level
or volatility. It dates back to the time before the classical gold standard era
was established (Bordo et al., 2007). Although both bimetallic U.S. and its
European counterparts were involved in currency interventions, it was the Eu-
ropean central banks that rst developed some intervention techniques. The
techniques were adopted in the currency interventions in the classical gold
standard era (1870-1913) and the following gold exchange standard era until
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the Great Depression1. After active currency interventions during the Tri-
partite Agreement period (1934-1939)2, currency interventions became rare
until the last era of the Bretton Woods system (1961-1973).
The antecedents of modern currency interventions normally adopted ad-
ministrative approaches to a¤ect the gold import and export point positions.
These approaches included direct restrictions on gold exchanges, and indirect
monetary policy changes through changes in interest rate or purchases and
sales of foreign currencies. The latter approach is still used by the modern
unsterilised currency interventions. Although the fall of the gold exchange
regime became inevitable with increasing misalignments of gold bloc curren-
cies, currency interventions did have some e¤ects in slowing down its collaps-
ing speed.
The free oat system (1973-1984) emerged with the ending of the Bret-
ton Woods system. In this system, unsterilised currency interventions were
frequently used, but not in large amounts. This contrasted with the man-
aged oat period (1985-1996), which was featured with large interventions.
In September 1985, after a strong overvaluation of USD and devaluation of
JPY, the G53 leaders made an agreement at the Plaza hotel in New York
to bring down the highly appreciated USD through coordinated currency in-
terventions. The G7 meeting in 1987 at Louvre led to an entente showing
the intent of coordinated intervention on the low-valued US dollar. After
the Plaza and Louvre currency accords, automatically sterilised currency in-
terventions became regular and sometimes very heavy (Obstfeld, 1990). In
the U.S., the Treasury made decisions with consultation of Federal Reserve
Board. Then the Federal Reserve Bank of New York and the Treasury to-
gether conducted interventions. In Japan, the Ministry of Finance made
1Shortly after issuing the Yen, Japan adopted the gold standard from October 1897 to December 1931.
2An international gold settlements system was rst established by French, UK and US to x the exchange
rates at the gold standard. Swiss, Netherlands and Belgium later joined the system.
3G5 (Group of Five) meant France, Japan, the United Kingdom and the United States. It became G7 in
1987 after including Italy and Canada, and G8 in 1997 with Russia as a new member.
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decisions followed by interventions imposed by the Bank of Japan.
Japan initiated 340 interventions between 1991 and 2004, 22 of which were
coordinated with the US. There have been three active intervention regimes
in Japan since the Japanese o¢ cial intervention data was disclosed in April
1991. The rst regime between April 1991 and June 1995 was featured with
frequent but small-scale interventions (Ito, 2005). The second regime started
after Eisuke Sakakibara took charge of interventions on 21 June 1995 and was
characterised by large-scale but infrequent interventions. Haruhiko Kuroda
continued with the similar strategy while he was in charge of interventions
between 8th July 1999 and 14th January 2003 (Ito and Yabu, 2007). The
third regime, labelled as the Great Intervention (Taylor, 2006), covered
the period between 15th January 2003 and 31th March 2004. The precarious
economic condition in Japan forced Zenbee Mizoguchi to conduct frequent
and large scale interventions.
O¢ cial currency interventions in advanced economies have been in steady
decline. After March 2004, among all G7 central banks, only the Bank of
Japan has conducted four solo currency interventions. Other G7 central
banks only stepped in the currency market only once to support the Japanese
counterpart after the Great East Japan earthquake (Bordo et al, 2012).
However, the situation is quite di¤erent in developing countries. Canales-
Kriljenko (2006) nds that 91 percent of the 76 responding central banks
conduct currency interventions. The central banks in developing countries
intervene in the foreign exchange market frequently and sometimes with very
large amounts (Guimaraes and Karacadag, 2006). The interventions are
aimed to correct currency misalignment in terms of levels or rates, smooth
uctuations by reducing exchange rate volatility, accumulate international
reserves to fence o¤ speculative attacks, or provide liquidity to the markets.
There is severe lack of research on intervention in developing countries. This
is partially due to the lack of publicly available o¢ cial intervention data
(Menkho¤, 2013) although about 65 percent of emerging market members of
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IMF publish intervention data in some way (IMF, 2010).
As one of the few central banks of developing countries that regularly
publish o¢ cial intervention data, the Mexican central bank (Banxico) has
been actively intervened in the foreign exchange rate market since the Peso
was forced to oat in December 1994. There have been three di¤erent in-
tervention regimes in Mexico. From October 1997 to June 2000, while accu-
mulating international reserves, Banxico undertook several daily USD sales
up to 0.2 billion and some discretionary interventions to ease the volatility
of the MXN/USD rate (Sidaoui, 2005). After the rst intervention regime,
there was no o¢ cial intervention until May 2003. In the second regime from
May 2003 to August 2008, Banxico sold USD directly in the foreign exchange
market via daily auctions to slow down the pace of international reserve accu-
mulation. The interventions of the third regime, started in September 2008,
were to ease the impact of the nancial crisis. Banxico sold USD through
daily auctions and several discretionary interventions to provide liquidity and
reduce exchange rate volatility (Quintanilla et al., 2012).
2.2.2 Theoretical Background: The Transmission Channels
Currency intervention can be classied either as unsterilised or sterilised. Un-
sterilised currency interventions inuence the foreign exchange market mainly
through the changes in the monetary supply. According to the open macro-
economic models, unsterilised intervention is not an independent policy tool
but a standard monetary policy tool. On the contrary, sterilised currency
interventions o¤set any changes in monetary base through immediate open
market operations, e.g., buying or selling domestic bonds in the opposite
direction. Therefore, they are widely regarded to be independent from mone-
tary policies and may work through the main transmission channels, i.e., the
portfolio balance, signalling, and coordination channels.
Although there were some exceptions in Japan between 2003 and 2004
when the currency interventions and monetary expansions were parallel (Ito,
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2007), most currency interventions in Japan, the US and many other devel-
oped countries are sterilised (Sarno and Taylor, 2002). Sterilised interventions
and their transmission channels are the focus of this thesis.
The Portfolio Balance Channel
As a classic transmission channel, the portfolio balance channel (Isard, 1980;
Branson, 1984; and Kumhof, 2010) is based on the assumptions that the Ri-
cardian condition4 does not hold true and bonds in di¤erent currencies are not
perfect substitutes. Within the portfolio balance framework, investors bal-
ance their portfolio among assets denominated in di¤erent currencies, based
on the relative expected returns of their assets. Through the channel, ster-
ilised interventions can alter the assets within the monetary authoritiesbal-
ance sheets. Without changes in the monetary base, the domestic interest
rates stay unchanged. Therefore, the spot exchange rate shifts in order to
a¤ect the domestic value of foreign assets and the expected returns from
holding them (Sarno and Taylor, 2002).
The portfolio balance models can be seen as dynamic exchange rate deter-
mination models based on the interactions of asset markets, current account
balance, and rates of asset accumulation. This idea can be illustrated with a
simple exchange rate equation5:
st= X t+ [Et (st+1j
t) st] +"t; (2.1)
where st is the spot exchange rate, Xt the fundamental factors, e.g., interest
rates, monetary supply, current account, and 
t the currently available in-
formation set. Hence, the exchange rate is determined by the fundamental
4Ricardian condition is that there are no e¤ects of government borrowing on the interest rate when
expected future tax payments of private agents, served as extra government debt, are o¤set against the bond
holdings in terms of domestic currency.
5The equation and its derivation are based on the talk of Michel Beine at the University Paris 10 in
February 2010.
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factors Xt and the expected change in exchange rate [Et (st+1j
t) st]. Currency
intervention works through the portfolio balance channel by inuencing Xt.
It is really di¢ cult to choose variables related to the non-monetary assets
for the portfolio balance channel. There are two types of empirical tests for
the channel. The rst approach, the direct demand approach, is to test the
intervention e¤ects based on a reduced form of the portfolio balance channel.
The second approach, the inverted demand approach, is to test the perfect
substitutability of domestic and foreign assets based on risk premium6. Most
studies within the portfolio balance framework, e.g., Kearney and MacDonald
(1986), follow the second approach.
Loopesko (1984), an early empirical study using the inverted demand ap-
proach, estimates an equation for risk premium with explanatory variables of
lagged exchange rates and cumulated currency interventions in G7 countries.
The hypothesis of perfect asset substitutability is rejected and some supports
for the short-run e¤ectiveness of the portfolio balance channel is provided.
Dominguez and Frankel (1993) use survey data to measure expectations on
the DEM/USD and CHF/USD exchange rates and construct a risk premium
from the deviation of the uncovered interest rate parity. They nd that
currency interventions have signicant e¤ects on the risk premium through
the portfolio balance channel. In both papers, risk premium is measured
by the deviation from uncovered interest parity and currency interventions
reect the relative asset supplies denominated in di¤erent currencies. These
features mean that the empirical tests for the e¤ectiveness of the portfolio
balance channel should take account of intervention e¤ects on the bond yield
di¤erentials and changes in exchange rates.
Although Dominguez and Frankel (1993) provide some empirical supports
for the portfolio balance channel, most other studies are not very supportive
(Frankel, 1982; Obstfeld, 1983; Rogo¤, 1984; and Lewis, 1988). Although
6Risk premium can be measured by the deviations of the uncovered interest parity based on the changes
in exchange rates and bond yield di¤erentials.
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the perfect substitutability of assets in di¤erent countries is rejected, inter-
ventions in most developed economies have been found to be not e¤ective
through the portfolio balance channel. Even in the cases that interventions
are e¤ective through the channel, their e¤ects are very small in size and do
not last long.
The Signalling Channel
The signalling channel was proposed by Mussa (1981), Kenen (1988), and
Almekinders (1995). It became an inuential approach with the works of
Dominguez (1987), and Dominguez and Frankel (1993). The monetary au-
thorities are assumed to have superior information than other agents of the
foreign exchange market. Other participants can only know the superior
information through operations of the central banks, e.g., currency interven-
tions. Therefore, exchange rates are a¤ected by the currency interventions
through the new information they associate with. To be specic, the interven-
tions change the agentsexpectations on the actions and policies of monetary
authorities, and hence their expectations on the exchange rates. The main
point of the signalling channel can be presented by solving equation (2.1)
with the following results:
st=
1
(1 + )
1X
j=0
i
(1 + )i+1
Et(Xt+j)+


1 + 
t+j+1
Et (st+j+1) ; (2.2)
where currency interventions have impact on exchange rates through the
signalling channel if they can convey some information about future values
of fundamentals Et(X t+j), or future exchange rate Et (st+j+1).
As a means by which a central bank conveys its inside information to the
foreign exchange rate market, a currency intervention is empirically exam-
ined whether it is a leading indicator of the change in the monetary policy
or inuences the exchange rate expectations (Dominguez and Frankel, 1993).
Under the e¢ cient market hypothesis, Eij¢ nger and Gruijters (1991) pro-
pose that currency interventions will alter the expectations of the foreign
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exchange market participants, and therefore have immediate impact on the
exchange rates through the signalling channel. They construct a testable re-
gression function of exchange rates with explanatory variables of the interest
rate di¤erential and spot market interventions. Under the rational expecta-
tions hypothesis, Dominguez (1990) estimates an inverted portfolio balance
equation of risk premium with interventions as explanatory variables.
The empirical results of previous signalling channel studies are mixed.
While Dominguez (1987) and Dominguez and Frankel (1993) nd that ster-
ilised interventions have very substantial e¤ects, Humpage (1989) and Eij¢ n-
ger and Gruijters (1991) show that they are not e¤ective.
The Coordination Channel
The coordination channel has been proposed by Taylor (1994, 1995) as an in-
dependent channel of inuence, which is related to studies on the microstruc-
ture of the foreign exchange market. Unlike the signalling approach, the
central bank is not assumed to be better informed than other foreign ex-
change market participants. The speculators basing their expectations on
fundamental information are often able to coordinate with the central bank.
However, amid strong and persistent non-fundamental misalignments of the
exchange rates, they may lose their condence, credibility, or even exhaust
their liquidity. Therefore, monetary authorities should use currency inter-
ventions as coordination signals to encourage them to re-enter the foreign
exchange market. By this means, the orders from the central bank and co-
ordinating speculators may help to stabilize the exchange rate, smooth the
exchange rate volatility, or reduce the size of deviation of the exchange rate
from its equilibrium rate.
The new coordination approach has attracted some academic interests.
Evans and Lyons (2002) use the net amount of foreign exchange orders initi-
ated by buyers and sellers as an indirect measure of the order ows initiated
by the central bank, i.e., interventions. They nd that the interdealer order
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ows have signicant and substantial e¤ects on exchange rates: An interven-
tion of one billion USD increases the DEM/USD rate by 0.5 percent.
Within the similar microstructure framework of Reitz and Taylor (2008),
Reitz and Taylor (2012) empirically test the coordination approach with daily
data from the JPY/USD exchange rate market. Spot and real exchange rates,
price di¤erentials, and currency interventions are used as the main variables.
A smooth transition regression (STR)-GARCH procedure is adopted to es-
timate the e¤ects of U.S. and Japanese currency interventions from April
1991 to March 2004. The coordination channel was e¤ective in the US: A
purchase of one billion USD appreciated the currency by 0.04 percent. How-
ever, Japans Ministry of Finance failed to provide a credible coordination
signal to speculators, and hence the exchange rate was not moving towards
equilibrium.
Giradin and Lyons (2007) use daily order ows of traders from three di¤er-
ent types of institutions to estimate the e¤ects of the Japanese interventions
between January 2003 and March 2004. Although non-nancial corporations
and unleveraged nancial institutions shifted their positions according to the
intervention direction, leveraged nancial institutions, e.g. hedge funds and
proprietary trading desks of large banks, did not follow the coordination sig-
nals provided by currency interventions. In a similar context, Marsh (2011)
examines the behaviour of end-user order ows in the JPY/USD market. He
also nds that, while corporate customers were more likely to act with the
monetary authority, nancial customers tended to be net buyers of JPY on
the same days when Japans Ministry of Finance was intervening to sell yen.
Although the order ow data is often not publicly available7, the empirical
studies related to the coordination channel have shown a promising picture
of testing the e¤ectiveness of currency intervention.
7In our research, currency futures contract positions are used as proxies for order ows to test their e¤ects
on exchange rates.
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2.2.3 Estimating E¤ectiveness of Currency Intervention
Empirical studies on currency intervention are based on di¤erent econometric
and statistical methodologies. Most of them can be classied into one of the
four methodological groups, i.e., low-frequency time series, event study, high-
frequency, and identied models.
The Low-Frequency Time Series Method
The low frequency time series method is a standard approach measuring the
e¤ects of currency intervention on the exchange rates, and has been widely
used since the inuential works of Rogo¤ (1984) and Dominguez and Frankel
(1993)8.
Typical equations to measure the e¤ects of currency intervention include
explanatory variables of interventions, interest rates and other variables, e.g.,
market news, and can be expressed as:
st= 1+1Xt+1CI t+"t; (2.3)
4st= 2+2Xt+2It+"t; (2.4)
where st is the exchange rate measured by units of domestic currency per
foreign currency, normally in logarithm form, It and CI t measure actual in-
terventions and cumulative interventions respectively. Xt is a set of variables
measuring changes in monetary policies, bond yields, ination rates, and
other factors which may have impact on exchange rates, e.g., macroeconomic
news. The contemporaneous e¤ects of cumulative interventions and actual
interventions are interpreted as 1 and 2 respectively.
Evans and Lyons (2002) propose to use order ow data generated from
interdealers as proxies for sterilised secret currency interventions and adopt
8Sarno and Taylor (2002) and Neely (2005a) provide a detailed literature review on the traditional
low-frequency method.
31
the following equation:
4st=  + (it it ) + xt+"t; (2.5)
where the order ow data xt is constructed from the net interdealer order ow
of buyers and sellers, it it is the domestic and foreign overnight interest rate
di¤erential.
Although the low-frequency approach is good at measuring the exact in-
tervention e¤ects on the exchange rate levels, it has some weak points. Inter-
ventions happen sporadically and often in clusters, which makes the e¤ects
of interventions hard to measure and interpret. Additionally, it is di¢ cult
to justify an inclusion of an explanatory variable as there is little consensus
on exchange rate determination models (Obstfeld and Rogo¤, 1995). Fur-
thermore, there may exist endogenous relations among the variables, i.e.,
the simultaneity among changes in exchange rates, interventions and other
variables.
Some researchers use the low-frequency approach to analyse the e¤ects of
intervention on the volatility of exchange rates9. Dominguez (1998) proposes
two approaches to analyse the e¤ects of currency intervention on the exchange
rate volatility. The rst approach is based on a GARCH (1,1) model and
expressed as
4st=  + X t+I t+
p
ht"t; (2.6)
ht= 0+1"
2
t 1+2ht 1+3It+"t; (2.7)
"tj 
t 1 N(0; ht; ); (2.8)
where 4st is the change in spot exchange rates measuring exchange rate
returns, Xt is a set of variables inuencing exchange rate volatility, which
may vary in di¤erent cases. While It is an intervention variable capturing
currency interventions known at time t, ht measures conditional volatility of
9 The related studies include Baillie and Humpage (1992), Almekinders and Eij¢ nger (1994), Bonser-
Neal and Tanner (1996), Ramaswamy and Samiei (2000), Beine (2003), Frenkel, et al. (2005), Hillebrand
and Schnabl (2008), et al.
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exchange rates, and "t is t-distributed disturbance term with variance ht and
degree of freedom .
The second way to measure intervention e¤ects on volatility is based on
the implied volatility of option prices:
4IV t=  + X t+I t+IV t 1; (2.9)
where 4IV t measures the changes in the exchange rate volatility, and Xt is a
set of variables inuencing exchange rate volatility.
The GARCH-related volatility research is not subject to option pricing
models which implied volatilities depend on, and are computationally simple
with available econometric software. However, it does not take into consider-
ation the market expectations embedded in option prices. On the other hand,
the implied volatility related studies are subject to the data availability prob-
lem because the related option data of many developed economy currencies
was available for only a few years, and not available for many developing
economy currencies10.
The Event Study Approach
The event study approach is introduced to deal with the issues related to
the sporadic and clustered currency interventions. The key elements of an
event study include dening events, windows around the events, and success
criteria. An event is dened as interventions in the same direction within a
short period. An event window is normally 2, 5, 10, 15, or 30 days to include
one or more intervention episodes. The e¤ects of intervention are analysed
by comparison of exchange rate behaviour of pre- and post-event windows
based on the direction or smoothing criteria (Humpage, 2000).
Based on direction criterion, Fatum and Hutchison (2003, 2006) analyse
the German, Japanese and US interventions. They test and nd statistically
10Currency option markets in many developing countries are not developed or liquid enough to provide
suitable data for research.
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signicant changes in the exchange rates between pre- and post-intervention
periods. They also nd that the sterilised Japanese currency interventions
systemically a¤ect the exchange rate within one month, and large-scale (over
$1 billion) and coordinated interventions tend to be e¤ective.
Bordo, Humpage and Schwartz (2009, 2010) analyse the e¤ectiveness of
currency intervention using summary statistics, e.g., the percentage of suc-
cesses and mean changes in the exchange rate. Based on smoothing criteria,
they nd the di¤erences between pre- and post- event behaviour were sta-
tistically signicant in some periods of the Volcker-Greenspan era. In other
words, with only eeting e¤ects on the changes in the exchange rate, the US
currency interventions might o¤er a means of calming market disorder.
The event study approach provides a simple but sound technique to mea-
sure the e¤ects of sporadic and clustered currency interventions. It focuses
on the non-zero observations and does not require exchange rate determina-
tion models as the basis for data analysis. Nevertheless, this methodology is
not devoid of problems. The denition of an event is not formalized among
researchers, which means it is di¢ cult to construct comparable events. The
longeval events with large number of continuous interventions are di¢ cult to
compare with ephemeral events with smaller number of interventions. At the
same time, the methodology provides no hints on the e¤ectiveness of specic
transmission channels, and focuses mainly on short-term intervention e¤ects.
Furthermore, there is risk of endogenous problems among the variables in the
event study models.
The high-Frequency Time Series Approach
The high-frequency time series method uses intraday exchange rates and in-
tervention data to explain the intermediate intervention e¤ects. It may pro-
vide more specic information di¢ cult to grasp by low-frequency time series
and event studies approaches (Vitale, 2007). However, the main problem vis-
a-vis this approach is the limited availability of high-frequency transaction
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data on currency intervention. The Bank of Canada and the Swiss National
Bank are the only central banks that provide intraday transaction data for
limited research purposes (Menkho¤, 2010).
Intraday analyses of the interventions in Japan and the US and many
other countries are on the basis of press reports, not o¢ cial intervention
data. Goodhart and Hesse (1993) analyse the high-frequency e¤ects of inter-
ventions. Their analysis are based on Reuters headline news on the exchange
rate quotes in frequency of 30 minutes for 12 weeks. Dominguez (2003, 2006)
adopts an event study approach into a 5-minute frequency analysis. She nds
that currency interventions have signicant price impact and the impact in-
creases with trading volume.
However, the studies based on news reports have some drawbacks as news
reports are not always correct and tend to have serious delay (Fischer, 2006).
For example, Frenkel, et al. (2004) nd that 55% of Japanese currency in-
terventions between January 1995 and December 1999 were not reported by
major nancial newspapers. Galati et al. (2005) also nd that 23% of ac-
tual Japanese interventions between September 1993 and April 2000 were not
reported by Reuters.
Another problem related to early high-frequency studies is the lack of
identication. Simple linear regressions estimated by Payne and Vitale (2003)
can not insulate the unexpected intervention e¤ects from other exchange rate
innovations. And the event study approach proposed by Fatum and King
(2005) is also not free of the endogeneity problem. There is also an inference
problem caused by the paucity of exact intervention timing(Neely, 2005a).
Recently, there are some progresses in the high-frequency studies on the
Japanese and US interventions. Based on daily transaction data of Japanese
currency interventions between 1991 and 2004, Kim (2007) and Kim and
Anh (2010) break down a trading day into three time zones, i.e., the Tokyo
business hours, the London business hours, and the New York afternoon
hours. They nd that the interventions conducted during the Tokyo business
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hours signicantly reduced the volatility of the JPY/USD exchange rate and
reversed the undesirable trend of the exchange rate during the London and
New York business hours. Due to the simultaneity bias, the interventions
were not e¤ective during the Tokyo business hours between January 1991 and
June 1995: The interventions raised the level of the exchange rate volatility
and failed to move the exchange rate towards the right direction. However,
between June 1995 and March 2014, the simultaneity bias disappeared and
the interventions were also e¤ective during the Tokyo business hours.
In accordance with the microstructure framework proposed by Lyons (2001),
some recent studies interpret currency interventions as order ows of a central
bank. Giradin and Lyons (2007) analyse the daily e¤ects of Japanese and US
interventions with customer order ows of the Citibank, and nd interven-
tions signicantly impact daily exchange rate levels even with the existence of
other order ows. Although their research uses daily data instead of intraday
data, it still sheds some light on related high-frequency studies.
The Identied Models
The identied approach explicitly models structural economic relations and
identies the intervention impact on the exchange rate behaviour. Kim (2003)
uses an innovative unifying structural VAR framework to jointly analyse the
impact of the US currency interventions and conventional monetary policies
on the USD index in the post Bretton-Woods period. In order to overcome
the omitted variable problem, various macroeconomic variables, e.g., the con-
sumer price index, the Federal Funds rate, the industrial production index
and the monetary aggregate are included in the VAR model:
(L)t= ut; (2.10)
where the structural parameters are contained in (L), and the intervention
and macroeconomic variables are included in t. The following two equations
of the reduced form of the VAR model respectively measure the e¤ects of
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interventions and analyse the reactions of the central bank:
st= 1+1(L)st 1+1(L)I t 1+1(L)
0
Xt 1+"1;t; (2.11)
It= 2+2(L)st 1+2(L)I t 1+2(L)
0
Xt 1+"2;t; (2.12)
where Xt includes a set of di¤erent macroeconomic variables.
Kim investigates a rich set of macroeconomic relations, policy interactions,
and the interactions between monetary and intervention policies in the VAR
model. He nds that currency interventions had more e¤ects on the exchange
rate than the conventional monetary policies. The intervention e¤ects were
from the signalling channel as the purchases of foreign currencies signicantly
decreased the future Federal Funds rates and increased the future U.S. mon-
etary base. Kims paper provides a new way to estimate contemporaneous
interactions between currency interventions, monetary policies and exchange
rate movements. However, Kims approach is subject to improvement be-
cause some parameters in his VAR model are not identied and even in a
wrong rank condition (Neely, 2005b).
Based on the reports on the Japanese and U.S. currency interventions
from nancial press, Ramaswamy and Samiei (2000) propose a simple coin-
tegrated VAR model to analyse the short-term e¤ects of interventions on the
JPY/USD exchange rate with the following error correction form:
4st= C+
3X
i=1
i4st i+
3X
i=1
i(it i i?t i) + ECM t 1+
NX
j=1
Ij+"t; (2.13)
where st denotes the JPY/USD exchange rate, it i i?t i denotes the US and
Japanese interest rate di¤erential, ECM t 1 presents the long run relationship
of exchange rates and interest rates st= 0:165(it it) + 0:0003t, and It is an signi-
cant dummy variable reecting specic Japanese and US interventions. They
nd that interventions had signicant e¤ects on the exchange rate. However,
their analysis is based on the news reports and a more rigorous cointegrated
VAR research based on o¢ cial intervention data is needed.
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Kearns and Rigobon (2005) use a nonlinear intervention model with sim-
ulated method of moments to estimate structural breaks of currency inter-
ventions. They nd that Japanese currency interventions had signicant and
inuential e¤ects on the JPY/USD exchange rate: A sale of one billion USD
appreciated JPY by two percent. Based on a friction model, Neely (2005c)
estimates a system of equations to identify the cross-e¤ects of interventions
on the level and volatility of exchange rates.
The identied models provide a promising approach to analyse the inter-
vention e¤ects on exchange rates. Still at early stage, they are not without
their problems and limitations. The models may be improved by taking into
consideration the market microstructure and theoretical foundations (Vitale,
2007).
Summary
Although all the four approaches mentioned above o¤er useful methods of
analysing currency interventions, they are with both advantages and disad-
vantages. In our research, a cointegrated VAR model is built to incorporate
theoretical transmission channels and international parity conditions. In our
model, both short- and long-term intervention e¤ects are analysed. In order
to understand the e¤ectiveness of specic channels, a microstructure model
with speculation data is built and tested, which may shed some light on more
plausible theoretical models.
2.3 Speculation versus Intervention
Central bank intervention has been a common occurrence in the foreign ex-
change market. Therefore, currency speculators may adjust their behaviour
according to central bankspolicy and objectives. Meanwhile, central banks
may take account of the expected reactions of the speculators to formulate
their intervention policy.
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Based on the signalling approach, the sales of the domestic currency sig-
nal future monetary easing, which is associated with the depreciation of the
currency. To generate a credible signal, central banks are expected to earn
prot from the interventions. However, as Dooley and Shafer (1983) noted,
At worst, central bank intervention would introduce noticeable trends into
the evolution of exchange rates and create opportunities for alert private
market participants to prot from speculations against the central bank.
Neumann (1984) further investigates the interventions of the German Fed-
eral Bank in the DEM/USD market between1974 and 1981. They nd the
Western German central bank tried to compress the total risk premium of
DEM to reduce the incentive for speculation on DEM. LeBaron (1999) uses
the intervention data from the Federal Reserve to analyse the activities of
DEM/USD and JPY/USD markets. His empirical results suggest that spec-
ulators made money at the expense of central banks during the intervention
periods. Ito (2005) uses the net long futures positions on currencies in the
Chicago Mercantile Exchange as indicators for currency speculation. He nds
that the net long yen positions and interventions had strong correlations: The
large net long yen positions occurred with heavy yen-selling interventions. It
suggest that the Japanese monetary authorities and currency speculators
were at odds to control the direction of the yen.
In summary, both speculations and interventions play important roles in
the foreign exchange market. In order to analyse the e¤ects of currency
intervention on the exchange rates, suitable speculation variables are needed.
However, the limited availability of transaction data on currency speculation
is the main hurdle for related empirical research. Therefore, new proxies for
currency speculation in the foreign exchange markets are needed to conduct
related research.
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2.4 Potential Sentiment Measures for the Foreign Ex-
change Market
Speculative sentiment indices are created given the importance of behaviour
of speculators on the e¤ectiveness of currency intervention and the di¢ culty
of measuring the actual volumes of speculation in the foreign exchange mar-
ket. The indices not only reect the expectations of speculative traders on
the current market situations but also present hints on the overall market
sentiment.
There is a large group of literature relating investor sentiment to asset
prices and returns. Among early researchers in the area of investor expec-
tations and behaviour, Shiller (2000) states that investor sentiment refers to
simple expectations for price change or indicators of these expectations. It is
di¢ cult to have precise expectations for future changes over specic horizons.
Therefore, it is critical to construct feasible measures of investor sentiment. In
the following sections, three main groups of sentiment measures are reviewed.
2.4.1 Direct Sentiment Measures
The rst group of indices refers to direct measures based on the surveys of
investors, including surveys of the American Association of Individual In-
vestors (AAII), the University of Michigan Consumer Sentiment Index, and
the InvestorsIntelligence (II) Index.
The direct measures of investor sentiment have important advantages.
They tend to be precise as they directly measure the investors expecta-
tions. However, the surveys are not immune from errors with respect to
the interviewers, questionnaires or respondents (Groves, 1989). The survey
results are often a¤ected by problems relevant to inaccurate responses, non-
responses and self-selecting biases of investors. Furthermore, the investors
might change their mind shortly after a survey. Another potential problem
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is related to the low-frequency sampling. Many direct sentiment indices are
based on surveys conducted on a monthly or even annual basis, and are not
suitable to measure short-term investor sentiment a¤ected by unexpected
nancial events.
2.4.2 Indirect Sentiment Measures
The second group of indices refers to indirect measures derived from mar-
ket prices, volumes, or other objectively observable nancial data related to
sentiment. This group includes the Commitment of Traders (COT) index,
the put/call ratio, the long/short interest ratio, and the closed-end funds
discount (Pan and Poteshman, 2006).
Indirect sentiment indices are based on nancial market data and can be
easily constructed. Besides, it is easier to extract high-frequency sentiment
and analyse it together with contemporaneous events. Nevertheless, current
indirect sentiment indices are with some limits. It is di¢ cult to choose the
most relevant dataset out of many options. It is also hard to build up theory-
related nancial variables because the links between theory and empiricism
in indirect sentiment measures are often omitted in current research.
Some indirect sentiment indices are based on the COT reports. The
COT indices have been widely used for forecasting purposes in equity mar-
kets (Briese, 1994), energy markets, and recently in foreign exchange market
(Saettele, 2008). The COT reports on currency futures are released weekly
via the Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC). The reports con-
tain detailed information on the futures positons of traders in the Chicago
Mercantile Exchange (CME). There are three main groups of traders in the
reports: The non-commercials (mainly speculators11), commercials (mainly
hedgers) and non-reportables (small traders).
Based on the COT reports, Wang (2004) transforms traders positions
11The group of speculators refers mostly to large individuals traders and hedge funds.
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into COT sentiment indices which are fairly intuitive and easy to compare
across various nancial markets. His empirical baseline sentiment model is
expressed as
Rt+k= 1+1COT t+et; (2.14)
where Rt+k represents the returns of currency futures over the subsequent
k weeks and COT t is the sentiment index for either hedgers or speculators.
He analyses the futures positions on main currencies including GBP, CAD,
DEM, JPY, and CHF. His estimation results revealed positive correlations
between speculatorssentiment and subsequent futures returns for all of the
ve currencies: A 1% increase in speculative sentiment was related to a 0.42%
annualized return over the subsequent four weeks. The positive performance
of speculators was explained by the market risk premium. In other words,
the speculators were compensated for the high risk they held.
In summary, the indirect measures have been adopted to analyse the in-
uential e¤ects of sentiment in the nancial markets. However, nancial
theories are still needed to justify the construction of sentiment measures
and interpret the related empirical ndings.
2.4.3 Big Data Sentiment Measures
In addition to the two standard categories of sentiment indices (Brown and
Cli¤, 2004; Qiu and Welch, 2004; and Beaumont et al., 2008), the third
category of indices, the big data measures, is emerging with the availability
of huge information. The measures are based on amalgams of information on
big data in nancial markets. The section reviews relevant literature about
information supply and demand respectively.
Sentiment Measures of Big Data on Information Supply
The link between information supply and market movement has been noted
by many economists (Fama and Roll, 1968; Fama et al., 1969). The link has
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been addressed by the mixture-of-distributions hypothesis (Clark, 1973; Epps
and Epps, 1976) which imposes the dependence between volumes and returns
on a latent information process. Therefore, the patterns of information supply
are reected by similar patterns in the observed market behaviour.
In order to measure the information e¤ects that are not directly observ-
able, some researchers examine the tones of nancial news and quantify in-
vestor sentiment from news reports. Klibano¤ et al. (1998) analyse salient
news appearing on the front page of the New York Times, and nd dra-
matic country-specic news lead some investors to react more quickly and
signicantly, which a¤ects the prices of the closed-end country funds.
With contents from a daily Wall Street Journal column, Tetlock (2007)
uses the method of principal components analysis to quantitatively measure
the media pessimism. He nds signicant intertemporal interactions between
investor sentiment and stock prices: High media pessimism are followed by
falling stock market prices and high trading volume. Extending the sample
to all stories of the Wall Street Journal and Dow Jones News Service from
1980 to 2004, Tetlock et al. (2008) address the inuences of negative words,
and nd that the accounting earnings and stock returns of a specic S&P 500
rm can be predicted by sentiment measures.
Recently, Uhl (2011) constructs a sentiment index based on a classied
Reuters news database and test its correlation with the Dow Jones Industrial
Average in a VAR framework. He nds that the sentiment index explains and
predicts stock returns better than macroeconomic factors, and the sentiment
e¤ects remain signicant over months.
Sentiment Measures of Big Data on Information Demand
Another group of big data measures focuses on information demand. As
the internet makes information easily accessible at a very low cost, more
investors turn to the internet for information they demand. Antweiler and
Frank (2004) examine the messages in internet chat rooms related to stocks
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and characterize the message contents with buy, sell, or hold signals. They
nd strong correlations between message activity, trading volume and return
volatility. Das et al. (2005) study the information ows on stocks by applying
language-processing routines to message board posts and news. They create
an "eInformation" sentiment measure and nd strong relationship between
online discussion, news activity, and stock returns. Using statistical and
natural language-processing techniques, Das and Chen (2007) exact emotive
contents from Yahoo! message board discussions on specic stocks and nd
similar empirical results.
Information demand can also be measured by the Search Volume Index
(SVI) from Google Trends, "which is a real-time daily and weekly index
of the volume of queries that users enter into google12" (Choi and Varian,
2012). Da, et al. (2011) approximate a novel and direct measure of investor
attention using SVI, the aggregate search frequency data in Google. They
nd positive correlations between SVI and other sentiment measures in a
vector autoregression (VAR) framework. They also document that SVI is
strongly linked with the sentiment of less sophisticated retail investors, and a
positive SVI is correlated with higher stock prices in the short term and price
reversals in the long term, which supports the attention theory of Barber and
Odean (2008).
Vlastakis and Markellos (2012) use SVI data of 30 largest stocks traded
on NYSE and NASDAQ as a proxy for information demand. They nd that
information demand has signicant e¤ects on volatility and volume not only
at the individual stock level but also on the overall market level. The e¤ects
become especially signicant during periods of high returns. As one of the
rst studies on the big data sentiment in the currency market, Kita and
Wang (2012) measure the investor information demand by SVI and examine
its e¤ects on exchange rate volatility. They nd strong causal e¤ects of
12Google is the most popular internet search engine with 65.4% of the US search market share in November
2009 according to the Nielsen Megaview Search Data.
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information demands on volatility and strong correlation between information
demand and carry trade returns.
In general, the big data measures are based on innovative methods of
analysing large amount of nancial information, and well-suited for the tech-
nological developments and internet applications. Like the indirect measures,
a through theoretical foundation is needed to construct a big data sentiment
measure.
Summary
This section reviews the main groups of sentiment measures in the nancial
markets. Although the related research in the foreign exchange market is still
at its early stage and not devoid of drawbacks, it may provide a promising
way of analysing the e¤ects of currency speculation and sentiment.
2.5 Summary
This chapter reviews the related research on intervention, speculation and
sentiment in the foreign exchange market. Based on this review, suggestions
for future research in this area are provided.
Currency interventions are not recent phenomena. Numerous research ef-
forts have been devoted into studies on currency intervention in developed
country currencies. Meanwhile, research on currency interventions in devel-
oping countries is still sparse largely because of data availability problem.
Various methodologies have been used to analyse the intervention e¤ects.
However, there is need of research using identied models which provide a
structural way of analysing interventions with fundamental variables in one
framework. Furthermore, most studies are lack of a theoretical foundation or
market microstructure. More research is needed to analyse the interactions
of currency interventions, currency values and market conditions in a joint
theoretical framework. Based on our review, the studies on the coordina-
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tion channel and market microstructure, although at their early stage, may
provide a promising way in that direction.
Speculation and sentiment play an important role in nancial markets,
and there are already several group of sentiment indices available for research
purposes. However, few researchers have studied the inuence of speculation
and sentiment on the theoretical channels of interventions. In the same time,
there are lack of systematic studies with respect to the e¤ects of sentiment
on the exchange rates.
The following chapters, i.e., Chapters 3, 4 and 5, aim to ll the method-
ological, theoretical and empirical gaps in the eld. All the chapters adopt
the cointegrated VAR methodology to conduct identied studies on currency
intervention, speculation and sentiment. The methodology o¤ers a coherent
approach to test di¤erent hypotheses of the interactions of various variables
and examine their short- and long-term dynamics. Therefore it provides a
new way to jointly test reaction functions, separate transmission channels,
and speculation e¤ects in one framework, which provides a complete picture
of exchange rate dynamics under various market conditions.
While Chapter 3 o¤ers an examination of currency intervention, specu-
lation and sentiment in a microstructure framework based on international
parities e.g., PPP, UIP, the following two chapters are based on a new market
microstructure model and theoretical set-ups, such as the forward rate bias
and central bank credibility. The three transmission channels, especially the
coordination channel, and the foreign exchange market microstructure are
properly examined. In the meantime, all the three chapters consider the in-
uences of speculation and sentiment, and market conditions on the exchange
rate dynamics. In doing so, the three chapters provide systematic analyses
of exchange rate dynamics, currency intervention, speculation and sentiment,
and market conditions in a joint theoretical framework.
In order to ll the gap with respect to the studies on the developing and
emerging market currencies, Chapter 5 presents an analysis on theMXN/USD
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rate in a similar theoretical and empirical framework as the analysis of the
JPY/USD rate. The results across developed and developing countries are
compared and summarised in Chapter 6 to provide policy implications for
central bankers and suggestions for economic researchers.
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Chapter 3
Intervention, Speculation and
Sentiment: A Cointegrated VAR
Analysis of the JPY/USD Rate
Abstract:
This chapter analyses the e¤ects of currency intervention, speculation and sentiment on
the JPY/USD rate between April 1991 and August 2008. Using the identied cointegrated
VAR methodology, the research is the rst to test the portfolio balance e¤ects of currency
intervention in the context of the international parity conditions. It is also the rst to address
the e¤ects of speculation and e¤ectiveness of the coordination channel with a COT sentiment
index.
Main ndings of this chapter include: (1) Most hypotheses of the stationary international
parities, including UIP and PPP conditions, were rejected. The nonstationarity of the UIP
condition is the prerequisite for the e¤ectiveness of the portfolio balance channel. (2) The
Japanese interventions had long-term e¤ects on the yen through both the portfolio balance
and coordination channels. An intervention of one billion USD is correlated with a monthly
change in the exchange rate by 2.5% and 0.8% through the portfolio balance channel and
the coordination channel respectively. (3) The Japanese interventions had short-run e¤ects
through the coordination channel. (4) The U.S. currency interventions were not e¤ective
through either the portfolio balance channel or the coordination channel. Based on the
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detailed analysis, we suggest some directions for future research.
3.1 Introduction
During the period between April 1991 and August 2008, the Japanese mon-
etary authorities initiated 340 interventions, 22 of which were coordinated
with their US counterparts. In Japan, the interventions were decided by the
Ministry of Finance and imposed by the Bank of Japan. While in the US, in-
terventions are decided by the Treasury with consultation of Federal Reserve
Board, and then implemented by the Federal Reserve Bank of New York and
the Treasury.
This chapter focuses on the e¤ects of currency intervention on the JPY/USD
rate with consideration of speculation and sentiment. Although numerous
studies have addressed the intervention e¤ects on the currency pair, this
chapter is the rst to test the e¤ectiveness of the portfolio balance channel in
the context of the international parity conditions (Juselius and MacDonald,
2004). With a COT sentiment index, this chapter is also the rst to address
the speculation e¤ects and e¤ectiveness of the coordination channel in one
framework.
The structure of the chapter is organized as follows: After reviewing re-
lated literature and theoretical framework, we analyse the e¤ects of currency
intervention, speculation and sentiment using the cointegrated VAR method-
ology. Long-run parity conditions are tested to nd whether the Japanese and
U.S. interventions provided them with more explanatory power and whether
the requirement of the portfolio balance channel is fullled with the nonsta-
tionary UIP condition. Then the e¤ectiveness of the portfolio balance and
coordination channels are examined with consideration of speculative senti-
ment. The results may form a basis for analysing separate regimes of the
Japanese currency intervention.
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3.2 Literature Review
Currency intervention is dened as a purchase or sale of foreign currencies
by the monetary authorities in order to inuence the exchange rate level or
volatility. Currency intervention in advanced economies has a long history
and dates back to the time when the classical gold standard era was not
established (Bordo et al., 2007). After the meetings at Plaza in 1985 and
Louvre in 1987, sterilised interventions became regular and sometimes very
heavy (Obstfeld, 1990). However, the US and Japanese authorities stopped
active currency interventions at 1997 and 2004 respectively (Ito, 2007). This
section reviews literature on relevant transmission channels, estimation meth-
ods, speculation and indirect sentiment measures with respect to the Japanese
and US interventions.
3.2.1 The portfolio Balance and Coordination Channels
Although there were some exceptions in Japan between 2003 and 2004 when
the currency interventions and monetary expansions were parallel (Ito, 2007),
most currency interventions in Japan, the US, and many other developed
countries were sterilised (Sarno and Taylor, 2002). Widely regarded to be
independent from monetary policies, sterilised currency interventions o¤set
any changes in the monetary base through immediate open market opera-
tions, e.g., buying or selling domestic securities in the opposite direction.
While there are three potential transmission channels for sterilised interven-
tions, namely the portfolio balance, signalling, and coordination channels,
this chapter focuses on the portfolio balance and coordination channels.
The Portfolio Balance Channel
One assumption of the portfolio balance channel is that the assets in di¤erent
currencies are not perfect substitutes. Based on the relative expected returns,
investors balance their portfolio among the assets denominated in di¤erent
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currencies. Therefore, the assets within the monetary authoritiesbalance
sheets are altered while the monetary base and the domestic interest rates
are unchanged. Accordingly, the spot exchange rate shifts in order to a¤ect
the domestic value of foreign assets and the expected returns from holding
them (Sarno and Taylor, 2002).
There are two types of empirical tests for the portfolio balance channel.
The rst approach, the direct demand approach, is to test the intervention
e¤ects based on a reduced form of the portfolio balance channel, which can be
seen as a dynamic exchange rate determination model. However, it is really
di¢ cult to choose variables related to the non-monetary assets for the model.
Therefore, the second approach, inverted demand approach, is introduced to
test the perfect substitutability of domestic and foreign assets based on risk
premia1.
Most studies within the portfolio balance framework, e.g., Kearney and
MacDonald (1986), follow the second approach. For example, Loopesko
(1984) estimates an equation for risk premia with explanatory variables for
exchange rates and currency interventions in the G7 countries. He rejects the
hypothesis of perfect asset substitutability and provides some supports for
the short-run e¤ectiveness of the portfolio balance channel. Dominguez and
Frankel (1993) use survey data to measure expectations on the DEM/USD
and CHF/USD rates, and nd that currency interventions have signicant
e¤ects on the risk premia through the portfolio balance channel.
In both papers, risk premia are measured by deviations from the uncov-
ered interest parity and currency interventions reect the relative stock asset
supplies denominated in di¤erent currencies. These features mean that the
empirical tests on the e¤ectiveness of the portfolio balance channel should
take account of the e¤ects on the bond yield di¤erentials and changes in
the exchange rates. Although Dominguez and Frankel (1993) provide some
1Risk premia can be measured by the deviations from uncovered interest parity based on the changes in
exchange rates and bond yield di¤erentials.
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empirical supports for the portfolio balance channel, most other studies are
not very supportive (Frankel, 1982; Obstfeld, 1983; Rogo¤, 1984; and Lewis,
1988). Even the perfect substitutability of assets in di¤erent countries is re-
jected, the interventions were found to be not e¤ective through the portfolio
balance channel. In the cases that interventions were e¤ective, their e¤ects
were very small in size and did not last long.
The Coordination Channel
The coordination channel has been proposed by Taylor (1994, 1995) as an
independent transmission channel which is related to the studies on the mi-
crostructure of the foreign exchange market. Unlike the signalling approach,
central banks are not assumed to be better informed than other market par-
ticipants. Speculators trading on fundamental information are often able to
coordinate with the central bank. However, amid strong and persistent non-
fundamental misalignments of the exchange rates, they may lose condence,
credibility, or even liquidity. Therefore, the monetary authorities should use
currency interventions as coordination signals to encourage them to re-enter
the foreign exchange market. By this means, the orders from the central
bank and coordinating fundamental speculators may help stabilize the ex-
change rate, smooth the exchange rate volatility, or move the exchange rate
towards its equilibrium rate.
The coordination approach has attracted some empirical studies. Evans
and Lyons (2002) use the net amount of buyer- and seller-initiated orders as
an indirect measure of the order ows initiated by the central bank, i.e., inter-
ventions. They nd that the interdealer order ows have substantial e¤ects
on exchange rates: A purchase of one billion USD increases the DEM/USD
exchange rate by 0.5 percent. Reitz and Taylor (2008, 2012) empirically
test the coordination approach with daily data from the JPY/USD exchange
rate market in a microstructure framework. They adopt a smooth transition
regression (STR)-GARCH procedure to estimate the e¤ects of the US and
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Japanese currency interventions from April 1991 to March 2004. They nd
that the coordination channel were e¤ective for the US interventions: A pur-
chase of one billion USD appreciated the currency by 0.04 percent. However,
they nd that the Japanese interventions failed to provide a credible coordi-
nation signal to fundamental speculators, and hence the exchange rate was
not moving towards equilibrium.
Instead of estimating with the actual exchange rate data, Giradin and
Lyons (2007) use daily customer order ows of traders to estimate the ef-
fects of the Japanese interventions between January 2003 and March 2004.
Although non-nancial corporations and unleveraged nancial institutions
shifted their positions towards the intervention direction, leveraged nancial
institutions, e.g., hedge funds and proprietary trading desks of large banks,
did not follow the coordination signals. In a similar context, Marsh (2011)
examines the behaviour of the end-user order ows in the yen market. He
also nds that, while corporate customers were more likely to act with the
monetary authority, nancial customers were net buyers of JPY on the same
days when the Japanese monetary authorities were intervening to sell the
yen.
However, the related studies on the coordination channel are normally
based on the rder ow data which are often not publicly available. To over-
come the problem, this chapter uses futures contract positions in foreign
exchange market as proxies for order ows.
3.2.2 Estimation of E¤ectiveness of Currency Intervention
Empirical studies on currency intervention are based on di¤erent econometric
and statistical methodologies. Most of them can be classied into one of the
four methodological groups, i.e., low-frequency time series, event studies,
high-frequency, and identied models. The identied models, although still
in their early stage, provide a way of structurally modelling the e¤ects of
currency interventions and fundamental variables in one framework. This
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chapter builds an identied cointegrated VAR model to incorporate both
theoretical transmission channels and suitable international parity conditions.
In order to understand the e¤ectiveness of specic channels, a microstructure
model is built and tested, which sheds more light on future studies.
3.2.3 Speculation versus Intervention
Currency interventions have been a common occurrence in foreign exchange
markets. Therefore, currency speculators may adjust their behaviour ac-
cordingly. Meanwhile, central banks may consider the expected reactions of
currency speculators to formulate their intervention policy.
Based on the signalling approach, current sales of the domestic currency
signals future monetary easing and associates with the depreciation of the
currency. In order to generate a credible signal, a central bank should earn
prot from the interventions. However, while central banks tried to reduce the
incentive for unfavourable currency speculation (Neumann, 1984), currency
speculators proted at the cost of the central banks (Dooley and Shafer, 1983;
LeBaron, 1999).
In summary, both speculation and intervention play important roles in
the currency market. In order to identify the intervention e¤ects on the
exchange rates, suitable speculation variables are needed for the model. If
the data on currency speculation is not available, a proxy for speculation
should be created.
3.2.4 The COT Sentiment Measures
Speculative sentiment indices are created to reect the expectation of spec-
ulative traders on the current market situations. The COT-related indices
have been widely used to measure sentiment in various nancial markets
(Briese, 1994; Saettele, 2008). Wang (2004) transforms the traders positions
from the COT reports to a COT sentiment index, and nds strong positive
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correlation between speculative sentiment and currency futures returns.
3.2.5 Summary
This section briey reviews the literature on the Japanese and US currency
intervention, speculation and sentiment and discusses the previous research
on the portfolio balance and coordination channels, methods of estimating
intervention e¤ects, speculation and sentiment measures.
3.3 Theoretical Framework: International Parities and
Channels of Inuence
Most studies on the intervention e¤ects do not identify the e¤ectiveness of
specic channels in one coherent framework. This section provides theoretical
foundations to jointly test the portfolio balance e¤ects in the context of an
international parity framework and address the e¤ects of speculation and
sentiment in the framework of the coordination channel.
3.3.1 The International Parities
Juselius and MacDonald (2004) provide a framework of the international
parity conditions which are important to analyse the long run relations of
price adjustments, interest and exchange rates uctuations. I will present the
parity conditions in this section, and test them with currency intervention,
speculation and sentiment in later sections.
As the most well-known international parity, the purchasing power parity
(PPP) is based on the idea that two currencies have the same purchasing
power for the same goods. The logarithm version of the absolute PPP is
pppt= st (pt p?t ); (3.1)
where pppt is often denoted as real exchange rate, Pt and P ?t are domestic and
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foreign prices respectively, and St is the nominal exchange rate. With a error
term "t, the relative PPP can be dened as
st (pt p?t ) = "t: (3.2)
When PPP holds, the change in the nominal exchange rate has the same
sign with the change of the relative price and the real exchange rate should
mean-revert.
Under the e¢ cient market hypothesis, market prices should already fully
reect information available to market participants, which makes it impossi-
ble for a trader to earn excess returns. The risk neutral agents should expect
the expected returns, in terms of the expected exchange rate changes, to be
o¤set by the opportunity cost of holding the assets in di¤erent currencies, i.e.,
the interest rate di¤erential. This condition can be reduced to the uncovered
interest rate parity (UIP):
Et(4st+k) = (it i?t ); (3.3)
where st+k is the logarithm of the spot exchange rate at time t+ k condi-
tional on the information at time t, it is the domestic interest rate at time t
with maturity at time t+ k, and i?t is its foreign counterpart. If the rational
expectations hypothesis (REH) exists, then we can derive a testable parity:
4st+k= (it i?t ) + ut; (3.4)
where ut is a white noise error, which means agents do not make systematic
forecasting errors.
In the context of the relationship between the spot and forward rates,
the risk neutral arbitragers ensure that the exchange rate movements, at the
maturity of the underlying assets in the forward markets, is covered by the
interest rate di¤erential between the two assets2, which is presented by the
covered interest rate parity (CIP):
f t+kt  st= (it i?t ); (3.5)
2For simplicity, we ignore transaction costs.
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where f t+kt is the logarithm of the k-period forward rate3. Taylor (1987, 1989),
Clinton (1988), and Burnside et al. (2006) nd that deviations from CIP are
generally small when taking transactions costs into account. However, there
were large deviations from CIP in the aftermath of the 2008 nancial crisis,
which are resulted from the liquidity issues and counterpart risk (Mancini-
Gri¤oli and Ronaldo, 2012).
Based on (3.4) and (3.6), if both the uncovered and covered interest parity
hold true, the forward premium f t+kt  st is equal to the expected exchange rate
depreciation:
f t+kt  st= Et(4st+k); (3.6)
and equivalently, the forward rate is equal to the expected future spot rate:
f t+kt = Et(st+k): (3.7)
The term spread parity measures the stationary link between the long-
and short-term interests:
il;t is;t= t; (3.8)
where il;t and is;t are the long- and short-term interest rates respectively, and
t is a random error4.
The interest rates can also be illustrated by the Fisher parity, a composi-
tion of real interests and expected price changes, as follows:
rl;t= il;t Et(4pt+l); (3.9)
rs;t= is;t Et(4pt+s); (3.10)
3The foreign currency is said to be at a forward premium relative to the domestic currency if f t+kt > st,
forward discount if f t+kt > st.
4There is no consensus with respect to the stationarity of the term spread parity. Although Campbell and
Shiller (1987) propose that the term spread should be stationary, empirical studies, e.g., Campbell (1995)
show the existence of non-stationarity.
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where rl;t and rs;t are long- and short-term real interest rates respectively, and
Et(4pt+l) and Et(4pt+s) measure expected price changes.
Based on rational expectations, the above functions can be transformed
into the real interest parity (RIP):
rb;t rm;t= (ib;t Et(4pt+l))  (im;t Et(4pt+s)) = et: (3.11)
If the goods prices are sticky, the real interest rate di¤erentials are station-
ary because the short-term interest rates are set by monetary authorities.
However, real interest rate parity does not hold in most cases (Hallwood and
MacDonald, 1999).
3.3.2 Risk Premia and the Portfolio Balance Channel
The arbitrageurs in the foreign exchange market equate returns on assets
denominated in domestic and foreign currencies:
it= i
?
t+f
t+k
t   st: (3.12)
Under the CIP condition and the assumption that the domestic and foreign
bonds are perfect substitutes, the forward rate should equate to the expected
spot exchange rate, which produces the UIP condition:
it= i
?
t+Et(st+k)  st: (3.13)
If investors do not treat the domestic and foreign bonds as perfect substitutes,
the forward rate is di¤erent from the expected spot rate by a risk premium
rpt to reect the extra risk:
rpt= f
t+k
t  Et(st+k): (3.14)
After substituting the risk premium into the UIP condition, we have
it= i
?
t+Et(st+k)  st+rpt; (3.15)
or equivalently
rpt= (it i?t )  [Et(st+k)  st] : (3.16)
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The core feature of the portfolio balance channel is the relative home to
foreign bond supplies determined by risk premia (MacDonald, 2007):
Bt
StFt
= (it i?t )  [Et(st+k)  st] ; (3.17)
where Bt is the domestic bond supply and StFt is the supply of foreign bonds
denominated in the domestic currency. The above condition can be inverted
and rewritten as
(it i?t )  [Et(st+k)  st] =  1(
Bt
StFt
); (3.18)
or a testable inverted demand function:
(it i?t )  [Et(st+k)  st] = 0+1(
Bt
StFt
) + t+k; (3.19)
(3.20) can be adopted in the context of currency intervention by replacing
the relative bond supplies with the o¢ cial (cumulative) intervention data
(Loopesko,1984; Dominguez and Frankel,1993):
(it i?t )  [Et(st+k)  st] = rpt= 0+1It+t+k; (3.20)
or
(it i?t )  [Et(st+k)  st] = rpt= 0+1CI t+t+k; (3.21)
where It and CI t are the actual and cumulative interventions to depreciate the
domestic currency, and Et(st+k) is constant because the relative bond supply
is assumed to have no inuence on the expected future exchange rate.
Through the portfolio balance channel, the sterilised interventions change
the relative supplies of the domestic and foreign bonds, which alters the risk
premia. We can illustrate the mechanism with Japanese currency interven-
tions It. We assume that the purpose of interventions is to depreciate Yen
against USD, i.e., a higher st. The Japanese interventions are nanced by
temporary sales of Treasury bills to the Bank of Japan, which are in essence
prompt issuances of Treasury bills in the market. The Bank of Japan then
sterilises the interventions by buying the correspondent US Treasury bills
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with USD, which causes an excess demand of US Treasury bills. Given the
Japanese and US Treasury bills are not perfect substitutes, a higher risk pre-
mium rpt is needed for investors to absorb the excess supplies of the Japanese
bonds. The higher risk premium causes an increase in bill rate di¤erential
(it i?t ) and spot exchange rate st through the following mechanism: The ex-
cess supply of Japanese bills tends to raise Japanese bill rate it and the excess
demand of US bills lowers the US bill rate i?t , which increases the demand on
USD. Given that the expected spot exchange rate Et(st+k) is unchanged, we
can expect that the yen depreciates against the dollar.
3.3.3 Speculation, Microstructure and the Coordination Channel
With the assumption that exchange rates are determined in an order-driven
market with heterogeneous agents (Bacchetta and van Wincoop, 2006; De
Gauwe and Grimaldi, 2006), this section builds a microstructure model of the
coordination channel. Unlike the signalling channel, there is no assumption
that the central bank is better informed than private agents. Although the
foreign exchange market is a decentralized market, it can still be analysed in
a batched and centralized trading structure (Kyle, 1985; Evans and Lyons,
2002) because the batch structure may act as a proxy for the prevailing lack
of transparency (Vitale, 1999).
In the Kyle framework, traders demand currency through market orders
with an immediate transaction at the best available price. Depending on
the demand level of the traders, the market maker lls their orders at an
exchange rate shifted from the previous exchange rate. There are three dis-
tinctive sources of exchange rate variation, i.e., publicly available informa-
tion that directly a¤ects the market markers price-setting decisions, indirect
public information that may operate via induced order ows, and order ows
unrelated to publicly available information (Reitz and Taylor, 2008 and 2012).
The main assumptions of the microstructure model of the coordination
channel are as follows: The change in the exchange rate is determined by,
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among other sources, the net order ows from the central bank interventions,
and the overall trades of the informed and uninformed private speculators, as
the market maker can not observe them individually. Therefore, the log-linear
function of exchange rate change may be expressed as
4st+1= aM(DInt +DUnt ) + t+1; (3.22)
where aM denotes a positive coe¢ cient of currency speculation and interven-
tion determined by the market maker, DInt and DUnt denote net order ows
of the informed and uninformed speculators respectively, and the noise term
t+1 captures the direct public information.
3.3.4 Summary
This section builds a theoretical framework for testing the portfolio balance
and coordination channels. Following this section, we illustrate the data on
intervention, speculation and sentiment in the JPY/USD market and present
testing criteria of the transmission channels.
3.4 Data Illustration and Hypothesis Testing Criteria
3.4.1 Data Description and Dummies
The right choice of data and variables is very important for our empirical
analysis. Most of our variables are based on the data from the EconWin
database. The exceptions are the Japanese and US Intervention data, which
are from Bank of Japan and Federal Reserve Economic Data respectively, and
the COT data, which is from the Commodity Futures Trading Commission.
Japan and U. S. are labelled as home and foreign country respectively. We
choose the duration to be from April 1991 to August 2008 for two reasons.
Firstly, the o¢ cial Japanese and US intervention data are jointly available
only from April 1991. Secondly, our choice is economically meaningful be-
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cause the period covers the lost years of Japanese economy and ends at the
eve before the global economic recession started in September 2008.
Our initial model consists of the following variables5:
st= the logarithm of the spot JPY/USD rate6,
pt= the logarithm of the Japanese consumer price index,
pt= the logarithm of the US consumer price index,
rb;t= the Japanese 10 years bond rate/1200,
rb;t= the US 10 years bond rate/1200,
rm;t= the Japanese 3 months libor rate/1200,
rm;t= the US 3 months libor rate/1200,
CI t= the cumulated Japanese currency interventions dened by the net
purchases of JPY or sales of USD in unit of billion USD,
CIt= the cumulated US currency interventions dened as total net pur-
chase of Japanese Yen or sales of US Dollar in unit of billion US Dollar,
COT t= the long to short ratio of speculatorspositions on the yen futures
from the COT reports of the Chicago Mercantile Exchange.
The graphs of the exchange rate are shown in the upper part of Figure
3.1. We nd that the yen appreciated steadily in the early 1990s and then
depreciated until late 1998. While the former might be caused by coordinated
currency interventions, speculations and the Kobe earthquake in the early
1995, the latter might be the result of continued injections from Bank of Japan
to keep the stability of the nancial markets. Accordingly, there were two
impulses happened in August 1995 and October 19987. The impulse dummy
in August 1995 was related to a series of coordinated currency interventions.
Except the dummy e¤ects, the di¤erenced exchange rate variable seemed
quite stationary, which may suggest st I(1).
5All original annual interest rate variables (in %) have been divided by 1200 to be comparable with the
price variables in logarithm.
6The exchange rate measures domestic currency units per unit of foreign currency. In our case, when
JPY/USD is down, JPY appreciates against USD.
7A dummy is introduced if its standard residual error in the specic period is larger than 3.
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The di¤erenced price variables pt and pt reect the ination levels
of Japan and USA respectively. The trend break in April 1997 reected the
sharp slowdown of the Japanese economy caused by a hike of consumption tax
rate from 3% to 5%, which ended a short-lived economic recovery. There was
a blip dummy in the US ination rate in September 2006, which was related
to the real estate bubbles in US. Based on the ination graphs of Figure 3.1,
both the levels and di¤erences of price variables were not stationary, which
might suggest pt, pt I(2).
rb;t and rb;t respectively measure the Japanese and US bond rates with the
maturity of 10 years. The Japanese bond rate contained a steady downward
trend from 1991 to 1998, and became relatively stable after a short mean
shift period. In Figure 3.2, two impulse dummies appeared in the di¤erenced
Japanese bond rate in December 1998 and July 2007 to account for the sharp
increases in the bond rate from 0.85% to 1.97% and from 0.94% to 1.46%
respectively. Except for their e¤ects, the di¤erenced Japanese and US bond
rate variables were fairly stationary, which indicated both rb;t and rb;t were
I(1).
rm;t and rm;t stand for the Japanese and US libor rates with the maturity
of 3 months8. After decreasing steadily in the rst half of 1990s and then
slowly in the second half with some minor shifts, the Japanese libor rate be-
came steady around zero until 2006. The unusual phenomenon reected the
strong stimulative monetary policies of the Bank of Japan to promote invest-
ment and prevent further deterioration of economic conditions. However, this
granted little space for the Japanese monetary authorities to impose further
stimulative monetary policies. In the di¤erenced US libor rate, there was
one impulse dummy in February 2008, which reected a sharp rate cut from
3.94% to 2.98% to ght for the economic recession. Except for this dummy,
the di¤erences of the Japanese and US interest rates in Figure 3.2 look quite
stationary, which suggests that the libor rate variables rm;t and rm;t may also
8We use the federal funds rate to measure the US libor rate.
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be I(1).
While the Japanese interventions were quite frequent and in clusters, the
US ones were much less active. In our model, CI t and CIt , instead of It and
It , are used for two reasons. Firstly, there were many months between 1991
and 2008 that were without interventions, especially the US ones. If we use
It and It , the zero observations may cause our time series analysis hard to
implement. Secondly, the cumulated intervention variable can be used to
test the e¤ectiveness of portfolio balance channel. CI t and CIt , in the unit of
billion USD, were weakly exogenous variables9.
COT t, the long to short ratio of speculatorspositions on the yen futures,
is used to measure the currency speculation and sentiment because it has
a strong contemporaneous relationship with the exchange rate movements
(Klitgaard and Weir, 2004). As shown in Figure 3.1, during the 1991-2008
period, there were two peaks of JPY speculation activities in May 1993 and
December 2003.
3.4.2 Illustration of International Parity Conditions
In this section, we illustrate the parities vis-a-vis exchange rates, prices and
interest rates. In comparison of the mean-adjusted price di¤erentials and
nominal exchange rates in Figure 3.1, there are three main features: Firstly,
the stochastic trend in the relative price between Japan and the US was
downward sloping. Secondly, the nominal exchange rate evolved, with large
persistent swings, around a similar trend as price di¤erential. Thirdly, there
was a trend break in April 1997 which had dynamic e¤ects on prices and
interest rates.
In Figure 3.3, the bond rate di¤erential ib;t ib;t and libor rate di¤erential
im;t  im;t were not stationary, which was related to the non-stationarity of
risk premium rpt. While the term spreads ib;t im;t and ib;t im;t showed strong
9In a cointergrated VAR model, a weak exogenous variable is a variable which a¤ects long-run relations
of other variables, without being inuenced by them (Juselius, 2006).
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non-stationarity, the Fisher parity conditions might hold true in Figure 3.4.
The graphical analysis reects the non-stationarity of most parity condi-
tions except the Fisher parity condition10. Frydman and Goldberg (2007) and
Frydman, et al. (2008) suggest that rational but myopic risk-averse specu-
lators make forecasts based on their imperfect knowledge, which drives the
international parity conditions out of stationarity. Using I(2) cointegration
tests, Johansen, et al. (2010) provides an empirical support for the imperfect
knowledge interpretation of the PPP and long swing puzzles.
3.4.3 Hypothesis Testing Criteria of the Transmission Channels
While most studies on currency intervention do not identify the e¤ective-
ness of specic transmission channels in one coherent framework, this section
proposes a new way to test them.
The core of the portfolio balance channel is the imperfect substitutability
of domestic and foreign assets, which means there exist risk premia rpt11
measured by deviations from uncovered interest parity (it i?t ) 4st+1. If
(it i?t )  I(1) and4st+1 I(0), then (it i?t ) 4st+1 I(1), which means that there
exist risk premia through which the portfolio balance channel can be e¤ective.
With the existence of risk premia, we should expect the interventions to
appreciate JPY work through the portfolio balance channel. To be exact, the
test of the portfolio balance channels is constructed of two steps. The rst
step is nd the existence of risk premia and second is to nd CI t or It> 0 =)
4st< 0.
The main prerequisite for the e¤ectiveness of the coordination channel
is that the speculators coordinate with the central bank interventions: The
speculation on domestic currency COT t and currency intervention CI tmove in
the same direction12, e.g., CI t or It> 0 =) COT t> 0. Therefore, we include the
10The stationarity tests of parity conditions in the later sections justify our opinion.
11Risk premia depend on the relative asset supplies which be presented by the actual interventions It or
cumulated interventions CIt .
12The variable COTt is used as a measure of the speculation and sentiment on the yens appreciation, and
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speculation variable COT t into our model to reveal whether it moves together
with currency interventions.
3.4.4 Summary
In this section, related data and parity conditions are illustrated and discussed
before rigorous empirical analysis and statistical tests. The testing criteria of
the transmission channels are also discussed. In the following sections, after
discussion of the methodology adopted for empirical research, a detailed data
analysis is presented.
3.5 The Cointegrated VAR Methodology
3.5.1 Introduction
It is very di¢ cult to jointly test the e¤ectiveness of separate transmission
channels and e¤ects of currency speculation in one framework. According to
our literature review, most empirical studies use single equation regression
analysis to measure the e¤ects of intervention with respect to one channel,
which has drawbacks of missing the whole structural picture of exchange rate
movements and correlations of macroeconomic variables. At the same time,
most empirical studies ignore the e¤ects of speculation in the foreign ex-
change market. As the only research analysing the e¤ects of intervention and
speculation and testing transmission channels in one structural framework,
this chapter adopts the cointegrated VAR methodology as it o¤ers a coherent
approach to test di¤erent hypotheses and examine long-run relationships and
short-run dynamics.
3.5.2 Nominal-To-Real Transformation
Nominal variables are often modelled as I(2). The Nominal-To-Real transfor-
CIt or It as interventions to appreciate the yen.
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mation is to reduce the integration order of nominal variables, and transform
them into empirically valid real variables in accordance with long-run price
homogeneity while preserving the (polynomially) cointegration relations. Af-
ter the transformation, we can directly conduct an I(1) analysis in stead of
more complicated I(2) one.
We take the PPP-related variables pt, p?t and st as examples. The price
variables pt and p?t are I(2), and therefore their di¤erences4pt and 4p?t are
I(1). Given all other initial variables are I(1), we can cointegrate the common
stochastic trend of price variables or their combinations of other variables into
I(1). Based on economic theories and long-run price homogeneity, the relative
prices (pt p?t )  I(1) and purchasing power parity (pt p?t st)  I(1) need to be
tested.
3.5.3 The Cointegrated VAR I(1) model
Engle and Granger (1987) initiate the concept of cointegration and Error
Correction Models (ECM). The following univariate equation:
yt= yt 1+1xt+2xt 1+t; (3.23)
where yt and xt are both non-stationary variables and t is a white noise, can
be represented as
yt= 1xt (1  )fyt 1 (1+2)xt 1=(1  )  =(1  )g+ t; (3.24)
where the steady state solution of the rst order di¤erence equation is achieved
and the terms inside the brackets are the so-called ECM. An positive shock to
y at time t  1 will decrease yt by the adjustment coe¢ cient  (1  ), which
can bring yt back to the long-run equilibrium.
The VAR model in levels can be re-parameterized to a multivariate ECM
model as
X t= X t 1+ iX t i+Dt+t: (3.25)
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With the assumption that the errors are Gaussian, I start with a baseline
VAR (2) model:
Xt= 1Xt 1+2Xt 2+"t; (3.26)
where Xt is a p vector of I(1) variables and "t is a p vector of white noises.
The above equation can be formulated as
X t= X t 1+ X t 1+"t; (3.27)
where  = 1+2 1 and   =  2.
If Xt is I(1), which means X t is stationary,  should not be of full rank
to guarantee the consistency of the equation. Hence, either  = 0, or it has
reduced rank:  = 0 where  and  are p r matrixes and r < p. Thus, under
the I(1) hypothesis, the cointegrated VAR model is given by:
X t= 
0Xt 1+ X t 1+"t; (3.28)
where 0Xt 1 is an r  1 vector of stationary cointegration relations and "t Np(0;
 ).
As Theorem 5.1 in Johansen (1996) states, if jA(z)j = 0, which implies that
jzj > 1 or z = 1 and rank() = r, there exists a p r matrix with rank r such that
 = 0. Therefore, the necessary and su¢ cient condition that X t E(X t)
and 0Xt E(0Xt) are stationary is that 0?(I    i)? has a full rank.
The individual columns of  dene the linear combinations of the variables
which are of reduced order of integration, and can be interpreted as the steady
state cointegration relations in the system. On the other hand, the rows of
 determine the way in which the deviations from the steady state relations
inuence the short-run dynamics of the dependent variables.
3.5.4 Rank Determination: Cointegration Vector Estimation
One commonly used estimation methods to determine the rank of the model
is introduced by Johansen (1988, 1991). The main idea is to obtain a clean
long-run adjustment model to estimate the coe¢ cient vectors  and . After
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eliminating the short-run e¤ects, a regression of reduced rank is performed.
The solution is based on the calculation of the eigenvalues which determine
the likelihood value of the estimation. In other words, a likelihood ratio
test is undertaken to tell the eigenvalues which are statistically equal to zero
from those di¤erent from zero. The number of eigenvalues di¤erent from zero
equals to the number of cointegration relations.
Firstly the residuals R0t and R1t are obtained from regressions of X t on
X t 1 and Xt 1 on X t 1. The auxiliary regressions are dened according to
the Frisch-Waugh theorem:
X t = B^01X t 1+Rot; (3.29)
Xt 1 = B^02X t 1+R1t; (3.30)
where B^01= S02S 122 , B^02= S12S 122 and Sij are covariance expressed as Sij= T 1RitR0jt
for i; j = 0; 1. Hence, the concentrated model can be expressed as
R0t = 
0R1t + error terms; (3.31)
which is important for understanding both the statistical and economic prop-
erties of the VAR model. Accordingly, the "messy" empirical model is trans-
formed into not only a clean statistical model which is also economically
interpretable.
The Maximum-likelihood (ML) estimator is derived in two steps. The rst
step is to derive an estimator of  under the assumption that  and 0R1t are
known, and transform the ML function into a function of  to calculate the
maximizer ^. The second step is to solve the likelihood problem by calculat-
ing the eigenvalue function jS11 S10S 100 S01j = 0. A solution of  can be found
to minimize j
^()j, from which the eigenvalues 1 >^1>    >^p> 0 can be calcu-
lated. For a given choice of r, the ML function equals L 2=Tmax = jS00jri=1(1 ^i).
The likelihood test of the hypothesis H(r?) : r  r? for some number r?
against the general unrestricted model H(p) : r  p is given by
T (r?) =  2lnQ[H(r?)jH(p)] =  Tln(1 ^i); (3.32)
69
where T (r?) follows a multivariate Dickey-Fuller distribution.
3.5.5 Identication of the Long-Run Structure
The estimated cointegration vectors can not be interpreted if they are not
identied in any interpretable way. As a way to identify the vectors, structural
tests on the cointegration space can be performed. Unlike the normal tests of
a standard linear regression model, it is only possible to impose restrictions
on the whole space of , calculate the likelihood value once more with the re-
stricted vectors, and compare whether the new likelihood value is statistically
di¤erent from the original one which is asymptotically 2-distributed.
There are several types of tests on the long-run structure. A test with
some  vectors are known is based on the hypothesis of  = (b; ), where b
is some known vectors and  is the matrix of unrestricted vectors. Further-
more, hypotheses on  can be tested to nd whether the deviations from one
cointegration relation a¤ect the short-run changes in one specic variable.
3.5.6 Estimation of the Short-Run Dynamics
The cointegration relations are identied as r long-run simultaneous relation-
ships between p1variables which enter the cointegration space at the same
time. The short-run equations consist of p equations of p current variables
xt, p(k   1) lagged predetermined variables xt i, and r-lagged predetermined
equilibrium errors, (^
c
)0xt 1.
After the determination of long-run relations, a simple parsimonious struc-
ture of the short-run dynamics with lag number 2 can be expressed as
A0xt= A1xt 1+a(^
c
)0xt 1+0;a+1;at+ vt; (3.33)
where A1= A0 1; a = A0; 0;a= A00; 1;a= A01 and vt= A0"t INp(0;):
The parsimonious model is estimated by keeping the cointegration rela-
tions xed, which is justied by the consistency of estimated . To start out,
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this system is estimated by imposing p  1 just-identifying restrictions on each
equation and zero restrictions on the o¤-diagonal elements of the A0 matrix,
i.e., A0= I. By doing so, simultaneous e¤ects among variables are disregard.
By removing insignicant lagged variables from the system based on F-tests
and then insignicant coe¢ cients from the equations based on the likelihood
ratio tests, a parsimonious representation of the short-run dynamics can be
achieved.
3.5.7 Summary
This section discusses the methodology to analyse the e¤ects of currency
intervention and speculation. The cointegrated VAR methodology provides
a possible structure to identify possible long-run parity relations and test
the e¤ectiveness of intervention after considering the e¤ects of speculation
and macroeconomic fundamental variables. It also provides a way to analyse
the short-run e¤ects and identify the long-run impact of the intervention,
speculation and sentiment.
3.6 Data Analysis with the Cointegrated VARMethod-
ology
This section implements an analysis on the long-run relations and short-run
dynamics in a cointegrated VAR framework for the JPY/USD market from
1991 to 2008. After the basic model setup, we introduce new variables into our
model and impose specic restrictions in the extended model. In our case, the
model is extended from 5 main variables to 7 main variables with I(2) features
considered. Using the prices, interest rates, and intervention variables, we
test the long-run international parity conditions and the e¤ectiveness of the
portfolio balance channel, and analyse the e¤ects of speculation and sentiment
and the e¤ectiveness of the coordination channel.
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3.6.1 Choice of Main Variables
The relevant variables is chosen through Nominal-To-Real transformations,
and misspecication and rank tests. The software package, Cats in Rats
(Dennis et al. 2005) is used to analyse our data.
Basic Model Setup
Based on the specic-to-general principle of choosing variables, we start
with a basic variable vector

st, pt, p?t , ib;t, ib;t, CI t, CIt
	
. The price variables
are included because of their close relationship with the nominal exchange
rate. The long-term interest rates, instead of short-term interest rates, are
chosen because they are more informative in terms of long-run movements of
exchange rates. The intervention variables CI t and CIt are tested to be weakly
exogenous with probability 0.64, which support the idea that interventions
are set by the monetary authorities and not pushed by other macroeconomic
variables.
There are some I(2) signals in the model related to price variables. Hence,
Nominal-To-Real transformations are conducted by rst testing whether rel-
ative price (pt p?t ), and real exchange rate (pt p?t st)13 are I(1). A necessary
condition for pppt  I(1) is that st is I(2) and cointegrated with ppt. We test
whether the condition holds true given its theoretical and empirical impor-
tance.
Based on a rank test of the I(2) model, the number of rank is set to be 3
with one I(1) stochastic trend and one I(2) stochastic trend. After imposing
the rank condition, we test whether the PPP condition is acceptable in all
cointegration relations of the I(2) model based on Johansen and Luetkepohl
(2005). The results are mixed: the relative price ppt  I(1) was not rejected
with a p-value of 0.09, but pppt  I(1) was clearly rejected with a p-value of
0.00.
13Later ppt and ppptwill be used to stand for (pt   p?t ) and (pt   p?t   st) respectively.
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Hence my empirical analysis after Nominal-To-Real transformations is
based on the following variable vector
ppt;4pt; st; ib;t; ib;t; CI t; CIt
	 I(1); (3.34)
where 4pt I(1) is also included to consider the intervention e¤ects on the
domestic ination levels. Based on the ML function with an additional pe-
nalising factor related to the number of estimated parameters, the Schwartz
and the Hannan-Quinn information criteria suggest the number of lags k = 2,
which is enough for a quite rich dynamic structure even in a small dimensional
system (Juselius, 2006).
Let vector Xt = fX1;t; X2;tg where X1;t=

ppt;4pt; st; ib;t; ib;t
	
, and sub-vector
of weakly exogenous foreign intervention variables, X2;t = fCI t; CItg. Then
our partial error correction representation of V AR(2) model becomes
4X1;t =  1;14X t 1+10Xt 1+A04X2;t+0+Dt+"1;t;
"1;t  N(0;); t = 1991 : 04  2008 : 08:
Based on the standard residual errors, there are impulse dummies in Au-
gust 1995, April 1997, October 1998, December 1998, July 2003 and Sep-
tember 2005, which are ...,0,1,0,...dummies measuring permanent shocks. To
take account of the trend-break e¤ects of the consumption tax hike in April
1997, a shift dummy is added into the cointegration relations 0Xt 1, which is
a ...,0,1,1,1,...dummy measuring a mean shift of the cointegration relations.
To check the statistical adequacy of the small model, some important
misspecication test statistics are presented in Table 3.114. We nd that the
normality15 and no autocorrelation are rejected at the multivariate level with
p-values smaller than 0.05. Given a cointegrated VAR model is robust to
moderate AR e¤ects and excess kurtosis, we continue with the current model
specication.
14The signicant test statistics are in bold face.
15The non-normality is mostly due to excess kurtosis in the interest rate equations.
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Table 3.1: Misspecication and Rank Tests for the Basic Model
Multivariate Test Results
Autocorrelation: LM1: 2(25) = 43:16 with p-value 0.01
LM2: 2(25) = 41:55 with p-value 0.02
Normality: 2(10) = 20:30 with p-value 0:03
Univariate Test Results
4ppt 42pt 4st 4ib;t 4ib;t
ARCH(2) 0:27 8:18 2:84 10:02 0:41
Normality 3:38 9:38 0:87 6:24 2:16
Skewness 0:04 0:50  0:04 0:00 0:24
Kurtosis 3:50 3:93 3:17 3:75 2:94
Trace tests r = 0 r = 1 r = 2 r = 3 r = 4
p-value 0:00 0:00 0:00 0:02 0:22
Modulus of Five Largest Roots
r = 4 1 0:85 0:85 0:62 0:31
r = 3 1 1 0:86 0:61 0:30
r = 2 1 1 1 0:63 0:28
The cointegration rank divides the variables into r relations towards which
the system is adjusting and p  r relations which are pushing the system. In
order to determine the cointegration rank, the trace test statistics and the
ve largest roots of the characteristic polynomial are reported in Table 3.1.
While the trace test statistics suggest borderlinely accepting the rank number
to be 4, we set the rank number as 3, considering estimated characteristic
roots.
I(2) Analysis and Nominal-To-Real Transformation
We examine potential I(2) features with the variable vector

st; pt; p
?
t ; ib;t; i

b;t; im;t; i

m;t; CI t; CI

t
	
before conducting a cointegrated I(1) analysis. The I(1) trace tests of Ta-
ble 3.2 suggest that the rank of the I(1) model can be either 3 or 4 with
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Table 3.2: Rank Test Statistics under the I(1) Model Setup
I(1):Rank 0 1 2 3 4 5 6
p-value 0:00 0:00 0:00 0:06 0:17 0:23 0:26
Modulus of Five Largest Roots
r = 5 1 1 0:97 0:93 0:84 0:80 0:52
r = 4 1 1 1 0:97 0:89 0:83 0:50
r = 3 1 1 1 1 0:95 0:88 0:53
Table 3.3: Rank Test Statistics under the I(2) Model Setup
p  r r s2 = 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 0
7 0        
6 1       
5 2      105:3
[0:12]
4 3     62:64
[0:55]
3 4  65:12
[0:11]
49:20
[0:13]
37:20
[0:72]
2 5 41:51
[0:21]
26:37
[0:34]
20:11
[0:73]
1 6 11:51
[0:51]
7:99
[0:66]
p-values in brackets. Only p-values  0.05 are shown here.
probability 0.06 and 0.17 respectively. However, based on the modulus of the
largest roots, there exist two large roots for both rank r = 3 or 4, which means
that there might be some I(2) features in the model. In order to conrm the
existence of the I(2) features, we implement further rank tests for the I(2)
model and present the test statistics in Table 3.3. With a p-value of 0.11, we
can not reject the I(2) set-up of rank r = 4 with one I(1) trend and two I(2)
trends.
As the price variables are I(2) processes, Nominal-To-Real transformations
are needed to reduce their integration order. By imposing restrictions on all
vectors, we nd that the relative price ppt I(1) is not rejected with a p-value
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Table 3.4: Misspecication and Rank Tests for the Extended Model
Multivariate Test Results
Autocorrelation: LM1: 2(49) = 73:01 with p-value 0.02
LM2: 2(49) = 61:01 with p-value 0.12
Normality: 2(10) = 150:91 with p-value 0:00
Univariate Test Results
4ppt 42pt 4st 4ib;t 4ib;t 4im;t 4im;t
ARCH(2) 0:06 8:05 5:60 10:22 0:75 1:19 11:63
Normality 2:26 5:32 2:80 6:07 1:91 108:2 20:9
Skewness 0:01 0:36  0:15 0:03 0:23 0:22  0:85
Kurtosis 3:38 3:53 3:41 3:74 3:02 8:29 4:26
Trace tests r = 0 r = 1 r = 2 r = 3 r = 4 r = 5 r = 6
p-value 0:00 0:00 0:00 0:00 0:18 0:29 0:18
Modulus of Five Largest Roots
r = 5 1 1 0:94 0:94 0:82 0:55 0:34
r = 4 1 1 1 0:95 0:88 0:56 0:37
r = 3 1 1 1 1 0:91 0:60 0:33
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of 0.052, while pppt I(1) is rejected with a p-value of 0.00. Therefore, we
include the domestic ination level 4pt I(1) in the variable vector, which
becomes 
ppt;4pt; st; ib;t; ib;t; im;t; im;t; CI; CI
	 I(1): (3.35)
The Unrestricted Extended I(1) Model and Rank Tests
After dening the main variables, we conduct the misspecication and rank
tests for the structure of the extended model and summarise the related
results in Table 3.4.
At the multivariate level, the p-values of the LM tests with respect to the
second order residual autocorrelations is 0.30, which indicates no signicant
second autocorrelation in my model. However, at the univariate level, there
are some ARCH e¤ects in the variables of the Japanese ination and bond
rates, and the US libor rate. From the results of normality tests, there is
no normality at the multivariate level with a p-value of 0.0. The nding is
supported by the ndings at the univariate level that there are signicant
non-normality in the variables of the Japanese bond rate and US interest
rate variables, and excess kurtosis in the libor rate variables. Nevertheless,
the extended model shows much better validity than the basic model and is
adopted given the robustness of the cointegrated VAR model.
From the rank test statistics and modulus of seven largest roots, the rank
of my model is set as 4 with a p-value of 0.18. This means the inclusion
of libor rates adds one more long-run stationary relation into the extended
model.
Summary
This section sets up our main model. In the following sections, we will test
the e¤ects of currency intervention and speculation on the long-term parity
conditions and the e¤ectiveness of specic transmission channels.
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3.6.2 Testing Hypotheses of Potential Parity Conditions
After imposing the rank condition in the extended model, the hypotheses of
the long-run parities are tested to facilitate our search of best hypothetical
relations. The hypothesis tests are of the form  = (H1;  1;  2;  3) to test
whether a restricted relation H1 is in the  space with other three relations
unrestricted. The main test results16 are reported in Table 3.5.
H1:1 to H3:2 are hypothesis tests on pure parity conditions including the
term spread parity (H1:1 and H1:2), the interest rate di¤erential (H2:1 and H2:2),
the Fisher parity (H3:1 and H3:2). Most hypotheses are rejected with p values
less than 0:05 except the Fisher parity conditions in Japanese case (H3:1 and
H3:2) with a trend and trend break considered.
To nd more empirically veriable relations, H4:1 to H5:3 test extended par-
ity relations by adding some variables. On the tests of parities with interest
rates, the term spread parity in Japan combining with relative price, trend
and trend break (H4:1) and the interest rate di¤erential with some interest rate
variables, a trend and trend break (H4:7 and H4:8) are not rejected. The com-
bination of Japanese ination rate and nominal exchange rate (H5:1) is also
not rejected with a p-value of 0.33. Therefore, the hypothesis tests provide
me with six candidates for the long-run cointegration relations.
From the above test statistics, most pure long-run parity conditions, in-
cluding the UIP condition, are rejected, which full the prerequisite for the
e¤ectiveness of the portfolio balance channel. We will explore the long-run
structure of the extended intervention model and reveal the e¤ectiveness of
the portfolio balance channel in more details.
3.6.3 Portfolio balance Channel in a Cointegration Space
Before identifying long-run cointegration relations, we test the long-run weak
exogeneity on individual variables to investigate the absence of long-run feed-
16The p-values in parentheses are for the hypothesis relations with a trend and trend break in 1997:04.
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Table 3.5: Testing the Stationarity of Single Parity Conditions
ppt 4pt ib;t ib;t im;t im;t p   value
Test of Term Spread Parity
H1:1 1  1 0:00 (0:0)
H1:2 1  1 0:00 (0:0)
Test of Interest Rate Di¤erential
H2:1 1  1 0:00 (0:0)
H2:2 1  1 0:00 (0:0)
Test of Fisher Parity (Japanese Case)
H3:1  1 1 0:00 (0:27)
H3:2  1 1 0:03 (0:30)
Tests of Parities with Interest Rates
H4:1 1 1391 (14)  1391 ( 14) 0:00 (0:64)
H4:2 1 980 (0:6)  980 ( 0:6) 0:00 (0:02)
H4:3 1 175 (5:7)  175 ( 5:7) 0:01 (0:02)
H4:4 1 129 (0:06)  129 ( 0:06) 0:00 (0:02)
H4:5 1  1:07 ( 0:85)  1 0:47 (0:21) 0:00 (0:01)
H4:6 1 0:43 ( 0:33) 3:07 (1:76)  0:43 ( 0:33) 0:01 (0:00)
H4:7 1  1  6:99 (0:46) 0:64 (0:09) 0:01 (0:38)
H4:8 1 0:09 ( 0:67) 0:16 ( 0:05)  0:16 (0:05) 0:01 (0:48)
Test of Combinations with Exchange Rate
4pt st ib;t ib;t im;t im;t p   value
H5:1 1 0:00 0:33
H5:2 1 0:00  1 0:047
H5:3 1  0:01  1 0:00
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Table 3.6: Tests of Long-Run Weak Exogeneity for the First Extended Model
Critical value ppt 4pt st ib;t ib;t im;t im;t
2(4) = 9:49 18:01 78:50 2:42 23:29 13:32 41:70 30:35
back e¤ects. This test is formulated as a zero row of , i.e., H i: ij= 0; j = 1; :::; r.
If the hypothesis that the variable xi does not adjust to the equilibrium er-
rors is accepted, the corresponding variable becomes a driving variable in the
model while not being pushed in the system. From Table 3.6, the nominal
exchange rate is weakly exogenous with 2(4) = 2:42, smaller than the critical
value 9:49.
With the consideration of the weakly exogenous exchange rate variable
and previous hypothesis test results, we get the following full cointegration
structure:
Hfull:  = (H1'1; H2'2; H3'3; H4'4);
where the design matrices of H1; H2; H3 and H4 are respectively expressed as
26666666666666666666666666664
1 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0
0 1 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0
0  1 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0
0 0 1 0 0
0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 1 0
0 0 0 0 1
37777777777777777777777777775
;
26666666666666666666666666664
0 0 0
1 0 0
0 1 0
0 0 0
0 0 0
0 0 0
0 0 0
0 0 1
0 0 0
0 0 0
0 0 0
37777777777777777777777777775
;
26666666666666666666666666664
0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0
1 0 0 0
 1 0 0 0
0 1 0 0
0 0 1 0
0 0 0 0
0 0 0 1
0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0
37777777777777777777777777775
;
26666666666666666666666666664
1 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0
0 1 0 0 0 0
0 0 1 0 0 0
0 0 0 1 0 0
0 0 0  1 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 1 0
0 0 0 0 0 1
37777777777777777777777777775
;
where the four design matrices correspond to H4:1;H5:1; H4:7 and H4:8 respec-
tively. The identied long-run structure is clearly not rejected with a p-value
of 0.75.
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The rst  vector reects a function of the Japanese term spread, relative
price, the Japanese intervention, a trend and its break, and is presented as
(ib;t  im;t)+0:09(pt pt )  0:001CI t
+0:0001T 97:04 + 0:0001Trend+ error = 0; (3.36)
which means that the Japanese term spread, i.e., ination expectation, is
negatively related with the domestic price and positively with the US price
level and domestic currency interventions.
The second vector is represented by a function of the Japanese ination,
exchange rate, and interventions:
4pt + 0:04st + 0:001CI t+error = 0: (3.37)
The main nding is that the Japanese interventions may have direct and
signicant e¤ects on the nominal exchange rate through the portfolio balance
channel, i.e., CI t > 0 =) 4st< 0. A sale of one billion USD may appreciate
the yen by 2.5%17.
Representing the bond rate di¤erential, libor rates and the US currency
interventions, the third relation is expressed as
(ib;t ib;t)  6:88im;t + 1:12im;t + 0:0001CIt+error = 0; (3.38)
where the bond rate di¤erential positively correlated with the Japanese libor
rate but negatively with the US one.
The last relationship is about the libor rate di¤erential, relative prices,
bond rates, a trend and its break:
ib;t 0:6ib;t + 0:02(pt pt )  0:05( im;t im;t)
 0:001T 97:04 + 0:0001Trend+ error = 0; (3.39)
17The rate of appreciation is calculated by 0:0010:04  100% .
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where the Japanese bond rate is positively related to the US bond rate, libor
rate di¤erential and a trend break, and negatively related to the relative price
and the trend.
In summary, the Japanese interventions to appreciate JPY, CI t, may have
long-term e¤ects through the portfolio balance channel: A yen-purchasing
intervention of one billion USD may appreciate the yen by 2.5%. However,
there is no direct ndings with respect to the e¤ectiveness of the US inter-
ventions through the portfolio balance channel. The next section explores
the e¤ects of speculation and sentiment on the exchange rate and whether
the interventions work through the coordination channel.
3.6.4 Transmission Channels with Speculation and Sentiment
This section includes the speculation and sentiment variable COT t into the
extended model18. Therefore, the new empirical analysis is based on the
following variable vector:

ppt;4pt; st; ib;t; ib;t; CI t; CIt ; COT t
	 I(1): (3.40)
We then examine the long-run cointegration relations and short-run dynam-
ics, and analyse the e¤ects of currency intervention, speculation and senti-
ment through the coordination channel.
Long-term E¤ectiveness through the Coordination Channel
Based on the rank number=4, we construct a cointegration structure and
discuss the two cointegration relations most relevant to the e¤ectiveness of
the coordination channel.
18The process and results of conducting misspecication and rank tests are similar to the previous sections.
Hence we do not illustrate the detailed results here. Instead, we focus on main long-run relations and short-
run dynamics related to intervention, specualtion and sentiment.
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The rst relevant relation focuses on the Japanese interventions and can
be expressed as
4pt + 0:003st   0:0001COTt + 0:0001CIt + error = 0: (3.41)
The above relation o¤ers several interesting ndings: Firstly, the Japanese
interventions may be e¤ective through the coordination channel, i.e., CI t> 0
=) COT t> 0. An intervention of one billion USD is correlated with an increase
in the speculative sentiment by 1 unit, which means more speculators may
coordinate with the Japanese interventions.
Secondly, during the whole period between 1991 and 2008, the overall
intervention e¤ects of one billion USD through the portfolio balance and
coordination channels was around 3.3% change in the exchange rate19, with
around 0.8% out of the coordination channel.
The second relevant relation is on the long-term e¤ectiveness of the U.S.
interventions:
1:059im;t im;t   0:537(ib;t  ib;t)  0:005COTt   0:0001CIt+error = 0: (3.42)
The rst nding of this relation is that the U.S. interventions did not work
through the coordination channel. A yen-purchasing intervention of one bil-
lion USD was correlated with around 0.02 unit decrease of the speculation
sentiment on JPY20. In other words, less speculators might coordinate with
the central bank, CIt> 0 =) COT t< 0. The second nding is in line with the
last section that there was no direct e¤ects of the US interventions on the
exchange rate.
In summary, by adding the speculation and sentiment variable into our
long-term structure, the coordination channel is revealed to be another ef-
fective channel of the Japanese currency interventions. However, the US
interventions failed to work through either the portfolio balance channel or
the coordination channel, and had no direct e¤ects on the exchange rate.
19The rate of appreciation is calculated by 0:00010:003  100% .
20The rate is calculated by 0:00010:005  100% .
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Table 3.7: Short-Run Dynamics of Intervention, Speculation and Sentiment
Dp95:08 It I

t
4COTt+1  0:04
[2:93]

Short-Run Dynamics of Intervention, Speculation and Sentiment
After analysing the long-term e¤ects of intervention, speculation and senti-
ment, we present results on the a analysis of the short-run dynamics in Table
3.721.There were no short-term e¤ects of the US interventions and the joint in-
terventions in August 1995, i.e., Dp95:08. However, the Japanese interventions
had positive e¤ects on the speculation and sentiment on JPY. A yen-buying
intervention of one billion USD increased the rate of currency speculation and
sentiment in the next month by 0.04 unit. In other words, the speculators
tended to coordinate the Japanese central bank, which indicate the short-run
e¤ectiveness of the Japanese interventions through the coordination channel.
3.7 Summary and Proposal for Future Research
The chapter examines the e¤ects of currency intervention, speculation and
sentiment on the JPY/USD rate using the cointegrated VAR methodology.
The main results vis-a-vis long-run parity conditions, currency intervention,
and speculation and sentiment, are listed as follows:
1. The inclusion of an intervention variable did not increase the explana-
tory powers of the international parity conditions. Stationarity of most
pure international parities, including UIP and PPP conditions, was re-
jected. This means that the standard parity conditions based on the
rational expectations hypothesis were not good t for the analysis of the
JPY/USD rate.
21 indicates the related coe¢ cient is not signicant with a t-value  2:6.
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2. The Japanese interventions might have long-term signicant e¤ects on
the exchange rate. An intervention of one billion USD was correlated
with overall monthly change in the exchange rate by around 3.3%.
3. The nonstationarity of the UIP condition provided prerequisite for the
e¤ectiveness of the portfolio balance channel. The Japanese currency
interventions might be e¤ective through this channel: A sale of one
billion USD was correlated with an appreciation of the yen by around
2.5%.
4. The Japanese currency interventions might have signicant e¤ects on
both the long- and short-term JPY/USD rate movements through the
coordination channel: An intervention of one billion USD, coordinated
with the increasing speculation, was correlated with around 0.8% long-
term JPY appreciation. The Japanese monetary authorities also man-
aged to move the short-run speculations by 0.04 unit in the long-to-short
JPY speculation ratio.
5. The US interventions were not e¤ective through either the portfolio bal-
ance channel or the coordination channel. The sparse and small U.S. in-
terventions during the 1991-2008 period might cause the ine¤ectiveness
of the channels because they reected that the US monetary authori-
ties were inclined to inuence the JPY/USD rate through spot currency
interventions.
Based on the results of the chapter, some suggestions are provided on
future research on the intervention, speculation and sentiment related to the
JPY/USD rate:
1. Because the US interventions were much less frequent and e¤ective com-
pared with the Japanese counterparts, it reasonable to focus the Japanese
interventions instead of U.S. ones.
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2. As there were many days without any intervention, the whole Japanese
intervention period can be separated into several active intervention
regimes based on di¤erent intervention patterns. Therefore, the inter-
ventions in separate regimes can analysed and compared.
3. There might be more factors that inuence the e¤ectiveness of currency
interventions and movements of the JPY/USD rate. We may include
the forward rate bias and exchange rate volatility for future empirical
analyses.
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Figure 3.1: Exchange Rates, Prices, Speculative Sentiment and PPP
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Figure 3.2: Interest Rates and Interventions
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Figure 3.3: Interest rate Di¤erentials
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Figure 3.4: Real Interest Rates and Spreads
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Chapter 4
Regimes of the Japanese Currency
Interventions: A Microstructure
Analysis with Speculation and
Sentiment
Abstract:
This chapter provides a unique examination of three separate regimes of the Japanese
currency interventions between 1991 and 2004. It is the rst research to jointly test the co-
ordination and signalling channels and the reaction function of central banks in an identied
structural framework. The empirical research also involves testing an innovative microstruc-
ture framework considering fundamental and sentimental information.
There are several important ndings based on the analysis of the paper. Firstly, the
shocks to the bond yield di¤erential were the driving force of the dynamics of the JYP/USD
rate, and had strong long-run impact on speculation and sentiment. Secondly, with respect
to the reaction function of the central bank, the interventions happened in clusters, and
were the reactions to the sharp JPY appreciation. Between 2003 and 2004, the central bank
also reacted to the large speculation position and high sentiment on the yens appreciation.
Thirdly, the signalling channel was e¤ective when the interventions were frequent. Fourthly,
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the speculation and sentiment showed strong e¤ects on the changes in the exchange rate,
and the coordination channel worked when the changes in exchange rate volatility were slow.
4.1 Introduction
This chapter analyses the Japanese currency intervention, speculation and
sentiment in three separate intervention regimes between 1991 and 2004. It
jointly tests the signalling and coordination channels in a structural frame-
work with currency speculation and sentiment, exchange rate volatility and
forward exchange rate bias. The empirical research is based on an innovative
market microstructure model, and provides new information to unfold the
myths of the JPY/USD rate.
This chapter is organized as follows: After providing background informa-
tion about the regimes of the Japanese interventions, we survey the related
literature. Then we build a new theoretical framework and iuse the identied
cointegrated VAR methodology to conduct empirical analyses. We examine
the e¤ectiveness of the transmission channels, the inuence of currency spec-
ulation and sentiment, and the reaction function of the Japanese monetary
authorities. All the main empirical results are summarised and compared to
provide suggestions for related research and policy implications for central
banks.
4.2 Japanese Currency Intervention Regimes
Based on the o¢ cial data of the Japanese currency interventions, the Japanese
monetary authorities were active in the spot foreign exchange market after
April 1991, and initiated 340 interventions until March 2004. After the ac-
tive period, the Japanese authorities, led by Yoshihiko Noda, only intervened
several times between 15 September 2010 and 4th November 2011 to ght
against the sharp appreciation of JPY at the post-war high level, or the ex-
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cess volatility after the Great East Japan earthquake in March 2011 (Bordo
et al., 2012).
The Japanese interventions between 1991 and 2004 showed distinctive
characteristics in size and frequency, and could be analysed in separate regimes.
We summarise the statistics of the three di¤erent intervention regimes in Ta-
ble 1.
The rst regime between 1st April 1991 and 20th June 1995 was featured
with small-scale but frequent interventions (Ito, 2005). In the regime, inter-
ventions happened in 10.71% days and the average amount per intervention
day was 46.96 billion JPY.
The second regime between 21st June 1995 and 14th January 2003 was
characterized by very large-scale but infrequent interventions. After Eisuke
Sakakibara took charge as Director General of the International Finance Bu-
reau of Ministry of Finance on 21 June 1995, the style of currency intervention
was deliberately changed in order to change the level of the exchange rate by
inuencing the expectation and sentiment of the market (Sakakibara, 2000).
Haruhiko Kuroda continued with the similar strategy while he was in charge
of interventions between 8th July 1999 and 14th January 2003 (Ito and Yabu,
2007). In general, interventions only happened in 1.77% days of the days,
but the amount per intervention day was increased to 519.5 billion JPY.
The third regime started on 15th January 2003 and continued until 16th
March 2004. Featured with large-scale and highly frequent interventions, the
regime was labeled as the Great Intervention(Taylor, 2006). When Zenbee
Mizoguchi took charge of currency interventions, the precarious economic
condition in Japan1 forced him to take more active approach towards currency
interventions. The frequent and large-scale interventions were to prevent the
yens sharp appreciation by moderating its appreciation speed so that the
stagnant economy can be back on a recovery track. During the 2003-2004
period, interventions happened on 30.28% of total days, and the amount per
1The stock prices were in deep decline and the market mood was near-crisis.
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Table 4.1: Japans Intervention Regimes
Regimes Regime 1 Regime 2 Regime 3
Intervention Days 165 49 129
Total Days 1541 2765 426
Ratio of Intervention Days 10.71% 1.77% 30.28%
Total Intervention Amounts 7747.9 25455.4 35256.4
Amounts per intervention day 46.96 519.50 273.31
Source of Intervention Data: Ministry of Finance, Japan
Note: The unit of intervention data is billion yen.
intervention day was 273.31 billion JPY.
In summary, this section presents the three intervention regimes of Japanese
in details. Before we analyse them separately, we will review the related lit-
erature about the transmission channels, estimation methodology of the cur-
rency intervention, speculation and sentiment, and build a new microstruc-
ture framework.
4.3 Theoretical Framework of Currency Intervention,
Speculation and Sentiment
This section sets up a theoretical framework to test the e¤ectiveness of cur-
rency intervention through the signalling and coordination channels. A dis-
tinctive feature of our framework is the inclusion of the forward rate bias,
speculation and sentiment. The section is organized as follows: The forward
JPY/USD exchange rate bias is presented and adopted for tests of the sig-
nalling channel. The coordination channel and the reaction function of cen-
tral banks are based on a market microstructure considering exchange rate
volatility, speculation and sentiment. We conclude the section with empirical
testing criteria.
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4.3.1 Forward Rate Bias, Central Bank Credibility and the Sig-
nalling Channel
The section builds a framework for the signnalling channel. We discuss the
forward rate bias and the central bank credibility which play important roles
in testing the e¤ectiveness of the signalling channel.
Forward Rate Bias
This section focuses on the forward premium puzzle caused by the bias of
the forward exchange rate. Under the e¢ cient market hypothesis, the risk
neutral agents expect the future spot rate to be equal to the forward rate:
f t+kt = Et(st+k): (4.1)
In addition, if the agents form their expectations rationally, the future spot
exchange rate can be expressed as
st+k= Et(st+k) + t+k; (4.2)
where Et(t+k) = 0.
Accordingly, a prediction equation of future spot rate can be formed as
st+k= f
t+k
t +t+k; (4.3)
or equivalently
(st+k st) = (f t+kt  st) + t+k; (4.4)
where (st+k st) denotes the change in the spot rate from period t to t+ k, and
(f t+kt   st) is the forward premium or discount. The above equation can then
be transformed into a testable regression function:
(st+k st) =  + (f t+kt  st) + t+k: (4.5)
If the forward contracts mature in the next period, the above regression
function can be written as
(st+1 st) =  + (f t+1t  st) + t+1: (4.6)
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If the CIP condition holds, we have another function
(st+1 st) =  + (it it ) + t+1: (4.7)
Under the joint market e¢ ciency conditions, (f t+1t  st) is a unbiased pre-
dictor, i.e.,  = 0 and  = 1. However, based on a vast amount of empirical
studies for di¤erent currencies and time periods, there is little support for
the forward rate unbiasedness, i.e., the coe¢ cient  << 1, which is referred
as the forward premium puzzle or forward rate bias puzzle (MacDonald and
Taylor, 1989; Engel, 1996).
Using monthly data sample between December 1996 and April 2004, Frankel
and Poonawala (2010) nd that the pooled slope  estimates were negative
for developed country currencies: The exchange rates not only failed to move
in the direction indicated by forward discount, but moved in the opposite
direction. Loring and Lucey (2013) conrm that the  estimate of JPY/USD
was negative from December 1996 to September 2010, which is adopted as a
stylized fact for later tests on the e¤ectiveness of the signalling channel.
Central Bank Credibility
If the information is incomplete, market agents may depend on the near-term
exchange rate movements as indications for future exchange rate movements.
They may continue purchasing an appreciating currency or selling an depreci-
ating currency, which enforces the exchange rate misalignments and increases
exchange rate volatility. Therefore, the signalling channel works if currency
interventions change the agents expectations on the exchange rate move-
ments.
Under the main hypothesis that central banks have information advan-
tages (Humpage, 1986), they are expected to make prots through currency
interventions at the expense of speculators against the monetary authority
(Friedman, 1953). Therefore, the interventions without prots may fail to
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generate creditable signals to change the expectations of market agents and
caused the ine¤ectiveness of the signalling channel.
We use the Japanese interventions to illustrate the above mechanism. The
aim of currency intervention is to depreciate JPY. If the market agents expect
the yen to depreciate, i.e., (Et(st+1jI t)  st) > 0, based on the new information
through interventions, we can say that the Japanese interventions work ef-
ciently through the signalling channel. In order to generate a creditable
signal, Bank of Japan should make prots from the interventions, at least in
the long-term. Here, I propose to use the following prot function to measure
the central banks prots:
K=
KX
k=1
"
Ik(st sk)  (ik i?k)
KX
j=1
Ij
#
; (4.8)
where K denotes the overall prots that the Japanese monetary authori-
ties earn from the interventions between periods 1 and K, Ik denotes the
amount of USD purchased during the period k, (st sk) measures the change
in the JPY/USD exchange rate, and (ik i?k) denotes the short-term Japanese
and U.S. interest rate di¤erential, which measures the interest rate costs of
Japanese intervention or the divergence of the Japanese and U.S. monetary
policies.
If we focus one period ahead expected prot Et(t+1) after the intervention,
the above prot equation can be simplied as
Et(t+1) = I t

(Et(st+1)  st)  (it i?t )

; (4.9)
where the change in the agentsexpectations ((Et(st+1jI t)  st) is replaced by
(Et(st+1)  st), the Japanese central banks expected change in the exchange
rate, because the two parties will have same information after interventions.
In general, the e¤ectiveness of the signalling channel tends to increase
with the prot probability of the central bank. Protability is a criterion on
the credibility of currency intervention, one important prerequisite for the
e¤ectiveness of the signalling channel. However, it is not for measuring the
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e¤ects of currency intervention, especially when the central bank aims to
stabilize the exchange rate (Edison, 1993).
Summary
Based on the above discussions, if the Japanese interventions are to depre-
ciate JPY, e.g., 4st+1> 0, the prerequisite for the e¤ectiveness of the sig-
nalling channel is that the market agents expect the yen to depreciate, i.e.,
(Et(st+1jI t)  st) > 0 or (f t+1t  st) < 0 with the existence of the forward rate bias.
As the protability of the currency interventions increases the credibility of
the central banks, the criterion (it it ) < 0 may support the e¤ectiveness of the
signalling channel.
4.3.2 Market Microstructure Model of the Coordination Channel
and Reaction Function
Introduction
The section starts with presention of one inuential model of the coordina-
tion channel, then builds a new model with consideration of exchange rate
volatility, speculation and sentiment, which provides theoretical foundation
for studies on the coordination channel and reaction function.
The Reitz and Taylor Model
With the assumption that exchange rates are determined in an order-driven
market with heterogeneous agents (Bacchetta and van Wincoop, 2006; De
Gauwe and Grimaldi, 2006), Reitz and Taylor (2008 and 2012) build a mi-
crostructure model of the coordination channel. Unlike the signalling channel,
there is no assumption that the central bank is better informed than private
agents. Although the foreign exchange market is a decentralised dealer mar-
ket, it can still be analysed in a batched and centralized trading structure
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(Kyle, 1985; Evans and Lyons, 2002) because the batch structure may act as
a proxy for the prevailing lack of information transparency (Vitale, 1999).
In the Kyle framework, traders demand currency through market orders
which are lled immediately at the best available price. Depending on the
demand level of the traders, the market maker lls the orders at an exchange
rate divergent from the previous rate. There are three distinctive sources
of exchange rate variation, i.e., publicly available information that directly
a¤ects the market markers price-setting decisions, indirect public informa-
tion that may operate via induced order ows, and order ows unrelated to
publicly available information.
The main assumption of the microstructure model of the coordination
channel is as follows: Changes in the exchange rate are determined by, among
other sources, the net order ows from the central bank interventions, and
the overall trades of the informed and uninformed speculators, as the market
maker can not observe them individually. Therefore, the log-linear function
of changes in the exchange rate can be expressed as
4st+1= aM(DInt +DUnt ) + t+1; (4.10)
where aM denotes positive coe¢ cient of speculation and intervention deter-
mined by the market maker, DInt and DUnt respectively denote the net order
ows of the informed and uninformed speculators, and the noise term t+1
captures direct public information.
Speculators are assumed to be rational and risk-neutral. They take orders
depending on their expected excess returns which consist of the expected
changes in the exchange rate and the interest rate di¤erentials. However,
speculators many di¤erent expections of the exchange rate based on the same
information.
Informed traders form their expectations of future exchange rate changes
4st+1 based on their analysis of fundamental information2. The order ows
2Reitz and Taylor propose to use the time-varying long-run equilibrium exchange rate pppt as fundamental
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from informed speculators reduce the deviation pppt st and revert the ex-
change rate towards its long-run equilibrium with a time-varying coe¢ cient
wt. Correlated with the condence of the informed speculators in fundamen-
tals, wt is expressed as a function of past performances as well as interventions.
Therefore, with the weighting coe¢ cient wt, the orders of informed specula-
tors are determined by the deviations from the real exchange rate, or relative
prices, and interest rate di¤erentials:
DInt = a
Iwt(pppt st) + bIn(it it) = aInwt(p?t pt) + bIn(it it): (4.11)
Uninformed speculators are assumed to be lack of complete information
with respect to the underlining economic fundamentals, and may derive their
orders from chartist or technical trading rules (Sager and Taylor, 2006).
Given that the forecasting devices of most trading rules are based on his-
torical exchange rates, with consideration of the interest rate di¤erential, the
following order equation is proposed by Reitz and Taylor (2008, 2012):
DUnt = a
Un(4st) + bUn(it   it): (4.12)
In summary, the Reitz and Taylor model provides a simple but elegant
microstructure for the coordination channel. However, their model has some
limitations. Firstly, most studies have failed to support the existence of
the purchasing power parity. Even if the relative prices p?t pt measures the
deviations pppt st, the CPI data are only available monthly3, which makes it
di¢ cult to implement a high frequency analysis. Therefore, further studies
on the microstructure of the coordination channel are still needed.
A new Microstructure Framework
With consideration of exchange rate volatility, speculation and sentiment, the
information.
3One exception is daily online price index from http://www.pricestats.com/. However, the data starts
from 2007, and only the US and Argentina series are publicly available.
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section builds a new market microstructure model based on Reitz and Taylor
(2008 and 2012). The model provides theoretical foundations to explain the
mechanism of the coordination channel and the reaction function of central
banks.
There are several assumptions for our market microstructure model:
1. Exchange rates are determined in an order-driven market with het-
erogeneous agents (Bacchetta and van Wincoop, 2006; De Gauwe and
Grimaldi, 2006).
2. The main purposes of the central banks interventions are, with the
coordination of speculators, to appreciate the domestic currency amid
its sharp depreciation (or vice versa), or reduce exchange rate volatility.
3. Central banks are informed about economic fundamentals. However,
there is no requirement for central banks to have information advantages
over other market agents. The order ow of central bank convey indirect
information reecting economic fundamentals.
4. Speculators are rational and risk-neutral and can be classied into two
groups, i.e., informed speculators and uninformed speculators. The mar-
ket maker can not observe their individual orders but the overall trades
of the informed and uninformed private speculator.
5. Informed speculators make their expectation of exchange rate change
and volatility based on the direct fundamental information in the near
future, e.g., prices, interest rates, and indirect information from the cen-
tral bank activities, e.g. interventions. Unlike Reitz and Taylor (2008,
2012), informed speculators do not have information on long-term equi-
librium exchange rate, e.g., real exchange rates.
The index i is used to represents the types of agents in the foreign exchange
market, i.e., i = M for overall orders of informed and uninformed speculators,
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i = In for informed speculators, i = Un for uninformed speculators, and i = A
for central banks. The change in the exchange rate 4st+1 is determined by,
among other sources, the net order ows from the central bank interventions,
and the overall trades of the informed and uninformed private speculators
(DInt +D
Un
t ), as the market maker can not observe them individually. Therefore,
the log-linear function of exchange rate change may be expressed as
4st+1= aMt (DInt +DUnt )+t+1; (4.13)
where aM > 0 denotes positive e¤ects of speculations and intervention de-
termined by the market maker, DInt and DUnt denote the net order ows of
informed and uninformed speculators respectively, and the noise term t+1
captures e¤ects of the direct public information.
We propose to use a variant type of standard mean-variance function (En-
gel, 1996) to express the order ows of informed speculators DInt with respect
to risk-adjusted excess returns. The informed speculators are assumed to have
direct short-term fundamental information and indirect information from the
central bank activities, but not information on the long-term real exchange
rates.
The order ows DInt increase with

(EInt (st+1)  st)  (it   it )

, the expected
excess return rate, and decrease with the rate of expected exchange rate
volatility 4Int (st+1). The expectations of excess returns can be separated into
the expected exchange rate variation EInt (st+1) st, and the interest rate di¤er-
ential (it   it). The variation

EInt (st+1)  st

can be interpreted as a temporary
deviation exploitable by speculators.
Without intervention e¤ects, the initial speculation volume can be ex-
pressed as
DInt = a
In
t

EInt (st+1)  st

+bInt (i

t   it) + cInt
4Int (st+1) ; (4.14)
where aInt , bInt and cInt respectively measure the e¤ects of the expected exchange
rate variation, interest rate di¤erential, and volatility on the speculation vol-
ume Dit at time t. According to the assumptions, we expect aInt > 0, bInt > 0 and
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cInt < 0 so that informed speculators can maximise their risk-adjusted prots
based on available information.
New fundamental information from the interventions It a¤ects the in-
formed speculatorsexpectations on the future spot exchange rate EInt (st+1)
and volatility 4Int (st+1). With the existence of interventions, the order ows
of informed speculators can be updated to
DInt = a
In
t

EInt (st+1jI t)  st

+bInt (i

t it) + cInt
4Int (st+1jI t) ; (4.15)
where aInt > 0, bInt > 0 and cInt < 0. If currency interventions e¤ectively raise
their expected exchange rate level

EInt (st+1jI t)  st

, and reduce the rate of
expected volatility 4Int (st+1jIt), informed speculators are likely to increase
their positions in the direction of interventions. In other words, informed
speculators tend to coordinate with currency interventions with increasing
EInt (st+1jIt) and decreasing 4Int (st+1jIt) < 4Int (st+1), vice versa.
In our framework, uninformed speculators are lack of fundamental infor-
mation on both the long-term equilibrium exchange rate, and short-term
exchange rate level and volatility. They tend to rely on chartist or tech-
nical trading strategies, rather than the publicly available information and
information provided by interventions. Sager and Taylor (2006) nd that
many curreny managers derive their orders from chartist or technical trading
rules based on historical exchange rates. Taylor and Allen (1992) also observe
that a large mount of uninformed traders follow trend-following extrapolative
strategies.
With consideration of the interest rate di¤erential, we follow the propo-
sition from Reitz and Taylor (2008, 2012) and express the order ows of
uninformed speculators as
DUnt = a
Un(4st) + bUn(it   it); (4.16)
where both aUnt and bUnt > 0, which means that the order ows of unformed
speculators are positively correlated with changes in the exchange rate and
the interest rate di¤erential.
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From the above equation, currency interventions have no e¤ects on the
order ows of uninformed speculators. In other words, the interventions have
little impact on the behaviour of uninformed speculators. In order to work
through the coordination channel, central banks have to coordinate with
informed speculators.
We then model the orders of the central bank, interventions It, with a
central bank reaction function to shed light on the behaviour of the central
banks and to test certain theories related to currency interventions.
The central bank is assumed to implement leaning against the windinter-
ventions, i.e., the central bank buys (sells) foreign currency when the domestic
currency has appreciated (depreciated). Fore example, most Japanese inter-
ventions fall in this group. The Japanese monetary authorities buy USD amid
appreciation of JPY against USD. The central bank may also react if they
expect the exchange rate volatility increase in the next period, 4At (st+1)> 0.
Furthermore, the central bank may coordinate with the informed and unin-
formed speculators who are biding in the same direction, (DInt +DUnt ). There-
fore, the central banks reaction function can be expressed as
It= t(4st) + t
4At (st+1)+t(DInt +DUnt ); (4.17)
where It denotes the amount of interventions at time t, t< 0 as the central
bank bank implements leaning against windinterventions, t> 0 to reect the
positive reaction of the interventions to the expected volatility changes, and
t> 0 to present the coordinations between the central bank and speculators.
Based on the stylised fact, the  estimates of the JPY/USD rate were al-
ways negative from December 1996 to September 2010. Accordingly, if the ex-
planatory variable of the expected change in the exchange rate

EInt (st+1jI t)  st

is replaced by #t(f t+1t  st), we should expect the sign of the coe¢ cient #t to be
negative.
We can further assume that the central bank and informed speculators
have the same expected volatility, i.e., At (st+1) = 4Int (st+1jI t) = t(st+1). t(st+1)
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can be represented by the implied volatility IV t, which measures the expected
exchange rate volatility implicit in currency option prices (Dominguez, 1998).
IV t not only provides an unbiased estimate for the expected exchange rate
volatility if the options are e¢ ciently priced but also measures the long-term
exchange volatility as it is calculated from options that expire in future.
After considering the forward rate bias and implied volatility, the new
microstructure model is concluded with the following equations:
4st+1= aMt (DInt +DUnt ) + t+1; (4.18)
DInt = a
In
t #t(f
t+1
t  st) + bInt (it it) + cInt [4IV t] ; (4.19)
DUnt = a
Un(4st) + bUn(it it); (4.20)
It= t(4st) + t [4IV t] +t(DInt +DUnt ); (4.21)
where aMt , aInt , bInt , aUnt , bUnt , t and t> 0; #t, cInt , and t< 0.
Therefore, based on the above setups with the forward rate bias and im-
plied volatility, we can present empirical testing criteria for the e¤ectiveness
of the coordination channel. If the Japanese currency interventions are with
commitment of depreciating domestic currency, 4st+1> 0, the main criteria is
that (DIt+D
U
t ) > 0.
As it is only informed speculators that are supposed to coordinate with
the information provided by the central bank, we should expect that DInt > 0.
However, as the orders of informed speculators and uninformed ones are
assumed to be indistinguishable, we can not nd the real volume of DInt .
Therefore, the following supporting criteria, i.e., (it it ) < 0, (f t+1t  st) < 0 and
4IV t< 0 may support the e¤ectiveness of the coordination channel. With
respect to the reaction function of the central bank, we assume expect to nd
4st< 0, 4IV t> 0, (DInt +DUnt ) < 0.
As mentioned in the literature review section, actual speculation data is
not always available and sentiment measures may be needed as proxies. We
can use the COT sentiment index, COTt, dened by the net long speculators
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Table 4.2: Test Criterion of Currency Intervention
Channel Main Criteria Supporting Criterion
Signalling (f t+1t  st) < 0 (it it ) < 0
Coordination COT t < 0 (it it ) < 0; (f t+1t  st) < 0;4IV t< 0
Reaction Function: 4st< 0;4IV t> 0; COT t> 0
positions on JPY futures from the Commitments of Traders reports as a
measure of the total speculations on the decrease in the JPY/USD rate, i.e.,
 (DIt+DUt ). Hence, the equtions (3.18) and (3.21) are changed to
4st+1=  aMt COT t+t+1; (4.22)
It= t(4st) + t [4IV t] tCOT t: (4.23)
Accordingly, the main testing criterion of the coordination channel becomes
COT t< 0 and, for the reaction function, 4st< 0, 4IV t> 0, COT t> 0 may be
needed.
4.3.3 Testing Criteria for Channels and Reaction function
This section summarises the testing criteria for the e¤ectiveness of the sig-
nalling and coordination channels and the factors attributable to the reactions
of central banks. Table 4.2 lists the testing criteria for transmission chan-
nels and reaction function if the Japanese currency interventions are with
commitment of depreciating JPY.
For the e¤ectiveness of the signalling approach, the main criterion is that
forward and spot rate di¤erential decreases. Meanwhile, the main prerequisite
of the e¤ectiveness of the coordination channel is that speculators coordinate
with the central banks interventions. In other words, the speculation on JPY
appreciation decreases, COT t < 0, with the interventions.
It seems that the e¤ectiveness of the signalling and coordination chan-
nels are related as both (f t+1t  st) < 0 and (it it ) < 0 increase the possibility of
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excess returns for the speculators. Accordingly, they may be more willing
to coordinate with the central bank. At the same time, the decrease of ex-
pected change of volatility, measured by the change of the implied volatility
4IV t< 0, may reduce the risk of the speculation and support the coordination
of speculators and the central bank.
Table 4.2 also shows the test criteria for the central banks reaction func-
tion. The tests are to nd whether the Japanese monetary authorities were re-
sponding to the yens sharp appreciation, 4st< 0, excess exchange rate volatil-
ity, 4IV t> 0, or increase in speculation on the yens appreciation, COT t> 0.
After the theoretical discussions, the following sections present the cointe-
grated VAR methodology and conduct related empirical analysis for separate
intervention regimes.
4.4 Variable Description of the Three Regimes
The rst issue for empirical analysis is the right choice of variables. Based
on our previous empirical ndings, it is important to include a variable on
currency speculation and sentiment into the analysis together with the funda-
mental variables such as exchange rates, long- and short-term interest rates.
If the relevant data on the forward rate bias and exchange rate volatility
is available, it is useful to consider them given their importance in the mi-
crostructure model. Accordingly, the main variables we consider are as fol-
lows:
4st= the weekly percentage change in the spot JPY/USD rate4,
(f t+1t  st) = the weekly forward premium rate5,
(is;t is;t) = the di¤erence of the Japanese and US treasury bill rates with
maturity of 3 months,
4The variable is in the form of 100 times the di¤erential of logarithm of the exchange rate in terms of the
units of JPY per USD.
5It is measured by 100 times the di¤erence between the logarithm of the forward rate with maturity of
one week and the logarithm of the spot exchange rate
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(il;t il;t) = the di¤erence of the Japanese and US treasury bond rates with
maturity of 10 years,
4IV t= the weekly percentage change in the implied volatility of the JPY/USD
rate,
It = the weekly amount of the Japanese currency interventions to depreci-
ate JPY, dened as a purchase of USD in unit of billion USD,
COT t= the weekly net long speculators positions on JPY futures from
Commitments of Traders reports of the Chicago Mercantile Exchange, which
is a good measure of the total speculations on decrease of the JPY/USD rate,
i.e.,  (DIt +DUt ), and the sentiment of speculators6.
The main data source is Bloomberg because it provides data in weekly
frequency which is not available from traditional sources like International
Financial Statistics of IMF. The exceptions are the intervention data, which
is from Japans Ministry of Finance, and the speculation and sentiment which
is based on the data from the US Commodity Futures Trading Commission.
All the data is based on the end-of-the-day values on Tuesdays in order to
accommodate the COT reports which breakdown the JPY futures positions
every Tuesday.
The following sections provide a detailed cointegrated VAR analysis to
nd the long-run relations, short-run dynamics, and long-run impact of the
currency intervention, speculation and sentiment. The analysis is conducted
in di¤erent regimes of the Japanese currency interventions to identify the fac-
tors that the Japanese monteary authorities reacted to, the channels through
which the interventions were e¤ective.
6COTt measures the speculation activities in the foreign exchange market as it has a strong contempo-
raneous relationship with exchange rate movements (Klitgaard and Weir, 2004). Meanwhile, central banks
have used it as a quantitative measure to assess speculative activities in the currency market (Ito, 2005).
As a widely used indirect sentiment index, COTt can also measure the sentiment of currency speculators
(Wang, 2004).
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Figure 4.1: Main Variables in the First Regime, 1993-1995
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4.5 Analysis of the First Intervention Regime
4.5.1 Variable Description and Model Setup
For the rst regime between 1st April 1991 and 20th June 1995, our analysis
covers the period from 16th March 1993 to 20th June 1995 and uses the fol-
lowing variables: 4st, (f t+1t  st), (is;t is;t), (il;t il;t), It, and COT t are considered7.
In Figure 1, changs in the JPY/USD rate and the forward premia were
stationary around zero expect for the period between 1993 and 1995. The
short- and long-term interest rate di¤erentials both had downward trends,
which meant that the Japanese interest rates decreased more than the U.S.
ones. Given the Japanese interventions happened quite frequently, It is used
7The volatility data was not available between 1st April 1991 and 20th June 1995. While the data on the
weekly short-term interest rates was only available from 29th March 1992, there was no intervention between
March 1992 and March 1993.
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instead of the cumulated interventions. Meanwhile, the speculation and sen-
timent variable COT t had big swings in this period, with a double-bottom
pattern appearing at the end of 1993 and 1994.
The empirical analysis with the variable vector Xt  I(1), is based on
the maximal value of the likelihood function with an additional penalising
factor related to the number of estimated parameters. The Schwartz and
the Hannan-Quinn information criteria suggest the number of lags to be
2. Accordingly, the error correction representation for our VAR(2) model
becomes
4Xt =  4Xt 1+10Xt 1+0+Dt+"1;t;
"1;t  N(0;); t = 1993 : 03 : 16  1995 : 06 : 20:
Based on the standard residual errors, there were impulse dummies, namely
dum930427p and dum950307p, on 27th April 1993 and 7thMarch 1995, which
are ...,0,1,0,...dummies measuring permanent shocks on the forward premia
and exchange rates.
Table 4.3 presents some important multivariate and univariate misspeci-
cation test statistics, with signicant test statistics in bold face. Based on LM
tests, there was no serious residual autocorrelation at the multivariate level
with p-value of larger than 0.05. This result was supported at the univariate
level as only the forward premia showed some sign of ARCH e¤ects. How-
ever, normality was rejected at the multivariate level with p-value of 0. The
non-normality was mainly due to excess kurtosis in the forward premium,
currency intervention, and speculation and sentiment. Given a cointegrated
VAR model is robust to moderate AR exoects and excess kurtosis, the current
model specication is kept for further analysis.
The cointegration rank divides the variables into r stationary relations
towards which the system is adjusting and p  r nonstationary relations which
are pushing the system8. We rst report the degrees of integration of each
8According to main assumptions of a cointegrated VAR model, we should expect to nd r stationary
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variable based on the ADF unit root tests. If the t-statistics larger than
the critical value 2.89, we reject the null hypothesis of unit root at the 5%
level of signicance, which indicates that the respective variable is stationary
I(0). If not, the variable is nonstationary I(1). Accordingly, we nd that 4st;
(f t+1t  st); It ~ I(0) and (is;t is;t); (il;t il;t); COT t ~ I(1). Table 4.3 also reports the
trace test statistics which suggest accepting r = 39.
We conduct tests of weak exogeneity on individual variables to investigate
the absence of the feed-back e¤ects. If the hypothesis that the variable Xi does
not adjust to the equilibrium errors is accepted, the corresponding variable
becomes a driving variable in the model while not being pushed in the system.
We nd that the short- and long-term interest rate di¤erentials are weakly
exogenous with their 2 test statistics 2.438 and 2.577 smaller than the critical
value 7:82.
4.5.2 Testing Transmission Channels and Reaction Function
This section tests hypotheses on transmission channels of currency interven-
tion and the reaction function of the central bank after imposing r = 3. The
hypothesis tests are in the form of  = (H1;  1;  2), where the relation H1 is
restricted and other two relations  1 and  2 are unrestricted. This procedure
facilitates the search of best hypothetical relations. We can nd the main
results on the hypothesis tests in Table 4.4.
H1:1:1 to H1:1:4 are hypothesis tests on the e¤ectiveness of the signalling
channel. The tests are based on the variables of forward premia (f t+1t  st),
interest rate di¤erentials (is;t is;t) and (il;t il;t), and interventions It. We nd
that, combined with e¤ects of interest rate di¤erentials, the increase in cur-
rency intervention was signicantly correlated with an increase in forward
premia. Therefore, the results rejected the long-run e¤ectiveness of the sig-
variables without unit root and p-r variables with a unit root.
9The rank test results conrm our ndings based on ADF unit root tests. In the remaining sections of
my thesis, similar ADF and rank tests are adopted to help us nd right number of cointegrating vectors.
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Table 4.3: Misspecication and Rank Tests, 1993-1995
Multivariate Misspecication Tests
Autocorrelation: LM1: 2(36) = 30:70 with p-value 0.72
LM2: 2(36) = 28:45 with p-value 0.81
Normality: 2(12) = 130:60 with p-value 0:00
Univariate Misspecication Tests
42st 4(f t+1t   st) 4(is;t   is;t) 4(il;t   il;t) 4It 4COTt
ARCH(2) 0:93 16:79 0:47 3:61 2:72 0:10
Normality 4:18 9:60 1:10 3:34 118:26 6:32
Skewness  0:19  0:07  0:17 0:04 2:53 0:20
Kurtosis 3:69 4:24 3:15 3:58 12:56 3:94
Univariate Stationarity Tests
4st (f t+1t   st) (is;t   is;t) (il;t   il;t) It COTt
Unit Root 13:12 11:41 0:11 1:33 6:04 2:29
Process I(0) I(0) I(1) I(1) I(0) I(1)
Rank Tests
r = 0 r = 1 r = 2 r = 3 r = 4 r = 5
p-value 0.00 0.00 0.014 0.31 0.39 0.69
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Table 4.4: Testing Stationarity of Single Relations, 1993-1995
4st (f t+1t   st) (is;t   is;t) (il;t   il;t) It COTt Trend p-value
Tests on the Signalling Channel
H1:1:1 1 -0.044  0:091 0:851
H1:1:2 1 0.024 -0.083 0.003 0:861
H1:1:3 1 -0.023 -0.042 -0.080 0.904
H1:1:4 1 0.037 -0.039 -0.075 0.003 1
Tests on the Coordination Channel
H1:2:1 -4.353 1 0:533
H1:2:2  3:237 1 0.028 0:891
Tests on the Reaction Function
H1:3:1 2.381 1 0.119 0:989
H1:3:2 5.279 1 0.675 0.014 0:983
nalling channel in the 1993-1995 period.
The tests of the e¤ectiveness of the coordination channel were related to
the H1:2:1 and H1:2:2. With an increase in yen-depreciating currency interven-
tion, currency speculation COT t increased, which was against the e¤ectiveness
of the coordination channel.
The tests on the reaction function of the central bank, H1:3:1 and H1:3:2, are
to nd whether the central bank react to the yens appreciation, 4st< 0, or
the increasing speculation and sentiment, COT t> 0. We nd that the inter-
ventions were reacting to the JPY appreciation. However, the central bank
implemented more interventions when speculation and sentiment on JPY
were low.
All the above hypotheses are not rejected with the p-value larger than
0:05. The hypothesis tests provide candidates for the long-run cointegration
relations. Based on the test results, we will identify the long-run structure to
reveal the reaction function and the e¤ectiveness of the transmission channels.
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Table 4.5: Identied Long-Run Structure, 1993-1995
4st (f t+1t   st) (is;t   is;t) (il;t   il;t) It COTt Trend
ecm1;t 1 -0.021 -0.047 -0.075
ecm2;t -1.263 -2.836 1
ecm3;t 3.527 1 0.349 0.007
4.5.3 Identied Long-Run Structure
The search of a well-specied long-run structure is based on the  matrix
of the unrestricted model and the previous hypothesis tests. We adopt the
automatic procedure "CATS Mining" of the tailor made toolbox, CATS in
RATS, version 2 (Dennis, et. al., 2005), to facilitate our seach of most fea-
sible long-run structure. The algorithm is based on Omtzigt (2002) for con-
structing long run structures with CATS. It begins with the most restricted
relations, adds new varialbes into cointegrating vectors only until station-
arity is obtained, and reports all plausible restricted models with potential
cointegrating relations10.
We then manually select our models based on the following criteria: Firstly,
the p-value of the candidate should be normally larger than 0.20 to ensure
the stability of the cointegrating vectors which is essential for being econom-
ically meaningful (Juselius, 2006). Secondly, the sign of coe¢ cients of the
long-run relations should be the same as our theory and hypothesis tests sug-
gest. Finally, the absolute values of the coe¢ cients should be reasonable, not
extravagant.
Based on the Cats-mined results and our selection criteria, we accept the
cointegration structure listed in Table 4.5 with a p-value of 0.77.
The rst long-run cointegration relation focuses on the e¤ectiveness of the
10For more technical details of the algorithm, please refer to the section B.8 of Dennis, et. al. (2005) and
Omtzigt (2002).
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signalling channel:
(f t+1t  st)  0:021(is;t is;t)  0:047(il;t il;t)  0:075I t+error term = 0: (4.24)
The interpretation is that the forward premium rate is positively related to
currency intervention and the short- and long-term interest rate di¤erentials.
According to the testing criteria in Table 4.2, the positive relationship be-
tween the forward premium rate and currency intervention meant that the
signalling channel was not e¤ective between 1993 and 1995.
The second relation is mainly about the e¤ectiveness of the coordination
channel:
COT t   1:263(il;t il;t)  2:836I t+error term = 0: (4.25)
The speculation and sentiment variable COT t was positively correlated with
currency intervention. In other words, an increase in currency intervention
was related to an increase in speculation and sentiment. Therefore, in the
rst regime the main criterion of the e¤ectiveness of the coordination channel
was not fullled.
The third relation reveals the central banks long-run reaction function:
It + 3:5274 st + 0:349COT t + 0:007Trend+ error term = 0: (4.26)
The Japanese interventions were negatively correlated with changes in the
JPY/USD exchange rate, which supported the leaning against the wind
assumption. However, the negative relation between currency intervention
and the speculation and sentiment variable meant that interventions were
not reactions to the speculation and sentiment on JPY.
In summary, between 1993 and 1995, there was no supportive evidence
for the long-run e¤ectiveness of the signalling and coordination channels.
The Japanese central bank reacted to the yens appreciation with leaning
against the wind interventions. There were no evidence that the central
bank implemented interventions against the speculation and sentiment on
JPY.
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Table 4.6: Short-Run Dynamics,1993- 995
42st 4(f t+1t   st) 4It 4COTt
42st 1 0.033
4(f tt 1   st 1) -0.888 0.142 0.559
4(is;t 1   is;t 1) -1.114
4(il;t 1   il;t 1) -1.144
4It 1 0.230
ecm1;t 1 -1.237 1.310
ecm2;t 1 0.019 0.204
ecm3;t 1 0.380
Constant 0.172 -0.168 -0.214
dum930427p -0.666 2.002
dum950307p -6.09 0.537 2.283
Notes: The coe¢ cients are signicant with p<0.05.
The ecm variables represent (4.24)- (4.26) respectively.
4.5.4 Short-Run Dynamics
After identication of the long-run structure, we analyse the short-run dy-
namics and summarise the key results in Table 4.6. We discuss the second,
fourth and fth columns of the table because they are closely related to the
transmission channels and the reaction function.
The second column showed that the Japanese currency interventions were
e¤ective: an intervention of one billion USD reduced the rate of JPY change
by 0.23% in the following week and the same amount of excess interventions
by another 0.38%. The impressive e¤ects of interventions in reducing the
yens appreciation speed may come from either the signalling or coordination
channel. Meanwhile, the negative relationship between the forward premium
rate and the rate of the exchange rate change conrmed the previous ndings
of the forward rate bias.
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The fourth column revealed the short-term dynamics of the reaction func-
tion. The excess speculation and sentiment ecm2;t 1 had positive e¤ects on
currency intervention: The central bank reacted to the extreme speculation
and sentiment on JPY. Meanwhile, an increase in forward premia (f tt 1 st 1)
caused more interventions, which indicated a negative correlation between
the changes in the exchange rate and interventions based on the forward rate
bias. In other words, the central bank implemented interventions in reaction
to short-term JPY appreciations.
The fth column revealed the factors a¤ecting speculation and sentiment
and the e¤ectiveness of the coordination channel. We found that the spec-
ulation and sentiment is positively related to the JPY depreciation, which
meant the order ows of uninformed speculators and the central bank were
in the opposite direction. Meanwhile, the positive correlation between excess
forward premium ecm1;t 1 and the speculation and sentiment showed that the
informed speculators did not coordinate with the interventions. Therefore
the coordination channel failed to work during the 1993-1995 period. It was
the signalling channel through which currency intervention worked.
The results on the short-run dynamics are summarised as follows: Firstly,
the Japanese monetary authorities implemented interventions in response to
the sharp short-term JPY appreciation. Secondly, the interventions were ef-
fective in the short-term through the signalling channel. The interventions
greatly reduced the speed of the JPY appreciation: An intervention of one
billion USD reduced the rate of JPY change in the next week by as much as
0.61%. Thirdly, the coordination channel failed to work because the specu-
lators did not coordinate.
4.5.5 Long-Run Impact of Shocks
After the description of the short-run dynamics, this section illustrates the
long-run impact of a shock to our model. As we are interested in the nal
impact of a permanent shock to the variables, the estimates of the impact
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Table 4.7: Long-Run Impact, 1993-1995P
"4st
P
"(f t+1t  st)
P
"(is;t is;t)
P
"(il;t il;t)
P
"It
P
"COTt
4st  0:22 0:17  0:18
(f t+1t   st) 0:03 0:56 0:02
(is;t   is;t) 0:85
(il;t   il;t) 0:92
It 0:37  0:47 0:30
COTt 1:13 1:31 0:94
Notes: Only signicant coe¢ cients with t-value>1.96 are shown.
matrix are reported in Table 4.7.
Based on column-wise inspections, while the shocks to changes in the
exchange rate and interventions were insignicant. However, the shocks to
the bond yield di¤erential
P
"(il;t il;t) had strong impact on the exchange rate,
currency intervention, speculation and sentiment, which meant the bond yield
di¤erential worked as the driving force of the whole system.
While the impact of forward premium, currency speculation and sentiment
on changes in the exchange rate was negative, their impact on the forward
premium were positive. This not only supported the forward rate bias, but
also reected the signicance of currency speculation and sentiment on the
movements of the JPY/USD rate. A one billion USD long JPY position in
the futures market appreciated JPY by 0.18% during the 1993-1995 period.
Based on row-wise inspections, the positive impact of the forward premium
on currency intervention revealed that the central bank reacted to JPY ap-
preciation. Similarly, the speculation and sentiment on JPY had large impact
on currency intervention. The Japanese central bank intervened 0.37 billion
USD in reaction to a speculative futures position of one billion USD. The
shocks to the long-term interest rate also had positive impact on currency
intervention, which increased the protability and credibility of the central
bank.
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The last row measured the long-term impact of shocks on currency specu-
lation and sentiment. In accordance with equation (4.19), the shocks to the
forward premium had positive impact on currency speculation and sentiment,
which meant informed speculators reduced their long JPY/USD positions in
response to expected JPY appreciation. Similarly, the positive impact of
bond yield shocks supported the equations (4.19) and (4.20): Both informed
and uninformed speculators increased their long JPY futures positions with
widening bond yield di¤erential.
The main results of the long-term shocks are summarised as follows: The
central bank reacted to sharp JPY appreciation and large speculation with
leaning against the windinterventions. While the intervention shocks had no
long-run impact on the JPY/USD rate movements, the speculation on JPY
increased with shocks to the forward premium and bond yield di¤erential,
and had signicant e¤ects on the exchange rate.
4.5.6 Summary
The analysis of the rst Japanese intervention regime focuses on the frequent
but small interventions. The Japanese monetary authorities reacted with
leaning against the windinterventions to both short- and long- term JPY
appreciation. The short-term e¤ects of currency intervention came from the
signalling channel and an intervention of one billion USD reduced the rate
of JPY appreciation in the next week by as much as 0.61%. However, the
interventions were ine¤ective in the long-term. The shocks to the bond yield
di¤erential were the driving force of the whole system and had strong long-
term impact on most other variables.
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Figure 4.2: Main Variables in the Second Regime, 1999-2000
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4.6 Analysis of the Second Intervention Regime
4.6.1 Variable Description and Model Setup
The second intervention regime covered the period, between 21st June 1995
and 14th January 2000, under the leadership of Eisuke Sakakibara and Haruhiko
Kuroda. Given the implied volatility data was not available until 1998 and
there were few interventions from early 1998 to early 1999 and from early
2000 to early 2003, our analysis of the second intervention regime covers the
period between 1 June 1999 and 18th April 2000 and adopts the following
variables: 4st, (f t+1t  st), (is;t is;t), (il;t il;t), 4IV t, It, and COT t.
As Figure 4.2 shows, changes in the JPY/USD rate and the forward pre-
mium rate were not as stationary as in the period of 1993-1995. There were
some uctuations in September 1999 and March 2000. There was a relatively
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stable downward trend in the short-term interest rate di¤erential in the whole
period. Meanwhile, there was a potential trend shift of the long-term inter-
est rate di¤erential in the early 2000. The change in the implied volatility
was relatively stationary around 0. Although the second intervention period
was featured with large but infrequent interventions. We continue to use It
instead of cumulated interventions because there were enough intervention
observations in our 1999-2000 sub-example. The speculation and sentiment
variable COT t had big swings and stayed positive in late 1999.
Table 4.8 presents some important misspecication test statistics. There
was no serious residual autocorrelation: Only the speculation and sentiment
term showed some sign of ARCH e¤ects. However, largely due to excess
kurtosis in currency intervention, speculation and sentiment, normality is
rejected at the multivariate level with a p-value of 0.01. Nevertheless, we
kept the current model setup as its robustness to moderate AR e¤ects and
excess kurtosis.
Based on the univariate stationarity tests, we nd that 4st; (f t+1t  st); 4IV t;
It ~ I(0) and conrm our nding that the rank condition r = 4 from the trace
test statistics. Meanwhile, we nd the weak exogeneity of the short- and
long-term interest rate di¤erentials as their 2 test statistics smaller than the
critical value of 9:49.
4.6.2 Testing Transmission Channels and Reaction Function
We conduct hypothesis tests on the e¤ectiveness of the transmission channels
and the reaction function, and reports main results in Table 4.9. Based on
H2:1:1 to H2:1:5, while currency intervention increased, the forward premium rate
increased and the short-term interest di¤erential decreased, which rejected
the long-term e¤ectiveness of the signalling channel.
H2:2:1 to H2:2:4 tested the e¤ectiveness of the coordination channel. With an
increase in currency intervention, the speculation on JPY decreased. At the
same time, H2:2:3 and H2:2:4 showed the negative relationship between currency
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Table 4.8: Misspecication and Rank Tests, 1999-2000
Multivariate Misspecication Tests
LM2 Test on Autocorrelation: 2(49) = 46:11 with p-value of 0:59
Normality: 2(14) = 28:82 with p-value of 0:01
Univariate Misspecication Tests
42st 4(f t+1t   st) 4(is;t   is;t) 4(il;t   il;t) 42IVt 4It 4COTt
ARCH(2) 3:01 3:04 1:03 0:64 0:81 1:34 8:77
Normality 1:65 1:04 0:33 0:31 2:06 7:37 15:59
Skewness 0:43  0:32  0:17  0:06 0:48 0:96 0:40
Kurtosis 2:92 2:65 2:77 2:36 2:97 4:82 5:54
Univariate Stationarity Tests
4st (f t+1t   st) (is;t   is;t) (il;t   il;t) 4IVt It COTt
Unit Root 5:85 7:65 0:59 1:70 7:70 7:26 1:65
Process I(0) I(0) I(1) I(1) I(0) I(0) I(1)
Rank Tests
r = 0 r = 1 r = 2 r = 3 r = 4 r = 5 r = 6
p-value 0:00 0:00 0:00 0:01 0:14 0:33 0:85
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Table 4.9: Testing Stationarity of Single Relations, 1999-2000
4st (f t+1t   st) (is;t   is;t) (il;t   il;t) 4IVt It COTt Trend p-value
Test of the Signalling Channel
H2:1:1 1 -0.211 -0.183 0.059
H2:1:2 1 -2.62 -0.116 -0.007 0:821
H2:1:3 1 -0.125 0.024 -0.011 0:916
H2:1:4 1 1 0.349 0.059
H2:1:5 1 -0.116 -0.293 -0.065 0.086
Test of the Coordination Channel
H2:2:1 2.814 1 0:609
H2:2:2 2:901 1 0.309 0:501
H2:2:3 0.307 2.820 1 0:548
H2:2:4 0.275 2.784 1 0.018 0:410
Test of Reaction Function
H2:3:1 3.365 1 0.742 0:975
H2:3:2 3.370 0.116 1 0.736 0:992
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Table 4.10: Identied Long-Run Structure, 1999-2000
4st (f t+1t   st) (is;t   is;t) (il;t   il;t) 4IVt It COTt Trend
ecm1;t 4.256 0.152 1 0.802 -0.032
ecm2;t 0.480 1 0.022 -0.033
ecm3;t 1 -0.120 0.024 -0.011
ecm4;t 77.159 0.888 5.001 1
intervention and changes in exchange rate volatility. The test results meant
that, through the coordination channel, currency interventions were e¤ective
and reduced the exchange rate volatility.
The tests on the reaction, H2:3:1 and H2:3:2 showed that the Japanese mon-
etary authorities reacted to the sharp JPY appreciation. However, the in-
terventions happen more likely when the exchange rate was less volatile and
speculation and sentiment on JPY were low.
The hypothesis tests provide us with candidates for identied long-run
cointegration relations. We will explore the long-run structure of the model
based on the test results and reveal the reaction function of the central bank
and whether the intervention channels are e¤ective.
4.6.3 Identied Long-Run Structure
Based on previous hypothesis tests, we obtain an identied long-run structure
with a p-value of 0.39, and list the relations in Table 4.10. Related to H2:3:2,
the rst relation focuses on the reaction function of the central bank:
It + 4:2564 st + 0:1524 IV t + 0:802COT t   0:032Trend+ error term = 0: (4.27)
We found that interventions increased amidst sharp JPY appreciation, which
supports the leaning against the windassumption. Meanwhile, there were
more interventions when the exchange rate volatility and the speculation and
sentiment were low.
With regard to the intervention e¤ects, we found that an intervention of
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one billion USD might e¤ectively depreciate JPY by about 0.07% from the
second relation:
(il;t il;t) + 0:4804 st+0:0224 IV t 0:033I t 0:01Trend+ error term = 0: (4.28)
A one billion intervention may e¤ectively depreciate JPY by about 0.07%.
However, the Japanese interventions seem to be positively related to exchange
rate volatility, which means that there may not a long-term relationship that
interventions reduce volatility in the same period.
Based on H2:1:3, the third relation is about the e¤ectiveness of the signalling
channel:
(f t+1t  st)  0:12(is;t is;t) + 0:0244 IV t   0:011I t+0:02Trend+ error term = 0: (4.29)
The forward premium rate was positively related to the currency interven-
tions, which meant that the signalling channel was not e¤ective. Further-
more, the Japanese currency interventions could not reduce the JPY/USD
rate volatility.
Corresponding the hypothesis tests H2:2:3, the fourth relation is mainly
about the e¤ectiveness of the coordination channel:
COT t + 77:159(is;t is;t) + 0:8884 IV t + 5:001I t+error term = 0: (4.30)
The negative relation between the speculation and sentiment and the Japanese
interventions meant that the main criteria of the e¤ectiveness of the coordi-
nation channel was fullled. Furthermore, currency intervention was nega-
tively correlated with the short-term interest rate di¤erential and rate of the
volatility change, which supported the e¤ectiveness of currency intervention
through the channel.
In summary, the Japanese central bank reacted to the sharp JPY ap-
preciation with leaning against the windinterventions. There was strong
supportive evidence on the e¤ectiveness of the coordination channel, and an
intervention of one billion USD depreciated JPY by about 0.07%. Meanwhile,
the long-run e¤ectiveness of the signalling channel was rejected.
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Table 4.11: Short-Run Dynamics,1999-2000
42st 4(f t+1t   st) 42IVt 4It 4COTt
42st 1 0.277 0.054 -0.422
4(f tt 1   st 1) -5.143
4(is;t 1   is;t 1) -0.457 9.129 -4.583
4(il;t 1   il;t 1) 3.493 -5.504
42IVt 1 -0.016 0.004 0.449
4It 1 0.669
4COTt 1 0.149
4(il;t   il;t) 3.218
ecm1;t 1 -0.019 -0.274
ecm2;t 1 -2.464 4.223
ecm3;t 1 0.997 -0.921 -8.696 6.906 -1.879
ecm4;t 1 0.007 -0.376 -0.155 0.049
Constant -11.666 2.574 -11.796 -5.502 6.327
dum990914 -3.374 2.002
dum000307 -3.447 0.443 -6.304 1.947
di000104 -1.132 2.159
Notes: Only signicant coe¢ cients with p < 0:05 are shown.
The ecm variables are based on (4.27)-(4.30) respectively.
4.6.4 Short-Run Dynamics
We analyse the short-run dynamics of the second regime and present the
results in Table 4.11. Based on the rows of interventions 4I t 1 and excess
interventions ecm1;t 1, the Japanese interventions tended to happen in clus-
ters. Furthermore, the excess interventions ecm1;t 1 had negative e¤ects on
changes in speculation and sentiment 4COT t, which supported the short-run
e¤ectiveness of the coordination channel.
Revealed from the rows on 4COT t 1, and the excess speculation and senti-
125
ment ecm4;t 1, currency speculation and sentiment showed a clustering behav-
iour. Meanwhile, the excess speculation and sentiment had positive e¤ects
on the rate of forward premium change, which meant the excess speculation
increased the rate of JPY appreciation.
The fth column o¤ers ndings related to the reaction function of the
central bank: Interventions happened in clusters. Meanwhile, the excess
forward premium ecm3;t 1 had positive impact on the rate of intervention
change, which meant that he Japanese monetary authorities reacted with
more interventions amidst excess JPY appreciation, which is in line with
the leaning against the windassumption. However, the excess speculation
and sentiment had negative impact on the rate of the intervention change,
which reected that the Japanese central bank reacted with less interventions
amidst excess speculation and sentiment.
In summary, with the existence of the forward rate bias, the interven-
tions were e¤ective in the short-term through the coordination channel. The
Japanese interventions happened in clusters. The leaning against the wind
interventions were reactions to sharp JPY appreciation, not excess specula-
tion and sentiment.
4.6.5 Long-Run Impact of Shocks
After the description of the short-run dynamics, this section illustrates the
long-run impact of shocks and report the results in Table 4.12. The long-run
impact on the reaction function of the central bank was based on the in-
spection of the seventh column. The cumulative shocks to the change in the
exchange rate
P
"4st and to the speculation and sentiment
P
"COTt had nega-
tive long-run impact on currency intervention, while the cumulative shocks to
currency intervention had positive impact on itself. This was in line with the
nding in the short-run dynamic structure: The leaning against the wind
interventions happened in clusters. The central bank did not react to the
excess speculation and sentiment.
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Table 4.12: Long-Run Impact, 1999-2000P
"4st
P
"(f t+1t  st)
P
"(is;t is;t)
P
"(il;t il;t)
P
"4IVt
P
"It
P
"COTt
4st  1:41
(f t+1t   st) 0:90  0:003  0:04
(is;t   is;t) 0:88
(il;t   il;t) 0:79
4IVt  7:03 0:10 1:64
It  0:53 3:36  7:54  0:04 0:09  0:55
COTt 1:14 0:79
Notes: Only signicant coe¢ cients with t-value>1.96 are shown.
While the shocks to currency interventions, speculation and sentiment
had no long-term impact on the exchange rate, the shocks to the short-
and long-term interest rate di¤erentials were the main driving forces of the
system, which had strong impact on most variables, including the change in
the exchange rate.
4.6.6 Summary
The second intervention regime was featured with large but infrequent inter-
ventions. The Japanese monetary authorities reacted to sharp JPY appreci-
ation with leaning against the windinterventions in clusters. They did not
react to large exchange rate volatility, and excess speculation and sentiment.
It was the shocks to the interest rate di¤erentials that drove the change in
the JPY/USD rate. Interventions were e¤ective in both short-term and long-
term through the coordination channel. In the long-term, an intervention of
one billion USD depreciated JPY by about 0.07%.
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Figure 4.3: Main Variables in the Third Regime, 2003-2004
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4.7 Analysis of the Third Intervention Regime
4.7.1 Variable Description and Model Setup
The analysis of the third regime covers the weekly observations between 21
January 2003 and 30th March 2004 and focuses the following variables, i.e. ,
4st, (f t+1t  st), (is;t is;t), (il;t il;t), 4IV t, It, and COT t.
Based on Figure 4.3, the forward premium rate and changes in the JPY/USD
rate were relatively stationary. Except for some uctuations in early and mid-
2003, both the short- and long-term interest rate di¤erentials had a relatively
steady upward trend. The rate of the implied volatility change was relatively
stationary around 0, except for two possible dummies. The Japanese inter-
ventions were large and frequent, especially between late 2003 and early 2004
when the speculative futures volume was high.
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There were impulse dummies, namely dum030624, dum030923, and dum040224,
on 24th June 2003, 23rd September 2003, and 24th February 2004 respec-
tively. The dummy dum030624 measured shocks on the short- and long-
term interest rate di¤erentials, dum030923 on the change of the exchange
rate, the forward premium rate, and the change in the implied volatility,
and dum040224 on the change in the exchange rate change, and specula-
tion. There was also a transitory dummy, namely di030311, on 11th March
2003, measuring transitory shocks on the short- and long-term interest rate
di¤erentials.
Table 4.13 lists some important misspecication test results. Residual au-
tocorrelation at the multivariate level was rejected with p-value of 0.09, and
only the speculation and sentiment term showed some sign of ARCH e¤ects.
However, multivariate normality was rejected due to the excess kurtosis in
currency intervention, speculation and sentiment. Nevertheless, we kept the
current model specication and choose the cointegration rank number to be
3 based on the rank tests and ndings of univariate stationarity tests. Mean-
while, the short- and long-term interest rate di¤erentials, and the speculation
and sentiment variable were weakly exogenous based on their 2 statistics.
4.7.2 Testing Transmission Channels and Reaction Function
Table 14 reports the results of the hypothesis tests on the reaction func-
tion and the e¤ectiveness of transmission channels. Based on H3:1:1-H3:1:4, and
H3:2:1-H3:2:2, currency intervention was positively correlated with the forward
premium rate and the speculation and sentiment, which rejected the long-run
e¤ectiveness of the signalling and coordination channels. The positive rela-
tionship between currency intervention and changes in exchange rate volatil-
ity meant that the Japanese interventions could not reduce the exchange rate
volatility.
The tests results on the reaction function of the central bank are revealed
by H3:3:1 and H3:3:2. While H3:3:1 showed that the central bank reacted to the
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Table 4.13: Misspecication and Rank Tests, 2003-2004
Multivariate Tests
LM2 Test on Autocorrelation: 2(49) = 62:99 with p-value 0.09
Normality: 2(14) = 39:21 with p-value 0:00
Univariate Tests
42st 4(f t+1t   st) 4(is;t   is;t) 4(il;t   il;t) 4IVt 4It 4COTt
ARCH(2) 13:41 3:97 4:40 5:35 0:99 2:47 0:88
Normality 0:547 1:37 12:31 0:67 6:43 3:90 4:81
Skewness 0:17 0:18 0:87 0:22  0:63 0:41  0:66
Kurtosis 2:55 3:23 5:71 2:92 4:35 3:78 3:81
Univariate Stationarity Tests
4st (f t+1t   st) (is;t   is;t) (il;t   il;t) 4IVt It COTt
Unit Root 2:81 8:78 2:10 2:35 10:11 5:37 2:17
Process I(1) I(0) I(1) I(1) I(0) I(0) I(1)
Rank Test
r = 0 r = 1 r = 2 r = 3 r = 4 r = 5 r = 6
p-value 0:00 0:00 0:03 0:14 0:42 0:65 0:68
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Table 4.14: Testing Stationarity of Single Relations, 2003-2004
4st (f t+1t   st) (is;t   is;t) (il;t   il;t) 4IVt It COTt Trend p-val
Tests on the Signalling Channel
H3:1:1 1 0:02  0:01 1:00
H3:1:2 1 0:02  0:02 0:001 1:00
H3:1:3 1 0:18 0:02  0:02 1:00
H3:1:4 1 0:12 0:02  0:02 0:001 1:00
Tests on the Coordination Channel
H3:2:1 1:26  1:13 1 0:58
H3:2:2 1:52  1:92 1 0:18 0:91
Tests on the Reaction Function
H3:3:1 37:28  1:06 1  0:27 0:94
H3:3:2  13:31  0:68 1  0:57  0:14 0:99
Table 4.15: Identied Long-Run Structure, 2003-2004
4st (f t+1t   st) (is;t   is;t) (il;t   il;t) 4IVt It COTt Trend
ecm1;t 1 0138 0.023 -0.020 0.001
ecm2;t -14.931 1 0.241 -0.139
ecm3;t 32.200 -1.131 1 -0.359
appreciation of JPY, the increasing exchange rate volatility and speculation,
H3:3:2 did not support the leaning against the windassumption.
4.7.3 Identied Long-Run Structure
We nd a well-specied long-run structure with p-value of 0.93 and list the
identied cointegration relations in Table 4.15. The rst relation is based on
H3:1:4 and about the e¤ectiveness of the signalling channel:
(f t+1t  st) + 0:138(is;t is;t) + 0:0234 IV t   0:02I t + 0:001Trend+ error = 0; (4.31)
where currency intervention was positively related to the forward premium
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rate which meant that the signalling channel was not e¤ective. Meanwhile,
currency intervention was positively related to changes in the exchange rate
volatility, which meant the interventions might increase the exchange rate
volatility. The same result can be found from the second cointegration rela-
tion:
(il;t il;t)  14:9314 st + 0:2414 IV t   0:139I t+error term = 0: (4.32)
The Japanese interventions seem to be positively related to exchange rate
volatility, which means that there might not be a long-term relationship that
interventions reduce volatility in the same period.
Based on the hypothesis test H3:3:1, the third relation focuses on the reac-
tion function of the central bank:
It + 32:24 st   1:1314 IV t   0:359COT t+error term = 0; (4.33)
where the negative relationship between currency intervention and the change
in the exchange rate supported the leaning against the windassumption.
Furthermore, currency intervention was positively related to the exchange
rate volatility and currency speculation and sentiment, which indicated that
the central bank aimed to reduce exchange rate volatility and fence o¤ spec-
ulative attacks.
In summary, the Japanese central bank reacted to sharp JPY apprecia-
tion, large exchange rate volatility and excess speculation and sentiment with
leaning against the windinterventions. However, the long-run e¤ectiveness
of the signalling and coordination channel was not supported.
4.7.4 Short-Run Dynamics
This section focuses on the short-run dynamics and summarise related results
in Table 4.16. The rows of 4I t 1 and excess interventions ecm3;t 1 are on the
short-run e¤ects of the interventions in the dynamic system. The Japanese
interventions tended to happen in clusters. Meanwhile, the excess interven-
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tions might have positive e¤ects on changes in the exchange rate through the
signalling channel.
Based on the second column, changes in the speculation and sentiment
4COT t had negative e¤ects on the rate of exchange rate change: The negative
coe¢ cient of -0.44 meant that an increase in speculative futures position by
one billion USD increased the rate of JPY appreciation by 0.44%.
From the fourth column, we found that the excess interventions ecm3;t 1
and changes in speculation and sentiment 4COT t 1 had large positive e¤ects
on the rate of the volatility change. This meant the speculation and sentiment
increased the volatility of the exchange rate, and the Japanese interventions
failed to reduce the exchange rate uctuations.
The fth column is related the reaction function. Besides the nding that
interventions happened in clusters, we noticed that currency intervention was
negatively impacted by the rate of exchange rate change and implied volatil-
ity. While the former results reected the leaning against the windassump-
tion, the latter implied that the Japanese interventions were not reactions to
sharp increasing exchange rate volatility.
In summary, the Japanese interventions happened in clusters and reacted
to the excess JPY appreciation in a leaning against the windway. They had
strong and positive e¤ects on the rate of the exchange rate change through the
signalling channel. However, they were not reactive to the excess exchange
rate volatility correlated with speculation, and were not able to reduce the
exchange rate uctuations in the third regime.
4.7.5 Long-Run Impact of Shocks
After the description of the short-run dynamics, this section analyses the
nal impact of a permanent shock to the variables, and reports the results in
Table 4.17. Noticeably, the intervention shocks had positive long-run impact
on the exchange rate: Shocks to an intervention of one billion USD had a
long-run impact of 0.01% depreciation in JPY. Furthermore, the intervention
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Table 4.16: Short-Run Dynamics, 2003-2004
42st 4(f t+1t   st) 42IVt 4It
42st 1 -3.208 -1.162
42IVt 1 -0.231
4It 1 0.168
4COTt 1 1.239
4COTt -0.438
ecm1;t 1 0.499 -1.118
ecm2;t 1 0.096 -0.025 0.648
ecm3;t 1 -0.015 0.791
Constant 0.397 -0.344 -2.197
dum030923 -3.839 -0.297 6.755 -6.000
dum040224 -0.346 7.596 1.811
Notes: The coe¢ cients are signicant with p<0.05.
The ecm variables represent (40)-(42) respectively.
Table 4.17: Long-Run Impact, 2003-2004P
"4st
P
"(f t+1t  st)
P
"(is;t is;t)
P
"(il;t il;t)
P
"4IVt
P
"It
P
"COTt
4st 0:05 0:01 0:01 0:03
(f t+1t   st)  0:03  0:003  0:01
(is;t   is;t) 0:02 1:08
(il;t   il;t) 1:14
4IVt 2:08 0:22 0:50
It 1:94 0:21 0:46 1:14
COTt 10:14 1:03
Notes: Only signicant coe¢ cients with t-value>1.96 are shown.
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shocks had negative impact on the forward premium rate, which reected the
e¤ectiveness of the signalling channel.
The seventh column revealed the long-run impact of shocks on the reaction
function of the central bank: The interventions happened in clusters and
were reactions to the high exchange rate volatility, and large speculation and
sentiment.
The cumulative shocks to the long-term interest rate di¤erential
P
"(il;t il;t)
had positive e¤ects on the speculation and sentiment COT t which positively
inuenced the exchange rate. However, the coordination channel failed to
work as the intervention shocks had no inuence on the speculation and
sentiment.
In summary, there might exist a causal chain of variables with respect to
the long-term impact of the cumulative shocks: (il;t il;t) ! COT t ! It ! (4st,
(f t+1t  st), and 4IV t). The shocks to the relative increase of the Japanese bond
yield, the main driving force of the system, stimulated more speculation and
sentiment on JPY, which in return forced the Japanese central bank to react
with more interventions. Although The intervention shocks caused more
volatility, they decreased the rate of JPY appreciation, which was reected
by the increase of 4st and the decrease of (f t+1t  st).
4.7.6 Summary
As the main driving force, the cumulative shocks to the bond yield di¤erential
stimulated speculation and sentiment on JPY, which caused the frequent
and large-scale interventions. The interventions were also reactive to the
sharp JPY appreciation and had short-term e¤ects on the change in the
exchange rate through the signalling channel: An intervention of one billion
USD increased the long-term exchange rate by 0.01%.
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4.8 Summary
This chapter reviews the power of the identied cointegrated VAR modeling
technique and microstructure framework to explain a complex phenomena in
international nance. The empirical analysis provides detailed results with
respect to three regimes of the Japanese interventions between 1991 and 2004.
It is the rst research to jointly test separate transmission channels in an iden-
tied structural framework with various factors such as speculation and senti-
ment, exchange rate volatility and forward rate bias. The empirical research
also involves testing an innovative microstructure framework, with ndings
potentially helpful to unfold the myths of JPY/USD rate movements.
The interventions in the three regimes respectively show features of be-
ing small but frequent, very large but infrequent, large and highly frequent.
There are several interesting ndings with respect to the reaction function.
The Japanese monetary authorities reacted to sharp JPY appreciation with
leaning against the wind interventions in all regimes. In the second and
third regimes, the interventions happened in clusters. In the third regime be-
tween 2003 and 2004, the interventions happened amid increasing exchange
rate volatility and speculation on JPY appreciation.
The signalling channel were e¤ective in the rst and third regimes when
interventions were frequent. In the rst regime, the interventions had signif-
icant short-term e¤ects via signalling channel: An intervention of one billion
USD reduced the rate of JPY appreciation by 0.61%. In the third regime,
the interventions had both short- and long-term e¤ects on the change in the
JPY/USD rate: A yen-purchasing intervention of one billion USD increased
the weekly rate of JPY depreciation by 0.01%.
While speculation and sentiment show strong e¤ects on changes in the ex-
change rate, the coordination channel was only e¤ective in the second regime
when changes in exchange rate volatility were relatively small: An inter-
vention of one billion USD increased weekly change in the exchange rate
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by about 0.07%. However, in the rst and third regimes when the market
was volatile, the interventions failed to decrease the exchange rate volatility,
which deferred speculators from coordinating with the central bank11.
The fundamental factors played important roles in the exchange rate move-
ments. In all three regimes, the shocks to the bond yield di¤erential had
strong long-run impact on speculation and sentiment, and changes in ex-
change rate. The shocks to the yield di¤erence pushed speculation and sen-
timent on JPY, and worked as the driving force of the whole system.
While o¤ering policy implications for central banks, this chapter suggest
some directions for future research: More studies are needed to explore the
microstructure framework of the foreign exchange market and analyse the
developing country currencies to explain the interactions of exchange rate
dynamics with currency intervention, speculation and sentiment.
11Our ndings are supported by Ito (2005) and Marsh (2011).
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Chapter 5
Currency Intervention, Speculation
and Sentiment in Developing
Countries: An Analysis of the
MXN/USD Rate
Abstract:
This chapter provides a unique examination of three separate regimes of the Mexican
currency interventions between 1998 and 2009. It is the rst research to jointly test the
coordination and signalling channels in an identied structural framework for a developing
country currency. The empirical research also involves testing an innovative microstructure
framework formed in the previous chapter, with ndings potentially helpful to understand the
di¤erence in exchange rate dynamic mechanisms across developed and developing countries
and provide prospective policy implications for central banks in developing countries:
(1) Banxico intervened to depreciate MXN as reactions not to changes in the exchange
rate, but to the high speculation and sentiment on MXN and sharp increases in the exchange
rate volatility.
(2) The signalling channel was e¤ective when interventions were frequent in the second
and third regimes from 2003 to 2009.
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(3) The market conditions a¤ected the e¤ectiveness of the coordination channel. When
market was less volatile and with less risk, the coordination channel was e¤ective as the
speculators tended to coordinate with the central bank.
(4) The e¤ects of small and infrequent currency interventions were not from the coordi-
nation and signalling channels but dependent on accommodative monetary policies.
(5) The clustering speculation and sentiment on MXN worked as the main driver of the
whole system and had signicant e¤ects on change in the exchange rate in all regimes.
5.1 Introduction
O¢ cial currency interventions in advanced economies have been in steady
decline. After March 2004, among the G7 central banks, it was only the Bank
of Japan that conducted four solo currency interventions. Other G7 central
banks only stepped in the currency market once to support the Japanese
counterpart after the Great East Japan earthquake. However, the situation
is quite di¤erent in developing countries. Canales-Kriljenko (2006) nds that
91 percent of the 76 central banks in their survey conduct currency interven-
tions.
The central banks in developing countries intervene in the foreign exchange
market frequently and sometimes in very large amounts (Guimaraes and
Karacadag, 2006). The interventions are aimed to correct currency misalign-
ment in terms of levels or rates, smooth uctuations by reducing exchange
rate volatility, accumulate international reserves to fence o¤ speculative at-
tacks, or provide liquidity to the markets.
The chapter begins with a brief literature review and identication of
three regimes of Mexican currency interventions. After describing the main
variables, we conduct a detailed analysis on the separate intervention regimes
to examine the e¤ectiveness of the transmission channels, the inuence of
currency speculation and sentiment, and the reaction function of the central
bank. All the main empirical results are summarised and compared to provide
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suggestions for related research and policy implications for central banks in
emerging economies.
5.2 Literature Review
Before empirical analysis on the Mexican currency interventions, we review
literature related to the e¤ectiveness of transmission channels, methods of
estimating intervention e¤ects, and o¤ers suggestions for related studies.
5.2.1 Transmission Channels and Estimation Methods
Currency interventions in advanced economies have a long history and date
back to the time when the classical gold standard era was not established
(Bordo et al., 2007) and have been subject to extensive studies1. The studies
on the developed economy currencies have examine the e¤ectiveness of the
three main transmission channels of currency intervention, i.e., the portfo-
lio balance, signalling, and coordination channels using one of four groups
of estimation methodology, i.e., low-frequency time series, even study, high-
frequency time series, and identied models. Some studies focus on the di¤er-
ent intervention regimes to analyse the interventions with distinctive features.
There is severe lack of research on intervention in developing countries2.
This is partially due to the lack of publicly available o¢ cial intervention data
(Menkho¤, 2013) although at least 65 percent of emerging market members
of IMF publish intervention data in some way (IMF, 2010). As one of the few
central banks of developing countries that regularly publish o¢ cial interven-
tion data, the Mexican central bank (Banxico) has been actively intervened
in the foreign exchange rate market since the Peso was forced to oat in De-
1Sarno and Taylor (2002), Neely (2005a) and Chapter 2 of this thesis provide detailed literature reviews
on the currency interventions in developed countries.
2Disyatat and Galati (2007) and Menkho¤ (2013) provide extensive literature reviews on the currency
intervention in emerging markets.
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cember 1994 and have attracted some research interests on its interventions.
While Kumhof (2010) proposes the Mexican currency interventions were
e¤ective in exchange rate level and volatility through the portfolio balance
channels, most other studies on the Mexican currency intervention focus
on the signalling channel. Domac and Mendoza (2004) examine the daily
MXN interventions between August 1996 and June 2001 within an exponen-
tial GARCH framework. They nd that a sale of one billion USD appreci-
ated MXN by 0.08%. They found the USD-selling interventions reduced the
MXN/USD exchange rate volatility but not vice versa, which was supported
by the similar ndings of Guimaraes and Karacadag (2006) who analyse the
daily intervention e¤ects on volatility between August 1996 and June 2003.
Recently, Berganza and Broto (2012) and Broto (2013) analyse the currency
interventions in Latin American countries and nd that both USD purchases
and sales helped to moderate the MXN/USD exchange rate volatility between
July 1996 and June 2011 through the signalling channel.
With a unique panel data set, Adler and Tovar (2011) employ a panel xed
e¤ects model to examine the intervention e¤ects in Latin American countries.
They nd that the interventions had signicant e¤ects on the changes in the
exchange rates between January 2004 and December 2010. However, they did
not identify through which transmission channel the interventions worked.
In summary, most studies on the Mexican currency interventions have not
adopted identied models to jointly analyse the e¤ects of currency interven-
tion. There have been no research on the e¤ectiveness of the coordination
channels, examinations of foreign exchange market microstructure, or the
analyses of di¤erent intervention regimes.
By taking into consideration the market microstructure and theoretical
foundations (Vitale, 2007), our research adopts an identied and cointegrated
VAR model to incorporate the transmission channels, reaction functions, and
analyse the short- and long-term e¤ects of currency intervention, speculation
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and sentiment3.
5.3 Regimes of Mexican Currency Interventions
As one of few central banks of developing countries that regularly publish o¢ -
cial intervention data, the Mexican central bank (Banxico) has been actively
intervening in the foreign exchange rate market since the peso was forced
to oat in December 1994. Based on the o¢ cial data of the Mexican cur-
rency interventions, we can classify the whole intervention period into three
di¤erent intervention regimes.
From October 1997 to June 2000, while accumulating reserves, Banxico
undertook several daily USD sales up to 0.2 billion and some discretionary
interventions to ease the volatility of the MXN/USD rate (Sidaoui, 2005).
Therefore, the rst period was featured with small and infrequent currency
interventions.
After the rst intervention regime, there was no o¢ cial intervention until
May 2003. In the second regime from May 2003 to August 2008, Banxico sold
USD directly in the foreign exchange market via daily auctions to slow down
the pace of international reserve accumulation. The currency interventions
during the period were small but frequent.
The interventions of the third regime, started in September 2008, were
to ease the impact of the nancial crisis. Banxico sold USD through daily
auctions and several discretionary interventions to provide liquidity and re-
duce exchange rate volatility (Quintanilla et al., 2012). The interventions
were large and frequent but their volume decreased when market conditions
improved.
In summary, we categorise the Mexican currency interventions with di¤er-
3Given the important role speculation plays in the currency market, and the limited availability of trans-
action data on currency speculation, we need to adopt a COT-related proxy for currency speculation to
conduct related research.
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ent features into three regimes. Under the microstructure framework adopted
in Chapter 4, we will describe the variables, and analyse the Mexican cur-
rency intervention, speculation and sentiment using the cointegrated VAR
methodology.
5.4 Variable Description
It is very important to include suitable variables for empirical analysis. For
our specic research with respect to the Mexican currency intervention, spec-
ulation and sentiment, we should consider not only the standard fundamen-
tal economic variables such as exchange rates and interest rates, but also
variables measuring market speculation and sentiment. Conditional on data
availability, variables related to the forward rate bias and exchange rate
volatility are incorporated into our microstructure model. Therefore, the
main variables considered for empirical analysis are:
4st= the weekly percentage change in the spot MXN/USD rate4,
(f t+1t  st) = the weekly forward premium rate5,
(is;t is;t) = the di¤erence of the Mexican and US treasury bill rate with 3
months maturity,
(il;t il;t) = the di¤erence of Mexican and US treasury bond rate with 10
years maturity,
4IV t= the weekly percentage change rate of the implied volatility of the
MXN/USD rate.
It = weekly amounts of the Mexican currency interventions to depreciate
MXN, dened as net purchase of USD in unit of billion USD,
COT t= Weekly net long speculatorspositions on MXN futures from the
COT reports, which measures currency speculation on the decrease of the
4The variable is in the form of 100 times the di¤erential of logarithm of the exchange rate in terms of the
units of MXN per USD.
5It is measured by 100 times the di¤erence between the logarithm of the forward rate with maturity of
one week and the logarithm of the spot exchange rate
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MXN/USD rate, i.e.,  (DIt+DUt ), and the sentiment of the speculators.
The data resource of most variables is Bloomberg. The exceptions are the
intervention data, which is from Banxico, and the speculation and sentiment
variable which is based on the data from the US Commodity Futures Trading
Commission. In order to accommodate the COT reports, we use end-of-the-
day values on Tuesdays.
5.5 Analysis of the First Mexican Intervention Regime
5.5.1 Variable Description and Model Setup
We focus on the period between 17th February 1998 and 23 November 1999,
when almost 60% volume of the interventions of the rst regime happened.
As we can not get access to the data related to long-term interest rates and
exchange rate volatility, our analysis is based on the following variables: 4st,
(f t+1t  st), (is;t is;t), It, and COT t.
In Figure 5.1, the changes in the JPY/USD and forward premia were
relatively stationary although there might exist impulse dummies between
August and October 1998, January 1999 and May 1999. The short-term
interest rate di¤erential increased until September 1998 and then reversed,
while the speculation and sentiment on MXN showed a roughly opposite
pattern.
With the variable vector Xt, i.e., 4st, (f t+1t  st), (is;t is;t), It, and COT t, the
error correction representation of VAR model with lag number=2 can be
expressed as:
4X t =  4X t 1+10Xt 1+0+Dt+"1;t;
"1;t  N(0;); t = 1998 : 02 : 17  1999 : 11 : 23:
Based on the standard residual errors, there were impulse dummies, namely
dum980811p, dum980825p, dum980901p, dum980922p, dum981006p, dum990112p,
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Figure 5.1: Main Variables in the First Regime, February 1998-November 1999
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and dum990525p, on 11th August 1998, 25th August 1998, 1st Septem-
ber 1998, 22nd September 1998, 6th October 1998, 12th January 1999, and
25th May 1999 respectively. While the impulse dummies of dum980811p and
dum980922p captured the impulse forward premium shocks, dum980901p and
dum981006p measured the shocks on the short-term interest rate di¤erential,
and dum980825p on the exchange rate shocks. Furthermore, dum990112p
measured the shocks on the exchange rates and interest rates, while dum990525p
on the exchange rate, forward premium, and speculation and sentiment. The
dummies of dum980825p, dum980901p and dum990112p also included the
shocks to currency intervention which might impact other variables.
The test results about the statistical adequacy of the model are shown
in Table 5.1 where the signicant test statistics are in bold face. Normality
and no autocorrelation are rejected at the multivariate level with p-values
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smaller than the critical value 0.05. The non-normallity and non-stationarity
mainly came from the forward premia and currency intervention. Given a
cointegrated VARmodel is robust to moderate AR e¤ects and excess kurtosis,
we continue with current model specication.
The cointegration rank divides the variables into r stationary relations
towards which the system is adjusting and p  r nonstationary relations which
are pushing the system. We rst report the degrees of integration of each
variable based on the ADF unit root tests. If the t-statitics larger than the
critical value 2.89, we reject the null hypothesis of unit root at the 5% level of
signicance, which indicates that the respective variable is stationary I(0). If
not, the variable is nonstationary I(1). Accordingly, we nd that4st; (f t+1t  st);
It ~ I(0) and (is;t is;t); COT t ~ I(1). Table 5.1 also reports the trace test statistics
which suggest accepting r = 3. We also conduct tests of weak exogeneity on
individual variables and nd that the speculation and sentiment variable is
weakly exogenous with its 2(3) test statistics 2.115 smaller than the critical
value 7:815.
5.5.2 Testing Transmission Channels and Reaction Function
This section tests hypotheses on transmission channels of currency interven-
tion and the reaction function of the Mexican central bank after imposing the
rank=3 condition. In the form of  = (H1;  1;  2), we test whether a single
restricted relation is in the  space with other two relations unrestricted and
report the results in Table 5.2.
H4:1:1 to H4:1:2 are hypothesis tests to check whether the signalling channel
was e¤ective in the long-term. We consider the variables of forward premium
rate (f t+1t  st), interest rate di¤erential (is;t is;t), and interventions It for the
tests expressed as:
(f t+1t  st)  0:27(is;t   is;t)  131:24It + error term = 0; (5.1)
(f t+1t  st)  0:09(is;t   is;t)  29:09It   0:002Trend+ error term = 0; (5.2)
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Table 5.1: Misspecication and Rank Tests, February 1998-November 1999
Multivariate Test Results
Autocorrelation: LM1: 2(25) = 48:71 with p-value 0.00
LM2: 2(25) = 47:06 with p-value 0.00
Normality: 2(10) = 83:47 with p-value 0:00
Univariate Test Results
42st 4(f t+1t   st) 4(is;t   is;t) 4It 4COTt
ARCH(2) 0:75 0:63 0:27 0:32 0:81
Normality 1:06 9:64 9:35 57:91 5:05
Skewness 0:14  0:80 0:45  2:48 0:50
Kurtosis 3:17 4:64 4:51 13:92 3:83
Univariate Stationarity Tests
4st (f t+1t   st) (is;t   is;t) It COTt
Unit Root 8:56 10:41 1:25 7:21 2:19
Process I(0) I(0) I(1) I(0) I(1)
Trace Tests
r = 0 r = 1 r = 2 r = 3 r = 4
p-value 0:00 0:00 0:00 0:05 0:11
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Table 5.2: Testing Stationarity of Single Relations, February 1998-November 1999
4st (f t+1t   st) (is;t   is;t) It COTt Trend p-value
Test of the Signalling Channel
H4:1:1 1 -0.27 -131.24 0:98
H4:1:2 1 -0.09 -29.09 -0.002 1
Test of the Coordination Channel
H4:2:1 -21.01 1 0:13
H4:2:2  16:09 1 -0.002 0:08
Test of Reaction Function
H4:3:1 -0.39 1 -0.39 0:98
H4:3:2 -2.82 1 2.18 -0.003 1
where the increase in interventions was signicantly correlated with increase
in the forward premium rate with p-values larger than 0.05. The results reject
the hypothesis of the long-run e¤ectiveness of the signalling channel.
The test results with respect to the e¤ectiveness of the coordination chan-
nel are related to H4:2:1 and H4:2:2 with the following relations:
COT t   21:01I t+error term = 0; (5.3)
COT t   16:09I t   0:002Trend+ error term = 0; (5.4)
where the speculation on MXN increased with currency intervention to de-
preciate MXN, which did not support the long-run e¤ectiveness of the coor-
dination channel.
The tests of the reaction function of the central bank, H3:1 and H3:2, are
to nd whether the central bank reacted to the appreciation of MXN 4st< 0,
or the increasing speculation and sentiment on MXN appreciation COT t> 0,
with interventions:
It   0:394 st   0:39COT t+error term = 0; (5.5)
It   2:824 st   2:18COT t   0:003Trend+ error term = 0: (5.6)
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Table 5.3: Identied Long-Run Structure, February1998-November1999
4st (f t+1t   st) (is;t   is;t) It COTt Trend
ecm1;t 1 -0.04 -17.82
ecm2;t -25.11 1 -0.001
ecm3;t -0.01 1 -0.05
In both relations, the central bank reacted to the speculation and sentiment
on MXN appreciation. However, instead of leaning against the wind, the
interventions were reactions to the MXN depreciation, i.e., It> 0 when 4st> 0.
5.5.3 Identied Long-Run Structure
The search of well-specied long-run structure is based on the information
from  matrix of the unrestricted model and the previous hypothesis tests.
The search of a well-specied long-run structure is based on the  matrix
of the unrestricted model and the previous hypothesis tests. The automatic
procedure "CATS Mining" of the tailor made toolbox, Cats in Rats, version
2 (Dennis, et al., 2005), facilitate us in the model section by providing we
with all plausible restricted models with potential cointegrating relations. We
obtain a cointegration structure listed in Table 5.3 with a p-value of 0.06.
Based on the hypothesis test H4:1:1, the rst identied cointegration relation
is about the e¤ectiveness of the signalling channel:
(f t+1t  st)  0:04(is;t is;t)  17:82I t+error term = 0: (5.7)
The positive relationship of currency interventions and the forward premium
rate means the signalling channel was not e¤ective in the long-term according
to the testing criterion in Table 4.2.
Based on the hypothesis test H4:2:2, the second long-run relation is about
the e¤ectiveness of the coordination channel:
COT t   25:11I t   0:001Trend+ error term = 0: (5.8)
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The Mexican interventions were positively related the speculation and senti-
ment on MXN appreciation, which means that the coordination channel did
not work in the long run.
Based on the hypothesis test H4:3:1, the third relation focuses on the Banx-
icos reaction function:
It   0:014 st   0:05COT t+error term = 0: (5.9)
The Mexican currency interventions were positively correlated with the rate
of exchange rate change, i.e., interventions increased when the peso depre-
ciated, which did not support the leaning against the wind assumption.
Meanwhile, the positive relationship between currency intervention and cur-
rency speculation and sentiment means that, in the long-term, there were
more interventions to depreciate MXN when the speculation and sentiment
on MXN appreciation were high. The latter relationship support the hypoth-
esis that the central bank intervened to fence o¤ speculative attacks.
In summary, the long-run e¤ectiveness of the signalling and coordination
channel was not supported. The Mexican central bank reacted to not the
sharp MXN appreciation, but to high speculation and sentiment on MXN.
5.5.4 Short-Run Dynamics
After identifying the long-run cointegration relations, we analyse the short-
run dynamics analysis. With the weakly exogenous interest rate di¤erential
variable, the short-run dynamics summarised in Table 5.4 is accepted with a
p-value of 0.99.
We rst examine the fth and tenth rows with respect to interventions
4I t 1 and excess interventions ecm3;t 1, and the intervention-related dummies,
i.e., dum980825p, dum980901p and dum990112p. While the interventions
had no e¤ects on changes in the MXN/USD rate, the excess interventions,
dum980901p and dum990112p had strong positive e¤ects on the movements
of the MXN/USD rate. In the latter case, an intervention of one billion USD
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Table 5.4: Short-Run Dynamics, February 1998-November 1999
42st 4(f t+1t   st) 4(is;t   is;t) 4It
42st 1 -0.13 -0.29
4(f tt 1   st 1) -0.28 -0.08 -0.01
4(is;t 1   is;t 1) 0.17 -0.02 -0.004
4It 1 -4.59
4COTt 1 3.64
4COTt -7.26 0.81 -5.31 0.03
ecm1;t 1 -0.96 0.37 0.02
ecm2;t 1 -7.22 1.01
ecm3;t 1 4.88 -4.24 0.07
Constant 0.32 -0.48
dum980811p 0.99 -1.82
dum980825p 3.74 -0.18
dum980901p 2.66 10.98 -0.14
dum980922p -2.38 -2.22
dum981006p 6.14
dum990112p 2.86 -1.02 3.20 -0.15
dum990525p 2.34 -1.07 -0.06
Notes: Only signicant coe¢ cients with p < 0:05 are shown.
The ecm variables are based on (5.7)- (5.9) respectively.
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increased the rate of MXN depreciation by 4.88% in the following week. While
there was no sign that the interventions worked through the coordination
channel or the signalling channel, the negative correlation between the excess
intervention and the change in interest di¤erential might indicate that the
interventions changed the monetary policies which moved the exchange rate.
The short-run e¤ects of speculation and sentiment are presented in the
sixth, seventh and ninth rows, with ecm2;t 1 as the excess speculation and
sentiment. We nd that changes in speculation and sentiment signicant
short-run e¤ects on changes in the MXN/USD rate: An increase of spec-
ulation on the peso futures increased the appreciation rate of the peso by
7.26% in the same week. Meanwhile, it changes in speculation and senti-
ment decreased the rate of the forward premium 4(f t+1t  st) by 0.81%, which
supported the existence of the forward rate bias.
In terms of the short-run structure of the reaction function, the Mexican
monetary authorities reacted to high speculation on the MXN. The specu-
lation and sentiment on the MXN appreciation had positive e¤ects on the
interventions: An increase in speculation on MXN by one billion USD in-
creased currency intervention by 0.03 billion in the same week and 1.1 billion
in the following week. Another nding is that the excess intervention had
small but signicant short-run e¤ects on the interventions in the following
week. An increase in intervention by one billion USD caused more interven-
tion by 0.07 billion USD in the next week, which meant that the interventions
tended to happen in clusters.
The results of the short-run dynamic analysis can be summarised as fol-
lows: Firstly, the Mexican monetary authorities implemented interventions
in response to increasing speculation and sentiment on the peso, and the in-
terventions tended to happen in clusters. Secondly, the interventions were
e¤ective: A sale of one billion USD increased the rate of MXN depreciation
by 4.88% in the following week. Thirdly, the interventions were not inde-
pendent from monetary policies, and failed to work through the coordination
152
Table 5.5: Long-Run Impact, 1998-1999P
"4st
P
"(f t+1t  st)
P
"(is;t is;t)
P
"It
P
"COTt
4st -0.65
(f t+1t   st) 0.05 0.05 0.84
(is;t   is;t) 0.59 1.08 0.97 10.45
It 0.30
COTt 1.13
Notes: Only signicant coe¢ cients with t-value> 1:96 are shown.
or signalling channels. Fourthly, with the existence of the forward rate bias,
there were signicant short-run e¤ects of the speculation and sentiment on
changes in the MXN/USD rate: An increase in speculation on MXN by one
billion USD increased the appreciation rate of the peso by 7.26% in the same
week.
5.5.5 Long-Run Impact of Shocks
This section illustrates the nal impact of permanent shocks to the variables
and presents the related results in Table 5.5. Based on the column-wise in-
spections, the shocks to currency speculation and sentiment had signicant
long-run impact on most variables, hence worked as the driving force of the
whole system. In the rst regime, a long MXN futures position of one billion
USD increased the rate of MXN appreciation by 0.65%. Meanwile, the spec-
ulation and sentiment had opposite impact on changes in the exchange rate
and the forward premium, which reected the existence of the forward rate
bias.
The Mexican central bank mainly reacted to the high speculation and sen-
timent on the pesos further appreciation. Banxico reacted to an increase of
speculation on MXN with an interventions of 0.3 billion dollar. However, the
shocks to interventions failed to impact the MXN/USD rate, and negatively
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a¤acted the interest rate di¤erentials, which did not support the e¤ectiveness
of either the signalling channel or the coordination channel.
We also notice that the speculation and sentiment were only a¤ected by
the shocks to themselves. The speculators showed some herding behaviour
and speculation on MXN happened in clusters.
The main results of this section are summarised as follows: The speculation
and sentiment on MXN were the main driving force in the rst regime. The
speculation and sentiment happened in clusters and had substantial e¤ects
on changes in the MXN/USD rate. The central bank only reacted to the
speculation and sentiment on MXN, and their interventions failed to work
through either the signalling channel or the coordination channel.
5.5.6 Summary of Results of the First Regime
The rst regime focuses on the small and infrequent Mexican interventions
between February 1998 and November 1999. The speculation and sentiment
on MXN appreciation happened in clusters, and drove the exchange rate,
interest rates and interventions of the rst regime. The speculative activi-
ties on MXN had signicant short- and long-term e¤ects on the MXN/USD
exchange rate: A long MXN position of one billion USD increased the ap-
preciation rate of MXN by 7.26% in the short-run and 0.65% in the long
run.
The Mexican monetary authorities reacted with interventions only to the
currency speculation and sentiment, not to changes in the exchange rates. A
long MXN position of one billion USD caused Banxico to intervene 0.3 billion
USD in the long-run and 1.13 billion USD in the short-run. The currency
interventions happened in clusters and had signicant short-term e¤ects on
the MXN/USD exchange rate. An intervention of one billion USD increased
the intervention amount and the rate of MXN depreciation in the following
week by 7% and 4.88% respectively . The interventions were not e¤ective
through the coordination or signalling channel. The e¤ectiveness of Mexican
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interventions during this period was dependent on accommodative monetary
policies.
5.6 Analysis of the SecondMexican Intervention Regime
5.6.1 Variable Description andModel Setup of the Second Regime
The second regime covers the period between 6th May 2003 and 8th Septem-
ber 2008, which features small but frequent interventions before the peak of
the global nancial crisis. With the data availability of the long-term inter-
est rate and implied volatility, we now have the following variables, i.e., 4st,
(f t+1t  st), (is;t is;t), (il;t il;t), 4IV t, It, and COT t, which are illustrated in Figure
5.2. While the variables with respect to change in the exchange rate, forward
premium and exchange rate volatility are relatively stationary, the interest
rate di¤erentials and speculation and sentiment are not. Both interest rate
di¤erential increases from mid 2003 to mid 2005, then decreased steadily for
two more years before they resumed upward trend from mid 2007. The spec-
ulation and sentiment on MXN appreciation showed some swings during the
period.
With the variable vector Xt, we present the error correction representation
of the VAR model with lag number=2:
4X t =  4X t 1+10Xt 1+0+Dt+"1;t;
"1;t  N(0;); t = 2003 : 05 : 06  2008 : 09 : 09:
Based on the results of the standard residual errors of the seven vari-
ables, we nd the following impulse dummies, i.e., dum030610p, dum031111p,
dum040106p, dum060523p, dum060704p, dum070918p and dum071211p, mea-
suring permanent shocks on 10th June 2003, 11th November 2003, 6th Jan-
uary 2004, 23rd May 2006, 4th July 2006, 18th September 2007, and 11th
December 2007 respectively. To be specic, while dum030610p measures a ex-
change rate shock, dum031111p dum070918p and dum071211p capture sud-
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Figure 5.2: Main Variables in the Second Regime, May 2003 - September 2008
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den forward premium rate shocks. Furthermore, dum040106p measures the
shocks on exchange rate and long- and short- term interest rate di¤erentials,
dum060523p on exchange rate and forward premium rate, and dum060704p
on exchange rate and rate of volatility change. There is a transitory dummy, a
...,0,1,-1,0,... dummy dum070821t, measuring transitory e¤ects on the short-
term interest rate di¤erential on 21st August 2007.
Misspecication tests of the above model are shown in Table 5.6. At the
multivariate level, the residuals are not autocorrelated. However, multivari-
ate normality does not exist largely due to the excess kurtosis of short-run
interest di¤erential, the rate of volatility change and interventions. Given
the cointegrated VAR model is robust to moderate AR e¤ects and excess
kurtosis, we can stick with current model specication. The results from the
univariate stationarity tests and trace tests suggest that the rank number of
4 with probability 0.81.
5.6.2 Testing Hypotheses of Channels and Reaction Function
After imposing the rank condition, various hypotheses are tested with respect
to the signalling and coordination channels and reaction function. The hy-
pothesis test results reported in Table 5.7 based on the form of  = (H1;  1;  2;  3)
to test whether a single restricted relation is in the  space with other three
relations unrestricted.
We rst check the long-term e¤ectiveness of the signalling channel. The
tests, H1:1 to H1:5, with variables of forward premium rate, (f t+1t  st), interest
rate di¤erentials (is;t is;t) and (il;t il;t), volatility rate 4IV t and interventions
It. The relations presenting H1:1 to H1:5 can be expressed as:
(f t+1t  st)  0:04(is;t   is;t) + 0:49It + error term = 0; (5.10)
(f t+1t  st)  0:02(is;t   is;t)  0:124 IVt + 1:3It + error term = 0; (5.11)
(f t+1t  st)  0:06(il;t   il;t) + 0:24It + error term = 0; (5.12)
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Table 5.6: Misspecication and Rank Tests, May 2003 - September 2008
Multivariate Test Results
Autocorrelation: LM1: 2(49) = 48:16 with p-value 0.51
LM2: 2(49) = 53:48 with p-value 0.31
Normality: 2(14) = 250:78 with p-value 0:00
Univariate Test Results
42st 4(f t+1t   st) 4(is;t   is;t) 4(il;t   il;t) 42IVt 4It 4COTt
ARCH(2) 1:92 8:83 3:33 3:19 3:44 16:11 6:71
Normality 5:71 4:14 20:63 0:41 21:77 85:51 6:05
Skewness 0:35  0:18 0:56 0:07 0:10 0:43  0:12
Kurtosis 3:24 3:47 4:68 3:04 4:48 9:91 3:65
Univariate Stationarity Tests
4st (f t+1t   st) (is;t   is;t) (il;t   il;t) 4IVt It COTt
Unit Root 18:97 15:41 0:83 1:77 20:82 2:80 2:93
Process I(0) I(0) I(1) I(1) I(0) I(1) I(0)
Trace Tests
r = 0 r = 1 r = 2 r = 3 r = 4 r = 5 r = 6
p-value 0:00 0:00 0:00 0:01 0:81 0:89 0:99
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Table 5.7: Testing the Stationarity of Single Relations, May 2003 - September 2008
4st (f t+1t   st) (is;t   is;t) (il;t   il;t) 4IVt It COTt Trend p-value
Test of the Signalling Channel
H1:1 1 -0.04 0.49 0:67
H1:2 1 -0.02 -0.12 1.30 0:99
H1:3 1 -0.06 0.24 0.35
H1:4 1 -0.05 -0.09 0.93 1
H1:5 1 -0.03 -0.01 0.47 0.54
Test of the Coordination Channel
H2:1 -8.80 1 0
H2:2  2:40 1 -0.01 0
H2:3 -3.56 26.48 1 1
H2:4 -3.22 24.06 1 -0.003 1
Test of Reaction Function
H3:1 -9.85 1 -0.88 0:99
H3:2 -9.49 1 0.82 -0.001 0:97
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(f t+1t  st)  0:05(il;t   il;t)  0:094 IVt + 0:93It + error term = 0; (5.13)
(f t+1t  st)  0:03(is;t   is;t)  0:01(il;t   il;t) + 0:47It + error term = 0: (5.14)
All the ve long-run relations show that the increase of interventions was sig-
nicantly correlated with decrease of the forward premium rate, (f t+1t  st) < 0,
with p-values larger than 0.05. Therefore, the main criteria of the long-run
e¤ectiveness of the signalling channel is fullled. However, the interest rate
di¤erentials (is;t is;t) and (il;t il;t) were positively related with the increase
of interventions, which does not support the e¤ectiveness of the signalling
channel. Furthermore, the exchange rate volatility increases with the inter-
ventions, which means that the interventions did not reduce the volatility of
the exchange rate through the signalling channel.
The test results with respect to the e¤ectiveness of the coordination chan-
nel are shown in the rows from H2:1 to H2:4 with the following relations:
COT t   8:8I t+ error term = 0; (5.15)
COT t   2:4I t   0:01Trend+ error term = 0; (5.16)
COT t   3:564 IV t + 26:48I t+ error term = 0; (5.17)
COT t   3:224 IV t + 24:06I t   0:003Trend+ error term = 0: (5.18)
The rst two long-run relations show that speculation on MXN appreciation
COT t increases with the currency intervention to depreciate MXN. The rela-
tions were rejected with p-vaule equal to 0. Meanwhile, based on the last two
long-run relations, we can not reject the negative relations between interven-
tion and speculation and the sentiment with p-vaule=1. Therefore, the long-
run e¤ectiveness of the coordination channel was also fullled. However, the
positive relationship between intervention and volatility still persisted, which
reected that the interventions failed to smooth the volatility of MXN/USD
rate.
H3:1 and H3:2 are to test whether the central bank reacts to the apprecia-
tion of MXN, 4st< 0, or the increasing speculation and sentiment on MXN
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Table 5.8: Identied Long-Run Structure, May 2003 - September 2008
4st (f t+1t   st) (is;t   is;t) (il;t   il;t) 4IVt It COTt Trend
ecm1;t 1 -0.04 -0.003 0.60
ecm2;t -4.1 37.66 1 -0.004
ecm3;t -0.71 -0.08 1 -0.05
ecm4;t 1 0.01 -0.01 -0.04 0.10
appreciation, COT t> 0, with interventions:
It   9:854 st   0:88COT t+error term = 0 (5.19)
It 9:494 st   0:82COT t   0:001Trend+ error term = 0 (5.20)
In both relations, the central bank reacts to the increasing speculation and
sentiment on MXN appreciation. However, instead of leaning against the
wind, the interventions were reactions to the MXN depreciation, i.e., It> 0
when 4st> 0.
5.6.3 Identied Long-Run Structure of Channels and Reaction
Function
Based on the previous hypothesis tests and the information from  matrix
of the unrestricted model, an identied long-run structure is established in
this section. Firstly, the short- and long-term interest rate di¤erentials and
intervention variables are found to be weakly exogenous with their 2(4) test
statistics 1.75, 5.56 and 6.70 smaller than the critical value 9:49. After ex-
cluding weakly exogenous variables from the short-run dynamic analysis, a
full cointegration structure Hfull:  = (H1'1; H2'2; H3'3; H4'4) is found with the
long-run cointegrations listed in Table 5.8. The long-run structure is not
rejected with probability 0.06.
Based on the hypothesis test H1:5, the rst identied cointegration relation
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is about the e¤ectiveness of the signalling channel:
(f t+1t  st)  0:04(is;t is;t)  0:003(il;t   il;t) + 0:6I t+error term = 0: (5.21)
Although there was no accommodative monetary policies, the negative rela-
tionship of currency interventions and the forward premium rate means the
signalling channel was e¤ective in the long-term
Based on the hypothesis test H2:4, the second long-run cointegration rela-
tion is about the e¤ectiveness of the coordination channel:
COT t   4:14 IVt + 37:66I t   0:004Trend+ error term = 0: (5.22)
Although the exchange rate volatility increased with interventions, the Mex-
ican interventions were negatively related to the speculation and sentiment
on MXN appreciation, which means that the coordination channel worked in
the long run as the interventions to depreciate MXN managed to reduce the
speculation and sentiment.
Based on the hypothesis test H3:2, the third relation focuses on the reaction
function of the central banks interventions:
It   0:714 st   0:084 IVt   0:05COT t+error term = 0: (5.23)
The Mexican currency interventions were positively correlated with the rate
of exchange rate change, i.e., interventions increase with the depreciation of
MXN, which does not support the leaning against the windassumption. The
positive relationship between the interventions and rate of implied volatility,
speculation and sentiment variables means that, in the long-term, there were
more interventions to depreciate MXN when the exchange rate volatility and
speculation and sentiment on MXN appreciation were high. The latter re-
lationship supports the hypothesis that the central bank intervened to fence
o¤ sharp exchange rate volatility and speculative attacks
The fourth long-run relation is to reect whether the change in the MXN/USD
rate was a¤ected by fundamental variables, e.g., interest rate di¤erentials, and
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exchange rate volatility, and speculation and sentiment:
4st + 0:01(is;t is;t)  0:01(il;t   il;t)  0:044 IVt + 0:1COTt + error term = 0: (5.24)
The most striking feature of the relation is that the rate of MXN depre-
ciation, 4st, is negatively and signicantly correlated with the speculation
and sentiment on the MXN appreciation: One billion speculation on MXN
appreciation increased the rate of MXN appreciation by 0.1 percent. While
the short-run interest rate spread decreased the rate of MXN depreciation,
the long-run counterpart had the opposite e¤ects. The rate of exchange rate
volatility were positively correlated with the rate of MXN depreciation, which
may show that MXN was vulnerable to high risk.
The long-run structure of the model shows that the long-run e¤ectiveness
of the signalling and coordination channel between May 2003 and December
2008 was supported, though the interventions failed to decrease exchange
rate volatility. The Mexican central bank did not react to the sharp MXN
appreciation, but the exchange rate volatility and speculation and sentiment
on MXN appreciation. While the interest rates and exchange rate volatility
had signicant e¤ects on the rate of MXN depreciation, it was mainly the
speculation and sentiment on MXN appreciation that moved the exchange
rate in the long-run.
5.6.4 Short-Run Dynamics of the Second Regime
With identied long-run cointegration relations, the short-run dynamics of
the model is analysed. With weakly exogenous short- and long-term interest
rate di¤erentials and intervention variables, the short-run dynamic structure
summarised in Table 5.9 is accepted with probability 0.99.
From the second column, the changes of short- and long-term di¤erentials
had no short-run e¤ects on the change in exchange rates. However, based on
the values in the 7th row, the change in interventions 4I t 1 had signicant
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Table 5.9: Short-Run Dynamics, May 2003 - September 2008
42st 4(f t+1t   st) 42IVt 4COTt
4(f tt 1   st 1) -4.81
4(is;t   is;t) 0.13 7.62
4(is;t 1   is;t 1) 6.50
4(il;t   il;t) 7.95 -0.77
4(il;t 1   il;t 1) -0.17
4It 1 7.85 -1.11 -2.29
42IVt 1 0.16
4COTt 1 -0.15 -6.52 0.30
ecm1;t 1 0.33 -1.03
ecm2;t 1 1.99 -0.57
ecm3;t 1 -3.65 2.56
ecm4;t 1 -4.32 -2.7 4.56
Constant 1.06 -0.26 10.42 -0.48
dum030610p 1.88
dum031111p 0.91
dum040106p -1.64 0.48 3.65
dum060523p 2.23 -1.32
dum060704p -2.40 7.74
dum070918p 0.76 -1.32
dum071211p -0.88 0.94
dum070821t 7.22 -0.99
Notes: Only signicant coe¢ cients with p < 0:05 are shown.
The ecm variables are based on (5.21)-(5.24) respectively.
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positive e¤ects on the change of the MXN/USD rate, i.e., one billion increase
of Mexican intervention to depreciate MXN increased the rate of MXN de-
preciation by 7.85% in the following week. The short-term interventions were
e¤ective through both the signalling and coordination channels as the change
in interventions not only decreased the rate in forward premium rate but also
the speculation and sentiment on MXN appreciation, i.e., one billion increase
of Mexican intervention decreased the currency speculation in the following
week by 2.29 billion.
The short-run e¤ects of speculation and sentiment on other variables are
presented in the ninth row. The change of speculation and sentiment 4COT t 1
had signicant short-run e¤ects on the change of the MXN/USD rate and
exchange rate volatility in the following week. While one billion more specu-
lation on MXN appreciation in the futures market increased the appreciation
rate of the currency by 0.15% in the following week, it reduced the rate of
exchange rate volatility by 6.52%. One billion speculation on MXN appre-
ciation increased the speculation in the following week by 0.3 billion, which
indicates that speculation and sentiment in this regime happened in clusters
in the short-term. The results about e¤ects of excess speculation and senti-
ment ecm2;t 1 based on the 11th row conrmed the ndings that the clustering
speculation on MXN appreciation smoothed the exchange rate uctuations.
In summary, there was no signicant short-term e¤ects of interest rates
on exchange rates, the Mexican interventions 4I t 1 were e¤ective through
both coordination and signalling channels: One billion increase of Mexican
intervention to depreciate MXN increased the rate of MXN depreciation by
7.85% and decreased the currency speculation by 2.29 billion in the following
week. Additionally, the speculation and sentiment 4COT t 1 happened in
clusters had signicant short-run e¤ects on the change of the MXN/USD rate
and smoothed the exchange rate uctuations. One billion more speculation
on MXN appreciation caused 0.3 billion more speculation, and increased the
appreciation rate of the currency by 0.15% and reduced the rate of exchange
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Table 5.10: The Estimates of the Long-Run Impacts, May 2003 - September 2008P
"4st
P
"(f t+1t  st)
P
"(is;t is;t)
P
"(il;t il;t)
P
"(4IVt)
P
"It
P
"COTt
4st -0.09 0.04 0.85
(f t+1t   st) 0.04 -0.62
(is;t   is;t) 0.92
(il;t   il;t) -0.14 1.02
4IVt 0.17 7.85
It 0.99
COTt 0.91 -0.40 -5.23
Notes: Only signicant coe¢ cients with t-values> 1:96 are shown.
rate volatility by 6.52% in the following week.
5.6.5 The Long-Run Impact of Shocks
This section discusses the long-run impact of a permanent shock to vari-
ables after describing of the long-run structure and short-run dynamics of
the system with respect to the reaction function of Banxico, channels of the
interventions and e¤ects of currency speculation and sentiment. The related
empirical results are illustrated in Table 5.10.
Based on the column-wise inspections, the shocks to the change in ex-
change rate, forward premium rate, and currency speculation and sentiment
have no signicant long-run impact , while the shocks to currency interven-
tions and the short-run interest di¤erential had signicant long-run impact
on most variables in the second regime.
The shocks to the short-term interest rate di¤erential
P
"(is;t is;t) had sig-
nicant positive and negative impact on change in exchange rate and forward
premium rate respectively, which conrmed the existence of forward rate bias.
The shocks to the currency interventions
P
"It have signicant positive im-
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pact on the change in exchange rate, i.e., one billion currency intervention
to depreciate MXN deceased the rate of MXN appreciation by 0.85%, which
means the currency interventions were e¤ective and had lasting e¤ects on the
exchange rate movements in the second regime.
The shocks to interventions had long-term negative impact on both for-
ward premium rate (f t+1t  st) and speculation and sentiment COT t, which sup-
ports the e¤ectiveness of both signalling and coordination channels. One
billion intervention decreased speculation on MXN appreciation by 5.23 bil-
lion. Furthermore, the opposite signs of e¤ects of interventions on change in
exchange rate and forward premium rate supported the existence of forward
rate bias.
From the seventh row, the shocks to the interventions
P
"It had positive
and signicant impact on themselves, i.e., the shock of one billion interven-
tion caused 0.99 billion more intervention. The results reected that the
interventions were clustering in the second regime.
Based on the above empirical results, the long-term shocks to the variables
are summarised as follows: The shocks to currency interventions and the
short-run interest di¤erential had signicant impact on most variables in the
model in the second regime. The Mexican currency interventions happened in
clusters and were e¤ective through not only the coordination channel but also
the signalling channel with the existence of the forward rate bias. One billion
currency intervention managed to decease the rate of MXN appreciation by
0.85% and speculation on MXN appreciation by 5.23 billion.
5.6.6 Summary of Results of the Second Regime
The second Mexican intervention regime features small and frequent inter-
ventions and relative low exchange rate volatility and the results can be
summarised as follows: The Mexican central bank conducted interventions
in clusters to react to the increase of exchange rate volatility and currency
speculation and sentiment. Although the interventions failed to smooth the
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exchange rate uctuations, they were e¤ective both in the short- and long-
term through the coordination and signalling channels. In the short term, one
billion of intervention increased the rate of MXN depreciation by 7.85% and
decreased the currency speculation by 2.29 billion in the following week. In
the long term, the shocks of one billion amount of intervention deceased the
rate of MXN appreciation by 0.85% and speculation on MXN appreciation
by 5.23 billion.
While the interventions and short-term interest rate di¤erentials had sig-
nicant long-term impact on most variables, the clustering speculation and
sentiment on MXN appreciation had signicant short-term e¤ects on the
change of the MXN/USD rate and exchange rate volatilities. One billion
more speculation on MXN appreciation increased the rate of the currency
appreciation by 0.15% while reducing the rate of exchange rate volatility by
6.52%.
5.7 Analysis of the ThirdMexican Intervention Regime
5.7.1 Variable Description and Model Setup of the Third Regime
The third regime is between 16th September 2008 and 29th December 2009,
which covers the period of global nancial crisis after the collapse of Lehman
Brothers. The set Xt with the following variables, i.e. , 4st, (f t+1t  st), (is;t is;t),
(il;t il;t), 4IV t, It, and COT t, are available and illustrated in Figure 5.3.
Similar to the second regime, the changes in the exchange rate forward
premium were relatively stationary except for some spikes. However, the
exchange rate volatility showed larger uctuations, which was a main feature
of the exchange rate dynamics during the nancial crisis. Both the short- and
long-term interest rate di¤erentials showed a downward trend after staying at
high value until early 2009. While the volume of frequent interventions was
decreasing after some large interventions in late 2008, the speculation and
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Figure 5.3: Main Variables in the Second Regime, September 2008 - December 2009
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sentiment on MXN appreciation showed a di¤erent picture with relatively
low volume until early 2009 and relatively high volume in the later in the
year.
The error correction representation of variable vector Xt in the VAR format
with lag number=2 can be presented as follows:
4X t =  4X t 1+10Xt 1+0+Dt+"1;t;
"1;t  N(0;); t = 2008 : 09 : 16  2009 : 12 : 29:
Based on the results of the standard residual errors of the seven variables,
there exist the following impulse dummies, i.e., dum081007p, which captures
the shocks to change in exchange rate, forward premium rate, and exchange
rate volatility on 7th October 2008, dum090317p, which measures shocks to
change in exchange rate on 17th March 2009, dum090901p, which reects a
spike of speculation volume on 1st September 2009, and dum081209t, which
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demonstrates transitory e¤ects on the forward premium rate on 9th December
2008.
The results of following misspecication tests of the above model setup are
presented in Table 5.11. There exists some degree of residual autocorrelation
and non-normality in the multivariate level based on the LM and Normality
tests, which were caused mostly by the excess kurtosis of exchange rate and
intervention variables. As mentioned the previous sections, the cointegrated
VAR model is robust to moderate AR e¤ects and excess kurtosis, which
permits us of testing rank conditions under the current model specication.
Based on the results of trace tests and univariate stationarity tests, the rank
number are chosen to be 4 with probability 0.54.
5.7.2 Testing Hypotheses of Channels and Reaction Function
After setting the rank condition of the model, this section tests the hypotheses
of the e¤ectiveness of the channels and the reaction function of the Banxico
to set the foundations for valid long-run cointegration relations. The main
results of the hypothesis tests are included in Table 5.12.
To check whether the signalling channel was e¤ective in the long-term,
hypothesis tests were conducted with the variables of forward premium rate,
(f t+1t  st), interest rate di¤erentials (is;t is;t) and (il;t il;t), volatility rate 4IV t,
interventions It for the tests. The relations H1:1 to H1:5 can be respectively
expressed as:
(f t+1t  st)  0:10(is;t   is;t)  0:03It + error term = 0; (5.25)
(f t+1t  st) + 0:16(is;t   is;t)  0:074 IVt   1:33It + error term = 0; (5.26)
(f t+1t  st)  0:17(il;t   il;t) + 0:32It + error term = 0; (5.27)
(f t+1t  st)  0:57(il;t   il;t)  0:124 IVt   1:93It + error term = 0; (5.28)
(f t+1t  st)  0:37(is;t   is;t) + 0:78(il;t   il;t)  0:49It + error term = 0: (5.29)
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Table 5.11: Misspecication and Rank Tests, September 2008 - December 2009
Multivariate Test Results
Autocorrelation: LM1: 2(49) = 91:33 with p-value 0
LM2: 2(49) = 56:01 with p-value 0.23
Normality: 2(14) = 34:51 with p-value 0:00
Univariate Test Results
42st 4(f t+1t   st) 4(is;t   is;t) 4(il;t   il;t) 42IVt 4It 4COTt
ARCH(2) 0:19 1:36 0:94 1:90 0:49 2:48 3:27
Normality 7:88 4:53 0:84 0:76 0:51 13:01 5:47
Skewness  0:26 0:21  0:26 0:13 0:17 0:48  0:14
Kurtosis 4:33 3:84 2:81 3:08 2:58 5:15 3:96
Univariate Stationarity Tests
4st (f t+1t   st) (is;t   is;t) (il;t   il;t) 4IVt It COTt
Unit Root 8:54 9:26 0:69 2:02 6:63 5:14 1:42
Process I(0) I(0) I(1) I(1) I(0) I(0) I(1)
Trace Tests
r = 0 r = 1 r = 2 r = 3 r = 4 r = 5 r = 6
p-value 0:00 0:00 0:00 0:07 0:54 0:94 0:96
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Table 5.12: Testing the Stationarity of Single Relations, September 2008 - December 2009
4st (f t+1t   st) (is;t   is;t) (il;t   il;t) 4IVt It COTt Trend p-value
Test of the Signalling Channel
H1:1 1 -0.10 -0.03 0:27
H1:2 1 -0.16 -0.07 -1.33 1
H1:3 1 -0.17 0.32 0.08
H1:4 1 -0.57 -0.12 -1.93 1
H1:5 1 -0.37 0.78 -0.49 1
Test of the Coordination Channel
H2:1 -20.30 1 0:02
H2:2 296.45 1  1:09 0:02
H2:3 -0.51 -13.67 1 0:92
H2:4  0:63  17:64 1 0:02 0:86
Test of Reaction Function
H3:1 2:01 1 0:66 0:16
H3:2  1:89 1  0:37  0:03 0:15
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All the ve potential long-run relations are not rejected with p-values larger
than 0.05. However, di¤erent setup of the tests on the signalling channels
revealed di¤erent pictures. While H1:3 showed the interventions decreased the
forward premium rate which means the e¤ectiveness of the signalling channel,
the other four tests did not support the conclusion as the sign of the related
coe¢ cients was opposite. Hence, a suitable relation will be chosen based on
more information in the following sections.
The test results with respect to the e¤ectiveness of the coordination chan-
nel are shown in the rows from H2:1 to H2:4 with the following relations:
COT t   20:30I t+error term = 0; (5.30)
COT t + 296:45I t   1:09Trend+ error term = 0; (5.31)
COT t   0:514 IV t   13:67I t+ error term = 0; (5.32)
COT t   0:634 IV t   17:64I t + 0:02Trend+ error term = 0: (5.33)
While the rst two potential long-run relations, H2:1 and H2:2, are rejected
with probability 0.02, the hypotheses with the form of H2:3 and H2:4 can
be rejected with probability more than 0.05. The latter potential relations
shows that the speculation on MXN appreciation COT t increase with the
currency intervention to depreciate MXN, which means that the long-run
e¤ectiveness of the coordination channel was not fullled in the second regime.
Nevertheless, there exists a negative relationship between intervention and
exchange rate volatility, which reects that the interventions could smooth
the volatility of MXN/USD rate in the second regime.
To nd the long-run structure of the reaction function of Banxico, we test
with H3:1 and H3:2 whether the central bank react to the appreciation of MXN
or the increasing speculation and sentiment. The potential long-run relations
can be respectively expressed as follows:
It + 2:014 st + 0:66COT t+error term = 0; (5.34)
It   1:894 st   0:37COT t   0:03Trend+ error term = 0: (5.35)
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Table 5.13: Identied Long-Run Structure, September 2008 - December 2009
4st (f t+1t   st) (is;t   is;t) (il;t   il;t) 4IVt It COTt Trend
ecm1;t 1 -0.30 0.58 0.58
ecm2;t -0.37 -10.30 1 -0.004
ecm3;t -0.02 0.04 1 -0.10
ecm4;t 1 0.07 -0.94 -0.06 0.07
While both relations were not rejected with probability larger than 0.05,
the sign of the coe¢ cients were just in the opposite. While H3:1 shows that
the interventions was increasing with appreciating MXN, H3:2 reected that
the central bank was leaning with the wind. We will also explore more
information in the following section to choose which hypothesis to be the
foundation of a long-term reaction function of Banxico.
5.7.3 Identied Long-Run Structure of Channels and Reaction
Function
Similar to the analysis on the previous regimes, weakly exogenous variables
are excluded from short-run dynamic analysis before identifying long-run
cointegration relations of our model. The short-run interest rate di¤erential
is tested to be weakly exogenous with its 2(4) test statistics 8.82 smaller than
the critical value 9.49. A full cointegration structure Hfull:  = (H1'1; H2'2; H3'3; H4'4)
is not rejected with probability 0.09 , and the related long-run cointegrations
listed in Table 5.13.
Similar to the format of the hypothesis test H1:3, the rst identied coin-
tegration relation is about the e¤ectiveness of the signalling channel:
(f t+1t  st)  0:30(is;t is;t) + 0:58(il;t   il;t) + 0:58It + error term = 0: (5.36)
Although the short- and long-term interest rate di¤erentials showed conict-
ing e¤ects on the forward premium rate, the negative relationship of currency
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interventions and the forward premium rate means the signalling channel was
e¤ective in the long-term.
Based on the hypothesis test H2:3, the second long-run cointegration rela-
tion is on whether the interventions worked through the coordination channel:
COT t   0:374 IVt   10:30It+ error term = 0: (5.37)
Although the interventions were negatively correlated with exchange rate
volatility, the coordination channel was not e¤ective in the long run as the
Mexican interventions were positively related the speculation and sentiment
on MXN appreciation.
Based on the hypothesis test H3:2, the third long-run cointegration relation
focuses the reaction function of the central banks interventions:
It   0:024 st + 0:044 IV t   0:10COT t+error term: (5.38)
The Mexican currency interventions were leaning against the windas they
were positively correlated with the depreciating MXN. In the same time, cen-
tral bank intervened to fence o¤ speculative attacks reected by the positive
relationship between the interventions and speculation and sentiment vari-
ables. From the negative relations between change in exchange rate volatility
and interventions, the interventions were not reacting to the high exchange
rate volatilities.
The fourth long-run relation is to analyse the long term relationship be-
tween fundamental variables, e.g., interest rate di¤erentials, and exchange
rate volatility and speculation and sentiment, on the change in the MXN/USD
rate:
4st + 0:07(is;t is;t)  0:94(il;t   il;t)  0:064 IVt + 0:07COTt + error term = 0: (5.39)
While the short- and long-term interest rate di¤erentials have opposite e¤ects
on the changes in exchange rates, the rate of MXN depreciation, 4st, is
negatively and signicantly correlated with the speculation and sentiment
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on the MXN appreciation, similar to the respective relation in the second
regime. One billion speculation on MXN appreciation increased the rate
of MXN appreciation by 0.07 percent. The rate of MXN depreciation was
positively correlated with the rate of exchange rate volatility, which may
reect that MXN was vulnerable when the market risk was high.
The main ndings based on the analysis on the long-run structure of the
model are listed as follows: The Mexican currency interventions during this
period were to react to high speculation and sentiment and change in the
change rate, not to the large exchange rate uctuations. Although the in-
terventions failed to work through the coordination in the long run, they
were e¤ective through the signalling channel and reduced the exchange rate
volatility. Besides intervention e¤ects, the speculation and exchange volatil-
ity also have strong long-run relationship with the change in exchange rate.
The more speculation on MXN depreciation and change in exchange rate
volatility, the more depreciation of MXN in the long run.
5.7.4 Short-Run Dynamics of the Third Regime
With the weakly exogenous short-term interest rate di¤erential variable and
identied long-run structure, this section analyse the short-run dynamics
and summarise the relevant results in Table 5.14. The short-term dynamics
structure were accepted with probability 0.93.
The sixth column of Table 5.14 is about the short-run reaction function
of Banxico. The interventions to depreciate MXN were reactions to sharp
MXN appreciation and high exchange rate volatility. A 1% appreciation
of MXN in terms of increase of change in exchange rate 42st 1 and excess
change in exchange rate ecm4;t 1 increased interventions to depreciate MXN
by 0.16 billion. In the mean time, a 1% increase of the change in exchange
rate volatility 42IV t 1 caused Banxico to intervene 0.004 billion MXN in the
following week.
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Table 5.14: Short-Run Dynamics, September 2008 - December 2009
42st 4(f t+1t   st) 4(il;t   il;t) 42IVt 4It 4COTt
42st 1 -0.01
4(f tt 1   st 1) -0.45
4(is;t   is;t) 0.86 0.59
4(is;t 1   is;t 1) 0.33
4(il;t 1   il;t 1) 0.86 4.33 -0.18 0.50
42IVt 1 -0.04 -0.01 -0.004 0.004
4It 1 -4.61 0.76 -0.54 -8.61
4COTt 1 -0.84 0.09 0.30
ecm1;t 1 -1.06 -0.10 -6.07 0.12
ecm2;t 1 6.18 1.45
ecm3;t 1 5.15 -2.67 5.53
ecm4;t 1 -0.49 3.86 -0.15
Constant 1.35 -1.10 0.17 5.34 -1.14 1.60
dum081007p 1.71 -1.51 0.58 2.34 0.56
dum090317p -7.88 -0.37 2.89 -0.41
dum090901p 4.33 -0.83 1.34 -1.55
dum081209t -1.85 -0.46 0.24
Notes: Only signicant coe¢ cients with p < 0:05 are shown.
The ecm variables are based on (5.36) - (5.39) respectively.
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From the eighth and twelfth rows with respect to interventions 4I t 1 and
excess interventions ecm3;t 1, the combined e¤ects of interventions had signif-
icant short-term e¤ects on the dynamics of the MXN/USD rate. One billion
change in intervention to depreciate MXN increased the rate of MXN depre-
ciation by 0.51% and reduced the change in exchange rate volatility by 2.43%
in the following week. The e¤ectiveness of the interventions were through the
signalling channel with the combined negative e¤ects of interventions on the
forward premium rate, i.e., one billion change in interventions decreased the
forward premium rate by 1.91% in the following week. However, the inter-
ventions were not e¤ective through the coordination channel as one billion
change in interventions to depreciate MXN increased speculation on MXN
by 5.53 billion.
The ninth and eleventh rows reects the short-term e¤ects of change in
speculation and sentiment 4COT t 1 and excess speculation and sentiment
ecm2;t 1. While one billion increase of speculation on MXN appreciation
4COT t 1 increased the rate of MXN appreciation by 0.84% in the following
week, one billion excess speculation ecm2;t 1 increased the change in exchange
rate volatility 42IV t by 6.18%. Noticeably, the speculation and sentiment
shown some clustering behaviour as the one billion increase in speculation
and one billion excess speculation have combined short-term e¤ects of 1.75
billion more speculation in the following week.
The main ndings with respect to the short-run dynamics of our model can
be summarised as follows: Firstly, the Mexican interventions were in response
to sharp MXN appreciation and high exchange rate volatility. Secondly, the
interventions were e¤ective only through the signalling channel. One billion
intervention increased the rate of MXN depreciation by 0.51% and reduced
the change in exchange rate volatility by 2.43% in the following week. Thirdly,
the coordination channel failed to work during the last nancial crisis as
one billion intervention increased speculation by 5.53 billion. Fourthly, the
clustering speculation and sentiment on MXN have strong short-term e¤ects
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Table 5.15: The Estimates of the Long-Run Impacts, September 2008 - December 2009P
"4st
P
"(f t+1t  st)
P
"(is;t is;t)
P
"(il;t il;t)
P
"(4IVt)
P
"It
P
"COTt
4st -0.04 0.14 0.21 -0.05
(f t+1t   st) 0.03 -0.18 0.05
(is;t   is;t) 1.44
(il;t   il;t) 0.44 0.72 -0.01 0.02
4IVt -7.82 0.05
It 0.28 0.10
COTt 1.09 1.14
Notes: Only signicant coe¢ cients with t-values> 1:96 are shown.
on the exchange rate dynamics. One billion speculation on MXN appreciation
increased the rate of MXN appreciation and the change in exchange rate
volatility by 0.84% and 6.18% respectively in the following week.
5.7.5 The Long-Run Impact of Shocks
After analyzing the long-run cointegration relations and the short-run ef-
fects, this section examines the long-run impact of a permanent shock to the
variables. The results are reported in Table 5.15.
Based on the column-wise inspection, the shocks to the speculation and
sentiment and bond yield di¤erential, i.e.,
P
"COTt and
P
"(il;t il;t), were the
drivers of the whole system as they have long-run signicant impact on most
the variables in our model. The interventions were also reactions to the large
shocks to the bond yield di¤erential, and speculation and sentiment. Shocks
of one billion speculation on MXN appreciation increased the Banxicos in-
tervention by 0.1 billion.
A shock to the interventions
P
"It had no long-run impact on the exchange
rate dynamics. The reason might be the failure of the coordination channel as
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a shock to interventions on MXN depreciation had signicant positive impact
on the speculation and sentiment on MXN appreciation, i.e., a permanent
shock to one billion intervention caused 1.09 billion more speculation.
The impact of shocks on the change in exchange rate, 4st, and the forward
premium rate, (f t+1t  st), showed di¤erent sign which supports the existence of
the forward rate bias. The speculation and sentiment shocks had signicant
impact on the change of the exchange rate. Shocks of one billion speculation
on MXN appreciation caused the MXN appreciation by 0.05 percent.
It also noticeable that the shock to the speculation and sentiment on MXN
appreciation had a signicant positive impact on itself, which reects the
herding behaviour of the speculators speculating on MXN appreciation.
Therefore, the main results of the long-term shocks to the variables can
be summarised as follows: The speculation and sentiment on MXN appre-
ciation and bond yield di¤erential were the main driving forces in the third
regime where the last nancial crisis was at the peak. The speculation and
sentiment happened in clusters and signicantly a¤ected the change in the
MXN/USD rate, which stimulate Banxico to react with interventions. How-
ever, the intervention shocks failed to inuence the exchange rate dynamics
e¢ ciently because they only increased the speculation and sentiment on MXN
appreciation, i.e., the coordination channel failed to work.
5.7.6 Summary of Results in the third Regime
The third Mexican intervention regime was featured with large and frequent
interventions and relative high exchange rate volatility. The main ndings of
the related empirical analysis can be summarised as follows:
Firstly, after the collapse of Lehman Brothers, while Banxico intervened
in the foreign exchange market mainly to react to the high speculation and
sentiment, in the short-term it also reacted to the high exchange rate volatil-
ity.
Secondly, the interventions were e¤ective through the signalling channel
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and reduced the exchange rate volatility. One billion intervention increased
the rate of MXN depreciation by 0.51% and reduced the change in exchange
rate volatility by 2.43% in the following week.
Thirdly, the interventions failed to work through the coordination channel
as one billion intervention increased speculation by 5.53 billion in the short-
run and 1.09 billion in the long-term.
Fourthly, the clustering speculation and sentiment on MXN have strong
and signicant e¤ects on the change in exchange rate and worked as a main
driver of the whole system. The speculators shown some herding behaviour.
While one billion speculation on MXN appreciation increased the rate of
MXN appreciation by 0.84% in the following week and a shock of one billion
speculation had long-term impact of 0.05% MXN appreciation.
5.8 Summary
Following from the previous chapter, an unique analysis of currency inter-
vention, speculation and sentiment for an emerging economy currency with a
identied cointegrated VAR model in a microstructure framework. Separate
intervention channels are jointly tested in an identied structural framework
with various factors for an emerging country currency pair. The empirical
analysis provides detailed results with respect to di¤erent regimes of Mexican
interventions between 1998 and 2009, which also covers the nancial crisis af-
ter the collapse of Lehman Brothers. Additionally an innovative microstruc-
ture framework formed in the previous chapter is tested to help explain the
di¤erences of exchange rate dynamics and e¤ects of intervention, speculation
and sentiment across developed and emerging country currencies.
The three Mexican intervention regimes are respectively featured with
small and infrequent interventions, small but frequent interventions and rel-
ative low exchange rate volatility, and large and frequent interventions and
relative high exchange rate volatility.
181
With respect to the reaction function of the Banxico, in all regimes the
interventions to depreciate MXN were reactions to the high speculation and
sentiment on MXN appreciation, and vice versa. Banxico intervened in the
foreign exchange market to react to the increase of exchange rate volatility
from 2003 when the volatility data was available.
Similar to the ndings of the last chapter on Japanese interventions, the
signalling channel were e¤ective when the interventions were frequent in the
second and third regimes. In the second regime, through both the coordi-
nation and signalling channels, one billion of intervention increased the rate
of MXN depreciation by 7.85% in the short term and deceased the rate of
MXN appreciation by 0.85% in the long-term. In the third regime between
2008 and 2008, through the coordination channel, one billion intervention
increased the rate of MXN depreciation by 0.51% and reduced the change in
exchange rate volatility by 2.43% in the following week.
Contrary to the ndings of the last chapter that the coordination chan-
nel tended to be e¤ective when the Japanese interventions were large but
infrequent between 1999 and 2000, the channel only worked between 2003
and 2008 when Mexican interventions were small but frequent. In the third
regime when the last nancial crisis was at its peak, instead of reducing the
speculation and sentiment, one billion intervention increased speculation by
5.53 billion in the short-run and 1.09 billion in the long-run. Noticeably,
the coordination channel were e¤ective when the change in volatility of the
JPY/USD rate between 1999 and 2000, and MXN/USD rate between 2003
and 2008 were quite small, and not e¤ective amid the sharp increase of volatil-
ity of the JPY/USD rate between 2003 and 2004 and the MXN/USD rate
after the collapse of Lehman Brothers. The results indicate that it is not the
pattern of interventions but the market condition that matters the e¤ective-
ness of the coordination channel: The speculators tend to coordinate with
the central banks when markets are less volatile and with less risk, and vice
verse.
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The small and infrequent currency interventions between 1998 and 1999
were not e¤ective through the coordination and signalling channels and their
short-term signicant e¤ects on the change in the MXN/USD rate were de-
pendent on accommodative monetary policies.
In stead of bond yield di¤erentials, it was the clustering speculation and
sentiment on MXN appreciation drove most variables and had signicant ef-
fects on the change in exchange rate in all regimes. In the rst and third
regimes, one billion long position on MXN respectively increased the appre-
ciation rate of MXN by 7.26% and 0.84% in the short-run and 0.65% and
0.05% in the long run. In the second regime, one billion speculation on MXN
appreciation increased the rate of the currency appreciation by 0.15% while
reducing the rate of exchange rate volatility by 6.52%.
Together with the analysis on the JPY/USD market in the previous chap-
ters, this chapter provides a relatively complete picture of the exchange rate
dynamics under currency intervention, speculation and sentiment across the
developed and emerging countries. Our research provides a new way to not
only analyse the currency intervention, speculation and sentiment, but also
examine the transmission channels and reaction functions of monetary poli-
cies of central banks, which o¤ers a potential direction for further related
empirical and theoretical research.
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Chapter 6
Conclusion
This chapter summarise the main empirical ndings of this thesis, provide
several policy implications for central banks across the developed and devel-
oping countries, and o¤ers potential directions for future research on currency
intervention, sentiment and speculation in the foreign exchange market.
6.1 Summary of Key Results
After an introductory chapter providing the research background, Chapter 2
reviews the theoretical and empirical literature in the led of currency inter-
vention, speculation and sentiment. Previously, with greater availability of
data sets and advances of econometric modelling technique, there has been
important progressto shed more light on the dynamics of exchange rates
across developed and developing countries but three important issues re-
mained to be solved:
(1) There is an absence of structural analyses of the links between cur-
rency intervention, exchange-rate dynamics and market conditions measured
by currency speculation and sentiment. While most studies on currency inter-
ventions rely on traditional estimation methods, e.g., low- and high-frequency
time series and event studies, only several studies, e.g. Kearns and Rigobon
(2005), Kim (2003) and Neely (2005b,c), use structural models to identify
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interactions between currency interventions, monetary policy and exchange
rate dynamics. However, there is no research with identied models consider-
ing the market conditions inuenced by currency speculation and sentiment,
largely due to the limitation of data availability.
(2)There is a lack of clear theoretical foundation and consideration of mar-
ket microstructure to analyse the e¤ects of currency intervention, speculation
and sentiment on the exchange rate dynamics. As it is very di¢ cult to dene
the proper model of exchange rate determination, few empirical studies of
currency intervention are based on clear structural relations or theoretical
models. Although currency intervention has been intertwined with currency
speculation and sentiment, few studies have been conducted to analyse the
microstructure of foreign exchange markets considering the activities of the
speculators and central bank in the same framework. The main problems
are the di¢ culty of nding available currency speculation data or properly
dened proxy of currency speculation and sentiment.
(3)While there are numerous papers on the currency intervention, spec-
ulation and sentiment on developed country currencies, the related research
on developing and emerging country currencies is still sparse. Given that
currency interventions happen more often in developing countries than de-
veloped ones and speculation on the emerging country currency is very large,
research on developing and emerging country currencies is highly needed.
Furthermore, there might be di¤erent features with respect to exchange-rate
dynamics across developed and developing countries. However, we need to
overcome the data availability problem to conduct data analysis and result
comparison.
The three core chapters examines these questions. Chapter 3 analyses the
e¤ects of currency intervention, speculation and sentiment on the JPY/USD
rate between 1991 and 2008 with a identied cointegrated VAR model. This
chapter structurally examines e¤ects of interventions through the portfolio
balance channel in the context of the international parity conditions and also
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addresses the e¤ectiveness of the coordination channel with a COT senti-
ment index measuring speculation and sentiment on JPY. Not surprisingly,
the small and infrequent US interventions were not e¤ective through either
channel. Contrary to the previous ndings (Frankel, 1982; Obstfeld, 1983;
Rogo¤,1984; Lewis, 1988; Dominguez and Frankel, 1993) that there are no
long-term e¤ects through the portfolio balance channel, i.e., one billion USD
Japanese currency intervention is correlated with long-term monthly change
in the exchange rate by around 2.5% through the channel. The Japanese cur-
rency interventions have both short- and long-term e¤ects on the JPY/USD
rate through the coordination channel. One billion USD Japanese currency
intervention, coordinated with the increase of JPY speculation, is correlated
with around 0.8% long-term JPY appreciation.
Chapter 4 continues the research on the JPY/USD rate in a new theo-
retical and empirical framework by separating the whole periods into three
regimes with active interventions as there are many periods without any inter-
vention between 1991 and 2008. After building an innovative microstructure
framework we structurally identify and analyse the relation between currency
intervention, speculation and sentiment and exchange-rate dynamics. In all
regimes, it was the shock to the bond yield spread di¤erential that drove the
whole system of the JPY/USD market. The Japanese monetary authorities
intervened in the currency market to react to sharp JPY appreciation in all
regimes between 1991 and 2004. We nd the similar results as Ito (2005)
that the Japanese monetary authorities also reacted to the high exchange
rate volatility and large speculation on JPY appreciation between 2003 and
2004. With respect to the transmission channels of interventions, the sig-
nalling channel, with existence of the forward rate bias, was e¤ective when
the interventions were frequent in the rst and third regimes, and the coor-
dination channel were e¤ective in the second regime when the exchange rate
volatility was low. Similar to Ito (2005), Giradin and Lyons (2007) and Marsh
(2011), the speculators in the foreign exchange market were not coordinating
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with the Japanese interventions.
There has been few research on the currency intervention, speculation and
sentiment in developing countries. With availability of Mexican data, Chap-
ter 5 analyses the MXN/USD market to shed more lights on di¤erent features
of the exchange rate dynamics across developed and developing countries. It
was the speculation and sentiment on the MXN appreciation, not bond yield
di¤erential, that drove the whole exchange rate system. Furthermore, the
Mexican monetary authorities reacted to the high speculation and sentiment
on MXN appreciation and the increasing exchange rate volatility, not to the
change in the exchange rate. However, we do nd similar results across the
developed and developing country currency pairs. In both JPY/USD and
MXN/USD markets the e¤ectiveness of transmission channels were depen-
dent on the frequency of interventions and market conditions. To be specic,
while the signalling channel is e¤ective with frequent interventions and the
coordination channel is e¤ective amid low exchange rate volatility, they are
not e¤ective channels for the small and infrequent interventions.
Based on adequate data, Chapters 2-5 provide a literature review, clear
theoretical frameworks and detailed structural analyses of the factors a¤ect-
ing the exchange rate dynamics across developed and developing countries.
Our studies also have clear policy implications for monetary authorities in
both developed and developing countries, which are discussed in the next
section.
6.2 Policy Implications for Central Banks
There are several policy implications draw on the ndings of this thesis. This
section discusses the potential implications for central banks across developed
and developing countries respectively.
Based on the studies on Japanese currency intervention, speculation and
sentiment, the main purpose of Japanese currency interventions was to con-
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trol the change in JPY/USD rate, although sometimes the interventions
were reactions to sharp change in exchange rate volatility and high spec-
ulation and sentiment on JPY appreciation. Therefore, Japanese monetary
authorities were implementing intervention policies without a target value of
JPY/USD rate. Between 1991 and 2008, while cumulative Japanese inter-
ventions worked through the portfolio balance channel in the long-term, the
frequent interventions worked through the signalling channel, and coordina-
tion channel was e¤ective when the exchange rate volatility were low. Small
and infrequent interventions were not e¤ective.
The ndings on the Mexican foreign exchange market conrm that the
conditions on which the signalling and coordination channels are e¤ective are
the same as in the Japanese case. However, the Mexican monetary authorities
stepped in the foreign exchange market when the speculation and sentiment
on MXN appreciation were high and exchange rate volatility was increasing
fast. Further more, the speculation and sentiment on the MXN appreciation
have driven the whole MXN/USD exchange rate system since the Peso begun
to oat in mid-1990s.
Therefore, the main proposals for central banks across developed and de-
veloping countries to conduct successful interventions are as follows:
(1) The monetary authorities should rely on large and frequent interven-
tions to change the long-term level of the exchange rate through the portfolio
balance channel.
(2) If the central banks plan to send a clear signal to the other agents in the
foreign exchange market on future monetary policy or value of the exchange
rate, they should act more frequently and constantly during the intervention
period.
(3) In terms of the e¤ectiveness of interventions through the coordination
channel, the central banks should consider the change in expected exchange
rate volatility. To be specic, they should intervene when they and other
market agents expect there will be no huge change in the exchange rate
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volatility.
(4) Specic market conditions including activities and phycology of the
currency speculators should be taken into consideration before policy impli-
cation. In the Japanese case, the monetary authorities should make sure the
dynamics of the bond market does not hurdle the e¤orts of central bank in-
terventions as the bond yield di¤erential is the main driver of the JPY/USD
market. With respect to Mexican interventions, the Banxico should adjust
the course of the speculation and sentiment on the MXN and make the spec-
ulators coordinate with interventions.
6.3 Proposal for Future Research
This thesis suggests further research on currency intervention, speculation
and sentiment.The relationship between actual and oral interventions should
be examined further, as while the actual interventions in major developed
countries are less frequent now than in the past, the major central banks
tend to inuence the foreign exchange rate via oral interventions. Fratzscher
(2006) propose that the oral interventions are substitutes for actual inter-
ventions as oral interventions of the major central banks tend to move the
exchange rate in the desired directions by a¤ecting exchange rates over a 6
month horizon and also lowering exchange rate volatility. In contrast to the
substitution hypothesis, Beine et al. (2009) state that, while oral interven-
tions provide a powerful instrument for central bank, they are complements of
the actual interventions. Their proposal is supported by the ndings that the
oral interventions in terms of statements reduced the probability of counter-
productive interventions in terms of exchange rate level and volatility. Given
the limited research progress, more research is needed to test the interaction
hypotheses between oral and actual interventions to provide better theoretical
explanation and policy implication.
More research could be developed to contrast developed and developing
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countries. In some developing and emerging countries, e.g., Czech Repub-
lic, Mexico, Turkey, et al., currency interventions are quite active. However,
as Menkho¤ (2013) nds, the literature devoted to developing and emerg-
ing countries is sparse. Furthermore, there has been little investigation to
compare the transmission channels of interventions between the developed
and developing countries and there are conicting views on the e¤ectiveness
of the transmission channels, this thesis shows that the Mexican currency
interventions are e¤ective through the signalling and coordination channels.
Another area for future research would be to examine interventions in
the option foreign exchange markets. Previously, most research on currency
interventions examines interventions in the spot market, while the options
market has not been analysed as closely. There is a gap in the literature
about the advantages and disadvantages of the interventions through options
across developed and developing countries.
Extra attention could be paid to interactions between currency interven-
tions and monetary policies. Sterilised interventions o¤er an unique instru-
ment other than monetary polices. Kaminsky and Lewis (1996) raise the
question of whether currency interventions signal future monetary policy and
Watanabe and Yabu (2013) examine the relationship between the currency
intervention and the quantitative easing policy of the Bank of Japan between
January 2003 and March 2004. However, there is no research on the in-
terventions in interaction with unconventional monetary policies during the
last nancial crisis. More research is needed to nd their relationship and
distinctive e¤ects on the exchange rate especially during the nancial crisis
periods.
The fth potential research area is the protability of central banks and
speculators during the intervention periods. Ito (2005) note that the Japanese
interventions between 1991 and 2002 generate prots for the monetary au-
thorities. While LeBaron (1999) nd that currency speculators make money
from the market ine¢ ciencies generated from currency interventions, Neely
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(2002) argues that currency interventions happen after speculators activate
their positions and tend to reduce the protability of speculations. In gen-
eral, the protability of interventions and speculations is subject to further
research.
Lastly, there could be more research into the the interactions between in-
terventions and the sentiment of foreign exchange market participants and
the e¤ects of market sentiment on the dynamics of exchange rates. Corrado
et al. (2007) adopt the behavioural model of investor sentiment from Barberis
et al. (1998), and demonstrate that currency interventions can coordinate in-
vestor beliefs with those of policy-makers and reduce the excess exchange rate
volatility. The results of this thesis provides some analysis of interventions
in interaction with speculation and sentiment and the e¤ects of speculative
sentiment on the exchange rate movements, more research is needed in this
direction theoretical developments in behavioural nance.
In general this thesis contributes to the research related to the intervention,
speculation and sentiment in the foreign exchange market in itself, provides
feasible policy implication suggestions, and o¤ers plenty of topics need to be
addressed by future research.
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